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# NOTES FROM THE ACADEMY, TRANSCRIPT OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY CONFERENCE ON THE NEGRO AMERICAN (MAY 14-15, 1965).

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TO CLARIFY AND FIND STRATEGIES TO ERADICATE THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICA, THE PARTICIPANTS AT THIS CONFERENCE DISCUSSED THE SPECIFIC PAPERS PRESENTED AND THE IDEAS THAT THEY GENERATED. AMONG THE MAIN PROBLEMS DISCUSSED WERE WHETHER NEGRO COLOR WAS A UNIQUE STIGMA REQUIRING LEGISLATION AND ANTIPOVERTY MEASURES, THE EXISTENCE OF A NEGRO CULTURE, THE GOALS OF INTEGRATION, HOUSING, FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITIES, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, NEGRO AND WHITE ATTITUDES, AND NEGRO AND WHITE CHURCHES. THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR COMPENSATORY AND QUALITY EDUCATION TO PREVENT THE PERPETUATION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGRO AMERICAN. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE WIDENING GAP IN NEGRO AND WHITE ECONOMIC GAINS, THE RELATIONSHIP OF FAMILY DISORGANIZATION TO EMPLOYMENT, AND THE QUESTION OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF NEGROES WERE ALSO DISCUSSED. IN ADDITION, THE PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS ON NEGRO-OWNED BUSINESSES, NEGRO POLITICS AND RELIGION, AND THE EFFECTS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT ON LEGISLATION AND ON SKILLED AND LOW SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS NEGROES. (JL)

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# *NOTES FROM THE ACADEMY*

## Transcript of the American Academy Conference on the Negro American—May 14-15, 1965

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION

### SESSION I

**GRAUBARD:** Let me say, on behalf of the Academy, how enormously pleased we are to have you with us on this occasion. We regard this as the most important conference we have held in this house in five years. Five years ago, we convened to discuss the problem of arms control. Out of that conference, three months later, came an issue of *Dædalus* about 400 pages long that sold at that time the greatest number of copies we had ever dared print, 20,000, and that eventually became, as a book, a special selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club, which had the particular advantage of making it available to some 50,000 additional people.

Our hope is that we can do something of the same sort this time. As many of you know, *Dædalus* is now a much more widely circulated journal. We now print some 40,000 copies, and our expectation is that in this instance we will produce many more copies than that. It is also our intention that this should be a book in the *Dædalus* Library, which Houghton Mifflin Company is publishing, and that the book should appear early in 1966.

It occurs to me that we might properly begin with three of the papers which are among the most provocative we have, those of Mr. Fein, Mr. Hauser, and Mr. Moynihan. Each in its own way suggests that whatever the gains made by the Negro in the last decade in respect to civil rights, justice, and political rights, the *economic* gains for most Negroes have been, at best, negligible. Mr. Fein argues that in vital matters the gap between the Negro and white citizen has been widening rather than narrowing, that the Negro is today further behind than he once was. This is a theme which, in one way or another, both Mr. Moynihan and Mr. Hauser also agree on and develop.

These papers pay particular heed to the grave problems created by high unemployment and unstable family structure. The poverty of the Negro family, Mr. Hauser says, must rank as the single most important factor preventing the Negro from achieving his potential so that he is able to assume the rights and obligations proper to a first-class American citizen. This point is reiterated eloquently by Mr. Moynihan, who argues that the problem is particularly serious because the gap between Negro income and white income is not closing, but widening. The gains that the Negro

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communities were able to make in World War II and perhaps up through the Korean War have not continued. In fact, they have ceased.

The point made by Mr. Moynihan (and supported by Mr. Turner) is that it is imperative that we give immediate attention to the problems of Negro youth and of the Negro male worker. While we have been satisfied, for various reasons, with certain of the changes that have occurred within the last decade, we must admit that in many critical areas the changes are not such as to encourage us. Time, as Mr. Moynihan puts it, is our enemy and not our friend.

I would like to begin our discussion with the facts brought out in these papers, not simply in order that the facts may be discussed, but so that we may reflect upon their implications. What are the kinds of things that we ought to be concerned with first in devising a strategy for coping with the range of problems suggested? What do we as a group think are the most critical matters that ought to command our attention now? And, finally, how can the things to which we are going to give attention be accomplished?

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Does not Mr. Tobin's paper. . .?

**GRAUBARD:** Mr. Tobin's paper is also relevant.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Are we not therefore considering the four papers?

**GRAUBARD:** We could. Mr. Tobin is not here this morning, but will be here later in the day. He is saying three things which are absolutely essential. First, that unemployment is the key problem. Second, that the federal government is capable of doing a great deal more about unemployment than is presently being done, if only it will admit that the fear of inflation ought not so to dominate its thinking. Third, that we ought to reconsider our welfare programs. These welfare policies, so largely constructed, I suspect, out of the ideas and experience of the 1930's, are simply not, in the context of the 1960's, producing the social order that we want to see. I agree that Mr. Tobin's paper should also figure in our discussions this morning.

**HUGHES:** May I ask all these gentlemen a question? Are they or are they not saying that any reduction in the number and proportion of the very poor among the Negro will be accomplished not by addressing ourselves so much to the Negro but by addressing ourselves to the whole state of the economy in our society, to the nature of poverty in general?

**MOYNIHAN:** I will answer the question by saying that in order to do anything about Negro Americans on the scale that our data would indicate, we have to declare that we are doing it for *everybody*. I think, however, that the problem of the Negro American *is* now a special one, and is not just an intense case of the problem of all poor people.

**REDDING:** Why do we have to announce that we are doing this for everyone?

**MOYNIHAN:** Congressmen vote for everyone more readily than they vote for any one. Because the poverty program is a color-blind program, we can do what we could not have done otherwise. We could not have done it for West Virginia or for Harlem—either one of those opposite extremes—but we can do it in generalized terms—for people.

**REDDING:** Do you think, then, that the idea of compensatory or preferential treatment for the Negro specifically is a bad idea?

**MOYNIHAN:** I do not know about "good" or "bad." I would say that in terms of the working of the system we are trying to influence by our thinking here, it will be done for "everybody," whatever may be in the back of the minds of the people who do it.

**HAUSER:** May I introduce a word here? I think it probably ought to be said "for everybody" for no other reason than to include the Appalachian white, the hillbilly, on whom we do not have adequate data, but who, apart from some differences in historical background, is probably not too different in many respects from the Negro and who probably needs compensatory education as much as the Negro. The Appalachian white in some respects is worse off than the Negro, because he has not even discovered he has a problem yet.

**BERRY:** He is not organized.

**WILSON:** What struck me in the papers of Mr. Fein, Mr. Moynihan, and the others was not simply that the gap is widening, but that one of the crucial aspects of the gap is the very great importance we must attach to the nature of the family, and the relationship between family structure and employment. This I take to be the reason that Mr. Moynihan suggests pessimistically—and I think with good reason—that poverty may be feeding on itself; in some sense it may be a cultural, as well as economic, phenomenon and a cultural phenomenon that can be inherited to a very depressing degree.

Is there any evidence that this problem is the same as the white hillbilly or Appalachian problem? Or is the cultural aspect of poverty among the white poor different from that among the Negro? I do not know and would very much like to be enlightened.

**HAUSER:** May I speak to that very briefly? The evidence on the white Appalachian is not too good because it is obscured in the census. It is beginning to be discernible but we do not have very much in the way of a time series. However, I would like to introduce as evidence the Oscar Lewis thesis that cultural poverty is essentially the same everywhere. I think there is considerable evidence that poverty in India, in Brazil, in the Appalachian Mountains, and in the Mississippi Delta has many attributes and essentials that are the same from a cultural standpoint.

**BERRY:** There are a couple of different items involved here, though. It seems to me that there is a dual problem with the black poor in the cities (I just happened to know more about the black poor in the cities than in the country, having been one of them for a long time), one because he is black and the other because he is poor. There are certain features of poverty that are quite the same no matter what color you are, and this is bad enough; but when you add the racial situation to this, it is almost intolerable.

It seems to me that what Mr. Moynihan has said about sugar-coating the problem of race in order to get something done is quite an important thing at this point in history. However, I think that we are not going to get anything real and substantial done until we recognize and are willing to approach the problem of race without sugar-coating it, because the basic attitude with which we approach a problem is going to determine pretty much the outcome. Until we have the attitude that we have one hell of a problem, which we have caused and which has to be solved on the basis of the recognition of that problem, we are not going to get the job done.

Mr. Hauser touched in his paper on the distorted image of the Negro. The basic problem, underlying all others, is the basic attitude of white Americans toward black Americans. The big job is figuring out how to correct the image. This is the biggest thing that we can do. How do we correct the distorted image that white Americans have of Negro Americans and that has become a part of the decision-making process of every power structure in our society?

**COLES:** Without denying the fact that there is a culture of poverty, I am not so sure that we cannot have all kinds of subdivisions within the structure. I have just spent a couple of years with migrant farmers and sharecroppers, and I found a great deal of difference in the way white sharecroppers and white migrants live and the way Negroes do. I am not at all sure that the Negro migrant has not had an easier time of it than the white, because of the Negro's historical and cultural tradition, because of the ways that he has learned to live and develop, and because of strengths within the Negro family that many white Appalachian families do not have. I think we should try to trace, both historically and culturally, the different roots of the end result of poverty and not try to lump this all together.

I also wonder whether we could get through the Congress a kind of Black Belt Program similar to the Appalachian Program.

**HAUSER:** I agree that we have subcultures of poverty.

**BREEDEN:** Would it also be fair to say that there are subcultures in terms of *regarding* poverty? I think that the white American decision-making process *vis-à-vis* the Negro American may also reflect another kind of inquiry, the decision-making process *vis-à-vis* the poor. There may be stereotypes and standards in terms of the larger culture that confound dealing directly with the problem of poor people.

**HUGHES:** I would like to ask my question again. Mr. Moynihan answered it by saying that on the political front you have to offer a plan that appeals to everybody in order to achieve a program. I think, however, that the other side is still there. It comes out clearly in all these papers.

Although Mr. Moynihan shows the difference between the Negro labor force and the white labor force of the 1940's and the 1950's, he shows a comparison between the urban Negro labor force now and the Italian labor force of the 1900's. *That* was a different economy. There is certainly no demand now for unskilled illiterate labor; and the Negroes happen to be unskilled, illiterate, and urban, when that part of the labor force no longer exists. I think that is what Mr. Moynihan is saying in part. And he is saying that the Negro family and social structure is not as well developed, not as well equipped to overcome this handicap by itself. In the 1900's there *was* demand for unskilled labor. Furthermore, the Italians had very strong paternal families. The whole situation was different. Are you not saying, Mr. Moynihan, in part at least, that whatever we do has to be directed toward the present state and the projection of the economy?

**MOYNIHAN:** I would like to say that if we can decide, at this meeting or any meeting like it, what should be done, there are plenty of people whose business it is to figure out how to do it. That sort of strategy will take care of itself. I think our problem is to decide what is the situation and what should be done about it. We can leave it to others to decide how it should be done.

**BERRY:** Speaking of the family and the importance of the family in our way of life, I would say categorically that there is no way to strengthen family life among Negroes in the American community until we find a way to give the father his rightful role as breadwinner and protector of his family. There is no other way to do it. We have, in our society, denied the Negro male an opportunity to earn his living properly, to be the head of his family; and then we have engaged in a process of what I refer to as cultural castration by society's unwillingness to let that man protect his family. We have a very strong matriarchal situation in the Negro community.

Furthermore, when you go down the main drags in any big city during working hours, anybody—and especially the kids of the community—will be struck by the fact of the large number of Negro males who stand on the street. One has to come to the conclusion that Negro males do not work—which comes right back to the whole basic problem of the incentive of Negro youth. We have them corralled. We build fences around the kids, so they cannot get out of their compounds, the big ghettos. And again, one of the attributes of cultural poverty is that the kids never get far from home. They do not have any money or any way to ride.

**FLEMING:** I think we ought to linger a moment on the issue that has been raised about blanketing the problem of Negro poverty under general poverty. One of the questions is: Do these differences call for a difference in legislative approach? I think Mr. Moynihan was saying that any legislative approach is likely to be an over-all approach that does not specifically distinguish color. The second question is: Should these differences be allowed for in the implementation of a general program? This happens to be my own view. I think the legislative provision can be general, but I think in implementing it the people who are running the program have to be very aware of these differences.

The third question, which I do not think is really dealt with in the papers I read, and which would logically follow the other two questions, is: What can be said thus far, in terms of these differences, about the concept and approach of legislation to combat poverty? To what extent is this approach realistically designed to get at the problems of Negro poverty? And to what extent, as far as we can tell as yet, is it being implemented in a way to allow meaningfully for these differences? I think some analysis of this, even though it is early in the game for the antipoverty program, would add importantly to the implications of these papers.

**FEIN:** I would offer the comment that, obviously, among the things necessary are much more than federal programs. Continuing with that observation, I would point out that private programs at one time or another have played favorites. Harvard looked for the football player, or it looked for the young man who did not quite have the grades but came from Arizona, so it could get its geographic mix. If it needed a clarinet player, it discriminated in favor of him. It might well consider—as indeed Harvard undoubtedly has, but other schools have not—discriminating in favor of the Negro.

I would estimate that perhaps one-third to one-half of the poverty of the Negro today is a function of discrimination *today*, that is, not the historical discrimination in education, but the fact that Negroes *with* education are placed in occupations lower than whites with the same education and receive wages lower than whites in those occupations with the same education.

A good deal of the discrimination is not the kind that takes massive compensatory programs, but the kind that takes rather massive change in behavior—change that can come at virtually no cost, except the painful psychological cost to the white community, no economic cost as it were. In business, the president of the firm has usually made sure that his nephew got a job, even if his nephew was not quite up to snuff. All that I would suggest is that he might today make sure that his brother gets a job.

**COHEN:** I do not think the papers have faced squarely the issue of compensatory treatment, and I do not think we should let this issue evade us. There must be a posture here which we either support or do not support. I do not think we should deal with it peripherally as we do in the papers. I think the case has already been made for compensatory treatment within the framework of a larger program designed to eliminate poverty.

Another question I would like to raise is whether or not, within our present social and economic framework, we can eliminate poverty. I think we can. Mr. Tobin suggests some ways, particularly a tight labor market. I would suggest that a tight labor market is not enough, but rather the techniques must be developed that will provide in one way or another jobs for everyone who is capable of working. Some democratic societies in the world are already well on their way toward this.

I would suggest that as a first matter for discussion we consider compensatory treatment and our attitude toward it.

**HAUSER:** There are one or two points I want to make that I think are relevant to our present discussion and may perhaps help point up the discussion. I hope that before the morning is over those of us whose papers are under consideration will have the benefit of specific criticisms that suggest modification. For example, I would like to make a suggestion to Mr. Moynihan right now, because it is relevant to the discussion under way.

In his paper, Mr. Moynihan says: "Anyone with eyes to see can observe the emergence of a Negro middle class that is on the whole doing very well. The point about this group is that it has, if anything, rather a preferred position on the job market." In a very limited sense, in the specific type of example that Mr. Moynihan gives, this may be true. However, from the standpoint of implications for action, as we try to distinguish, let us say, the Negro part of the poverty question from cultural poverty in general, it seems to me that the most important differentiation that may be made is that there are at least two distinct kinds of problems which the Negro faces from a remediation standpoint. There is the problem, in the mass, of inadequate opportunity because of inadequate education, lack of occupational skills, family disorganization, etc. The other problem, one that is growing increasingly acute, is that the Negro who has achieved education and occupation is still far from his full position in the American social order. A good part, therefore, of the Negro problem in this sense is the problem of the white. Mr. Berry spoke of it as an image, and this is an essential part of it. I think, however, that there is something much more fundamental than just image-building in the Madison Avenue sense; that is, even if the education and the occupation are held constant, the income of the Negro is still fractional in relation to the white of the same education and the same occupation. In this respect, it might be misleading, even if accurate on this specific point, Mr. Moynihan, to say that the Negro middle class is doing very well. I think the unique part of the Negro problem is that even when the Negro acquires the advantages that limited opportunities precluded for him in the history of this nation, he still is far from achieving the full status that these symbols of education and occupation imply for the white population. This, it seems to me, is where the rub really lies.

We have two kinds of problems. One is compensatory. I will support compensatory education in the sense that what we are talking about is making up for deficiencies in opportunity, what we call cultural disadvantage—only in that sense does this phrase have any meaning to me—and in the sense that compensatory education is needed for white *or* Negro when there is disadvantaged cultural background. But in addition, the stigma—the Negro's position in the American society, even after he attains the educational and occupational characteristics—seems to me to be the unique aspect of the Negro problem to which we should very firmly address ourselves.

**PARRIS:** I think Mr. Hauser hit the nail on the head for us. I would like to attempt to differentiate fundamentally between the two phrases: *compensatory treatment*, which means one thing, and *a special effort*, as there are special efforts required by government or by a private sector to do something on behalf of the individual Negro. There are compensatory treatments that must be given to the large masses of young people in the schools, the young people who, because of 300 years of deprivation, cannot make up. I hope, however, that we do not get confused as our *New York Times* friends got confused three years ago. Whitney Young talked about *special effort*, and everybody began to talk about *compensatory treatment*. We never used that phrase.

**MOYNIHAN:** I think that we have a very strong tendency in this country to rush past problems toward solutions. We have just begun to discuss this problem, and our first subject is compensatory treatment to solve it. The question is: *what* problem? I think that the most important thing to be done in this whole area is to clarify whether, as Mr. Hughes says, this is a special problem. I think it is, and I think that the special quality of the problem is not generally understood. I feel strongly that it is not understood in the federal government.

I think that until we can reach agreement on what is special about the problem, the solutions we get are likely to be solutions to different problems. For example, both Mr. Berry and Mr. Turner talked about the problem of the Negro male, and I think this *is* a problem, but the federal government does not know about it. I have spent four and a half years in the middle of this thing, and I think I know the federal government. The government knows about the problem of Negro employment, but the idea of the problem of the employment of the Negro male is a new problem. It has not occurred to anybody. In this respect, I can give you a very exact example of what compensatory treatment does.

Four years ago—it is no secret—we found that the Negro American was not employed in the federal government at very decent levels or in very good numbers. We decided to enact a very explicit policy that Negroes were more equal than others with regard to employment, and we set out to hire them. There was no question about it; given any doubt, it was resolved on behalf of the Negro. We made a specific effort to get Negroes.

When I was working on my paper for this conference, I called up our employment officer and asked him: "Could you tell me how many Negroes we have working in the Department of Labor?" He said: "There are 1,819." (Or whatever the precise figure was.) I said: "How many of them are women? How many are men?" And he practically said, without saying a word: "You mean, in Esther Peterson's department, you ask such a question? We do not discriminate against women." And it is true. However, being a calm, decent civil servant, he said: "It must be in the computer. I will get the information." And two weeks later he reported back to me something that seems immensely important. In the Department of Labor, at the nonprofessional levels—which will pay up to as much as $8,500 a year and are good jobs—Negro women outnumber Negro men four to one.

This man, our employment officer, had been working very hard to solve the problem, and indeed he had. Nineteen per cent of our employees are Negro. This is a record of achievement. But had he helped the families of the Negro men whose wives he had hired, or had he hurt them? I do not know which he had done, but I know that he did not know he had the problem Mr. Berry tells us he had. And if that *is* the problem, we have to get that clear, or we are solving another problem.

You can stand in front of the Department of Labor any morning at eight-thirty, and it is a sight: spectacularly well-dressed, competent, beautiful young women, in expensive clothes, getting out of the front seats of taxicabs, going up to work on the third floor on carpeting, spending the day on the phone with the Attorney General and seeing ambassadors, then coming home and asking the old man, what did you do today?

**BERRY:** Or else they cannot find a husband who fits their station.

**REDDING:** This goes back, of course, to another problem. The Negro women in America have been educated at the expense of the men, simply because they have been more welcome in the labor market. Something seems to need some attention here.

**PETTIGREW:** I think this male-female matter, particularly in the labor force, is a crucial point; but I would like to go back to what Mr. Hauser was saying in terms of two different problems. I thought he put it well, but, in defense of what Mr. Moynihan has in his paper, I think an additional point can be made. I also made a similar point in my paper, so I am defending mine as well as Mr. Moynihan's.

While there are two distinctly different problems, I think that so far the Negro American revolution has clearly made progress only on one—the upgrading of people who already have skills. Essentially, we can predict that the Negro American middle class will be in the affluent midstream in fifteen or twenty years. This is where real progress is being made, and many well-intentioned whites look around and see this conspicuous progress and feel that the revolution is really quite a success. In point of fact, it is hardly touching the second problem. I think perhaps that Mr. Moynihan was really implying not that there is no problem remaining at the middle-class state, but that this is where progress is in fact being pushed, and that the second—the other Negro America—has really been ignored not just by government, but by the revolution itself.

**WILSON:** Let me try to restate the answer to the question on compensatory treatment. It seems to me that Mr. Moynihan is right in urging us to think clearly about our objectives. Perhaps the way to do this, without losing sight of the compensatory issue, is to say that this is one of two factors we must keep in mind. On the one hand, we are having this meeting, and many more meetings will be held, because there is something special. We are not sure exactly how it is special in all the details, but we sense that it *is* special. Perhaps compensatory treatment in some sense is called for.

The other factor that we have to keep in mind, which Mr. Berry mentioned, is that we are dealing here with the Negro male head of household. The reason that his employment is crucial, it seems to me, is that this is the way we give self-respect to men; we make them breadwinners and heads of household, capable of enduring unemployment or even poverty without the disintegration or the loss of self-respect that now is the real pathology of this issue. It is possible to devise all sorts of compensatory treatments that will make the self-respect problem worse, not better. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is in a real sense a compensatory project in the United States today, and I think it is subsidizing many of the worst features of the problem. I do not want to reject it—we have to do something—but it is a far cry from an ideal solution. There are many other compensatory strategies, various make-work and public-welfare programs, which could make the self-respect problem worse. Mr. Moynihan gave us an example from the Department of Labor.

We have the need for a special effort, because there is something special here; but we also have to define that special effort so that it is likely to increase the self-respect, stability, and economic power of the Negro male. If we think of these as two constraints, perhaps we will have a greater range for exploration than if we take compensatory treatment in some sense as our objective or as what we are trying to maximize.

**GEERTZ:** I want to address myself to the problem that was raised by Mr. Hauser, Mr. Berry, and Mr. Pettigrew. It is essentially a class problem. The thing that struck me about the three papers on this problem was the lack of attention—although I think the data are there—to internal social stratification within the Negro community. We all spend a great deal of time on the relationship between the whole society and the Negro's position in it, but we do not know very much about what the Negro middle class is, what it means to talk about the Negro middle class, how big it is, what it is doing, etc. I think it is a very serious question that Mr. Moynihan and Mr. Pettigrew raised—about the sort of vicious cycle in which some parts of the Negro community are gaining from the revolution while others are not. We really know very little about who belongs where and how many people are in what categories. We still, I think, have an image of the Negro middle class from Franklin Frazier's work, which after all was done a long time ago. We do not really have much sense of how and on what basis the internal social stratification of the Negroes is organized.

I think the problem that Mr. Berry raised is very important. The whole question about what is called in anthropology the matricentral family, or the matrifocal problem, has been studied very comparatively. The "absent father," the concentration on women and sometimes on the line of women as the core of the family, has been found associated with any kind of a class system where there is either a quasi-industrial or a quasi-modern situation and an ascriptive occupational role system for the male, no matter what sort of system it is. This supports what Mr. Berry said very strongly. This phenomenon has been studied in the Caribbean by Raymond Smith. It has been studied in Central America. My wife studied it in Java. (Incidentally, as a footnote, I do not particularly believe in the culture of poverty. I think it has been established for Mexico. Whether it will hold true for Harlem is, I think, a very, very big question.) And there are some aspects of it which are very clear. One thing that is clear is that there is a relationship between a certain kind of class system—an ascriptive class occupational system—and this kind of family structure.

To go back to my other problem, if we look into the social stratification within the American Negro community and try to see if there are differences in family organization between middle-class and lower-class Negroes, then assuming we can figure out what this means—figure out who is in what category and what it means to be a middle-class Negro within the Negro community—we will get somewhere. This is the one thing the papers (which I think are of very high caliber) have not given the attention it deserves. "The Negro population," "*the* Negro American," is not conceptually differentiated enough by us. We do not have enough grasp of the differentiation—culturally, structurally, and so on—of the Negro population from within, the internal view of it. I think this is a good place to start, because the whole problem of stratification has been raised here. It is obviously central. What we know about the stratification system of the Negro community as such, rather than the position of the Negro community in the wider society of which we are all fairly clear, is very little. I think that more attention might be given to figuring out how many middle-class Negro Americans there are, what it means to say a Negro American is middle-class, what middle-class means in this kind of subsociety.

PARSONS: I strongly endorse that. It seems to me some very interesting themes have begun to emerge. I would like first, relative to Mr. Hauser's comment on the general culture of poverty, to raise the question of the significance that will be highlighted by Appalachia versus Harlem and South-Side Chicago or, of course, the Black Belt of Alabama versus Harlem and South-Side Chicago, of the significance of the shift of the poor-Negro center of gravity from the rural area to the big city. This is a distinction not only with respect to the culture of poverty itself, but with respect to the forces to which these people are exposed. That is, I think the general upgrading process of immigrant populations in this country has been almost directly a function of their locating in the big urban community, where they are exposed to quite different forces from those of the rural situation. However, there is also the vicious-circle phenomenon.

Several remarks have been made by several people about the status of the nonpoor Negro groups and their relation to the whole Negro community. It seems to me this raises an exceedingly important question. There is now quite a bit of knowledge of the fact that, even though previously disadvantaged groups—perhaps none of them as severely disadvantaged as the Negro—have made their way very substantially in American society, they still retain (as the Moynihan and Glazer study of New York shows) not merely image identity but a very considerable structurally differentiated position in the society. There *is* a Jewish subsociety in the big city. It is not merely a Jewish subculture. There is still an Irish subsociety, merging over into a more general Catholic subsociety.

My own view is that the problem of compensatory treatment must be linked with the problem of what the higher level, relatively specific niche for Negro leadership and higher-status Negro groups in the society can evolve toward and is evolving toward. I think the color-blind formula neglects the importance of this kind of differentiatedness, that there should be a distinction between status levels. By status level, there is no group in the whole society, not excluding the white Protestant Anglo-Saxons, that is equal to the Jews, if you take some sort of an ethnic criterion. The Jews are the highest major group in the whole society. On the other hand, Jews are not randomly distributed through the higher reaches of society, and they have a community solidarity of their own. My prediction would be that the Negro evolution is going to have more of this character than that of a random distribution. At least I think we need to consider these problems. They link up very closely with what Mr. Geertz was saying about the differentiation of the Negro community.

**GRAUBARD:** The point that Mr. Moynihan raised is a very legitimate one. It does seem that these four papers see "the" problem differently. Perhaps Mr. Moynihan should speak for himself, but I think the implication of his paper is that the thing to pay first attention to is the family. The implication of Mr. Tobin's paper is that the thing to pay first attention to is unemployment. Mr. Hauser does not make it quite as clear, but I think that the matter of birth rate and the deprivation that occurs within the family is the problem that he is particularly struck by. Mr. Fein, because his is more a profile paper, has simply tried to show all the social and economic disabilities that continue to prevail. It seems to me that the question that Mr. Moynihan has raised does need some further exploration. What is the problem, so to speak, that we will choose to emphasize in this volume?

**COHEN:** While I was pushing for preferential treatment, I was not neglecting the fact that there is a constellation of problems, each of which must receive attention. I was merely talking about preferential treatment as a policy.

I believe that in the papers there is one problem which is not adequately emphasized. It is referred to, but it deserves, I think, a more important place. The problem is education, a chance at the beginning. As I look at the area in New York in which I live, the schools to which my children go, I see a generation of Negro youngsters who, barring some miracle, are largely headed for the scrap heap. This is duplicated in major cities around the country. I think we are beginning to deal with the problem through Operation Head Start and other means, but we only dimly perceive, I think, the kind of heroic measures that are necessary. This aspect of the problem of providing educated and trained people who fit into the economy of our society is not adequately dealt with.

**ROSSI:** I would like to sound a skeptical note concerning the meaning of the patterns of family disorganization which are presently characteristic of the Negro population. There is a serious question of whether such disorganization is a symptom or a cause. In the history of sociological concern with social problems, we have gone through at least one earlier period of intense concern with family disorganization, blaming this condition and its prevalence for a wide variety of other "pathological manifestations," ranging from poverty to mental disorder. The general conclusion which was drawn from a decade's research in the thirties was that family disorganization was a symptomatic rather than fundamental cause. If the same reasoning were to apply to the disorganization presently manifested by Negro families, then Mr. Tobin's paper would seem to me to have sounded the proper note: Raise the economic position of the Negro population and its family structure will take care of itself. There is another reason for emphasizing the view of family disorganization as symptom rather than cause: the family, as such, is a very difficult institution to affect directly. An over-emphasis on this factor tends to make the case look hopeless, while an emphasis on elements of the life chances of Negroes which in turn would strengthen family structure presents a much more optimistic picture. The problem is what are the social policies, which, if instituted, would improve the position of the Negro population and at the same time improve the general level of Negro family life. If we take Mr. Moynihan's statistics seriously, bolstering the economic position of Negro males would help a great deal as would strengthening the institutions of social control in Negro areas. We know too little whether it is necessary to have a male in the household in order to achieve proper socialization. Certainly, we know quite definitely that children from homes in which mothers are employed full-time are not different in a variety of ways from those whose mothers are full-time housewives. I expect that we would find the presence or absence of a father equally unimportant, even though from our middle-class Freud-saturated viewpoint it doesn't look right.

HAUSER: I would like to support the emphasis on education, suggested by Mr. Cohen, as perhaps one of the major points, certainly with respect to program and remediation, that is to be involved. But I think it must be put into a context. I do not think we can pick any one of these things without having in mind the entire constellation.

I do not know whether others were similarly struck with this, but having accepted this assignment, in playing around with what the data might show, in deriving what I did from Orshansky's special tabulation on poverty, I ran into what to me is the most horrible statistic I have ever run into in some thirty-five years of statisticking. I refer to the fact that in Negro families with children under eighteen years of age, 62 per cent of all the children in these families are being reared in poverty, by the 22-cents-per-meal definition that Sargent Shriver has now adopted. In the Negro families with five or more children, we get an astonishing figure: 81 per cent of all those children are being reared in poverty. If we adopt the somewhat more rigorous definition of poverty, the one that provides the luxury of 26-cents-per-meal-per-capita, then the figure is almost complete: 94 per cent of all the Negro children in families with five or more children are in poverty.

I will close with this thought. There are some who feel that much of the worrying about antipoverty programs is nonsense, because the only trouble with the poor is that they need more money. Someone has estimated that it would take about $13 billion. Why don't we appropriate the money, give it to them, and forget about all this other nonsense? I think one of the things that should be brought home here is that the solution to the problem of the poor is not simply more money, that money alone does not cure poverty. There is an interaction of a whole constellation of factors, including family disorganization, including the lack of education and skill, including the stigma attached to the status, which is doubled, as Mr. Berry has said, when the face is black; and all these things have to be treated as a bundle.

**HUGHES:** It must be stressed that the structure of the modern labor force and the way of getting into it have changed. Apprenticeship is disappearing, and schooling is taking its place.

It has been mentioned that we now have a new kind of labor force and that the way of getting into it is changing. I hope that the labor-force experts will consider the future of the Negro in terms of what the labor force is going to be and how one is going to get into it. The Negro's integration into the economy has to be in terms of the economy as it is *going* to be.

**BERRY:** I certainly agree with Mr. Hauser that money is not everything; but I am reminded of a comment that our national director has made, a comment I certainly agree with also. He said it is much better for a Negro to be able to say "I is rich" than "I am poor."

When we were discussing what the data show, it occurred to me that among the most important things that could come out of this conference are the things that the data do not show. For instance, we know where Negroes are in terms of earning level; they earn a little over half as much as their white brothers. One of the things, it seems to me, that is awfully important is an assault on the color tax on the darker brother—how much more we charge him for the same things, how much more we charge him to live. It is clearest in housing, but it exists in everything else—in interest rates, in shoddy merchandise, and in shyster merchants who prey upon the darker brother and take from him in greater proportion the little that he has been able to attain. Thus, when Mr. Hauser talks about the 22-cent meal, in the Negro neighborhood it may end up being an 18-cent meal; but the Negro paid 22 cents for it, so his kids are still in trouble.

I would hope that when we talk about a special effort (and I do not care whether it is a special effort or preferential treatment), it is not just education. It has to be education and jobs, too. It has to be education and jobs for the Negro *male*. We can do all these things in Operation Head Start. We can do compensatory education. But if the family structure is still not there, we have not done very much. We have not done very much at all for the children, if we do not help the family structure mean what it is supposed to mean, according to the rules that Negroes have to play the game with—the white middle-class rules.

**HAUSER:** You should add not only education and jobs, but education, jobs, *and* the same level of income. We are now getting the Negro who has the education and has the job that looks the same as the professional job in a classification system, but he still gets 60 per cent of the income.

**BERRY:** It is worse than that in Chicago, Mr. Hauser, because at the median level in 1960 the white high-school dropout was earning 10 per cent more than the Negro college graduate.

**HAUSER:** We might add this note. One of our graduate students working with Mr. Rossi at the National Opinion Research Center has actually been able to estimate the cost of being a Negro. On the average, it costs $1,000 a year.

**MOYNIHAN:** I do not want to leave the subject of family structure. I do not insist for a moment that this is the most important thing. What is clear is that this is the most important discontinuity between the white world and the Negro world and, secondly, that most of us assume that this is important. But is it important, and if so, in what way? Mr. Berry clearly thinks that this is fundamentally important. Mr. Rossi raises the question: Is it at all? I do not think there was any difference between Dr. Tobin's paper and my paper. I assume he was saying that employment is fundamental because that is how families live, and I was saying employment is fundamental because that is how families live. But then, it seems to me that there is some evidence over the past five years, and maybe it is a trend in the last fifteen, that these very direct relationships between family structure and employment are beginning to break down.

Until recently, the rise and fall in family indicators have followed just beautifully the rise and fall in male unemployment, but suddenly the connection is breaking. I have a chart in my paper which shows the number of new AFDC cases and the Negro male unemployment rate. I could also have shown the figures on married families, husband's absence, or a dozen other such things, and you would see that they all work together very well. In the past five years, however, that connection has begun to break down. So I think we have to raise the question whether employment will do the job it could have done fifteen years ago with respect to family structure. The thing I would like to hear from this group is, what about it? Is family structure so fundamentally related to employment that until the Negro family is in roughly comparable circumstances with the white family, we are not going to get comparable results?

**COLES:** For the last four or five years, I have been following some families in both rural and urban situations in the South and in the North. It is interesting what happens if, for instance, a Negro migrant family or sharecropper family wants to get out of the rural area and come into the city. The whole family situation changes. I think that a lot of us want to enforce legislation that will prevent migrant children from working. We are very concerned with their education. I am not so sure, however, that in taking migrant children away from their mothers and putting them into school systems in the South, we are really solving much. I think I am getting around to the idea that Mr. Rossi brought up earlier, suggesting that we think about whether the matriarchal family actually is detrimental and, if so, where and when.

I think that in the rural areas it is one thing to talk about a matriarchal family and whether it is detrimental or not, and in the urban situation it is quite another. The families I have seen seem to function quite well—so long as we look at it in terms of what they are facing and what they want to do and how they get along with one another—in, say, Belle Glade, Florida, or the Black Belt of Alabama. Then they go up to Boston or New York. The mother no longer is with her children working in the fields. She tries to get a job and probably does, as a maid. The children are left alone. The family starts disintegrating. The father, if there is one, goes on relief, or the whole family goes on relief.

We are appalled by the fact that in the rural areas families make less than $1,000 a year working; but they *are* working and they *are* together, even if they are wandering all over the country in a disorganized state as *we* look at it. What happens when they come into the cities—and this is where we ought to think of it in terms of rural-urban as well as black-white and all the others—is that the families, I think, disintegrate. They are unprepared for the kind of city living that we experience, that we know about, and that we tend to think of in terms of "America." I think the millions of people who have only in the last twenty or thirty years—one or two generations at the most—come into the cities have not quite made the adaptation from rural living, with all of its implications for family structure, to the urban situation. The consequent disintegration in the city of this kind of family structure is something that we might talk about.

**TURNER:** One of the issues that we are impressed with in these four papers is the notion of the powerlessness of the Negro, powerlessness in terms of the ability to cope with the present system. This is almost a cliché, and I hesitate to use it except that it is a meaningful cliché. We assume here, and I think correctly, that closing the gap between Negro and white, with reference to the indices that we have been discussing, is a desirable thing.

The importance of the family may be that it provides certain kinds of resources that are not otherwise available for coping with the system. The family can provide a continuity of resources over a period of generations. In a sense, a family of the type being discussed needs to multiply resource and power over a period of time and without some mechanism by which these can get passed along it is very difficult to accumulate a sufficient depth of resources to enable the family to break through to reasonably stable and independent living. The family also provides a kind of discipline that is important for minority groups; that is, it helps in setting up long-term goals and in making the sacrifices without too much hardship, and thus it enables its members to regain resources to cope with and get on top of the system. The family provides, further, a peculiar kind of socialization, not just socialization into a class structure, but the socialization into a minority group that is coping effectively with the system, which is a distinct function.

We are not talking about family, then, so much in terms of whether or not people get along with each other in the family and whether there is love, etc., but really in terms of whether or not that family is able to provide protection, able to provide the socialization functions, and able to provide the basic necessities of life which people need to cope with the system. This is why family becomes important. It is a cell from which energy has to come and for which we so far have not been able to develop very much in the way of substitutes. If we look at minority groups in a variety of cultures such as Hawaii we find that some type of family structure has been used very much in these ways to enable minority groups to cope more effectively with whatever dominant culture they were in.

**PARSONS:** I think the Jewish family is classic.

**HANDLIN:** I agree with what Mr. Turner says; but I really would like to get back to Dr. Coles' point, because I am sure he did not wish to imply that the fact that the family is more adequate in the rural setting is the reason it should stay in the rural setting. The fact is that, although the family is more adequate there, these people prefer to come to the city. They see some gains in migration that outweigh the solidarity of the status they had in the rural setting. I myself believe that most disorders are an incident in rural-urban migration. They have a particular force on the Negro group because of its history and culture, but comparable disorders appeared in this stage of urban migration even among the Jewish immigrants, to whom Mr. Parsons referred.

The reason this is important is that there may be a basis for doubting that simple gross increase in income is going to solve these problems. Sometimes an increase in income increases the incidence of disorder in family life. Whether the net effect of raising the income is to strengthen the family solidarity or not depends a good deal on the way in which it comes, the direction in which it is channeled, and the effects it has on the functional role of the individuals in the family.

Measures to reduce the rate of unemployment are intrinsically useful and worth pursuing, but I am not sure that simply a reduction in the rate of unemployment from 5 per cent to 3 per cent is going to have much effect on the Negro or even that it will have much effect on the problem.

**WILSON:** I am not sure whether there is an answer to this question. If it is answerable, I would hope that this might be a supplementary paper that we could bring into the volume. It seems to me that we are trying to differentiate, as Mr. Geertz said we ought to, if not the whole Negro American culture, then at least the lower-income groups. There are those who are simply pathologically poor, who would not benefit either from welfare programs or from a gross increase in income. There are those who are on the edge, perhaps, where the male is functionally illiterate, and even though there are jobs as cab drivers in his city, he cannot get one because he cannot read a street sign. If we can change that strategic factor, we can change a great deal. There are others who have low incomes but strong families and, as was pointed out, can cope. I think that coping is an absolutely crucial element in this.

I do not think that the literature we have available before us provides us with any sense of the magnitudes involved here. Can we differentiate the lower-income groups into the pathological, the marginally pathological, and the nonpathological? It seems to me that what we are trying to do here, whether we call it special treatment or not, is not to make lower-income Negroes middle-income Negroes. We are trying to convert the pathological poor into the stable poor, to permit them not only to cope but to advance. Is there a body of data, which we could consider now and which could be brought into this volume, which would give us some sense of the magnitudes involved in these various groups? Also, what are the determinants of them? Why does a particular family or individual wind up in one group of poor rather than in another?

**BERRY:** Mr. Wilson, it is also very important, in terms of looking at this poverty effort, to determine whether we are concerned with improving the *condition* of the poor or their *status.*

**GEERTZ:** That is almost exactly what I was going to say. I would like to say a little bit more, however. When I was talking before about the relationship between the male role in society and the type of family, all I intended was to connect it with status, particularly with whether status is ascribed or achieved—whether there is much mobility, whether it is possible for people to move up. If the male cannot move up—if he does not have the mobility and the status of a family is not dependent on this—the family tends to become matricentral. So the question, to go to Professor Handlin's point, certainly is not simply one of income; that is, just having more money would not necessarily strengthen the family. In this society, occupational mobility is the main route to status. So the reason that, in a poverty program, we should not just distribute the largess is that it will have no effect upon the stratification system. If it is distributed through the occupational system, it will have a fundamental effect upon the statification system and a fundamental effect upon the family.

This comes back to something else. (I cannot remember who said this.) The real point, I think, is where we are going to attack in an attempt to reconstruct the Negro family, which, I agree with Mr. Berry, is absolutely critical. I think that attacking the problem through the occupational system and through employment is obviously strategic. It is not income as such, although income is obviously correlated with it. It is income that flows through the occupational system which will change the status of the Negro male, and *that* will change the status of the family. To be perfectly honest, I can, as an anthropologist, think of no other way in which one could directly affect the family, except perhaps through some kind of social work, which I think is useful only in the short run. In the long run, unless the Negro male's position in the occupational structure changes, nothing much else is going to change.

**HAUSER:** I just want to make a footnote reference to the desirability of differentiating within the Negro community on a class or stratification basis. I think the point that Mr. Geertz made and that Mr. Wilson spoke to is a fundamental one. The unfortunate thing is that at the moment these suggestions are, I think, proposals for research to be done, rather than for analysis of data which now exist. I want to add, however, that the tapes which are now available on a sample basis through the Census Bureau may permit tabulations specifically aimed at at least exploiting what the Census can tell us about this. It will tell us more than anything we yet have. Presumably this cannot be done for purposes of *Dædalus* in September; but if there is some by-product of this discussion, it might well be to point up the importance of at least exploiting what is available through the Census Bureau along these lines.

Partly to get Mr. Tobin to enter the conversation, I want to add another footnote. It is ironic that the best way, if we follow the logic in Mr. Tobin's paper, to improve the status of the Negro on the economic front—and certainly the best way that our society has yet discovered—is to find some way to get into a war. My own analysis of fluctuations in the unemployment rates and differentials between white and nonwhite over the years has shown very conclusively that the Negro never has it so good as in a war.

**TOBIN:** From an economic point of view, it was not the fact that we were in a war that made the Negro's occupational and economic status improve relatively to the white's during the decade 1940-50. It was the existence of a tight labor market. The tight labor market was created by the war, but war is not the only way to create a tight labor market. We can create it in peacetime if we have the will to do so. We did have a tight labor market from 1946 to 1956. I think that many of the difficulties which seem so pressing to us today, we would not find so pressing if during the subsequent years, from 1957 to now, we had run the economy at the same degree of high pressure as during the first ten years after the war, even if not at the wartime degree of high pressure. We can see, also, that before the war, in the Depression, when the economy was very loosely run, much of the progress that had previously occurred in the relative status of the Negro was wiped out. Then the war brought it back, broke new ground.

I would like to comment on Mr. Wilson's remark which, I think, had to do with the question whether there are types of poverty, or groups who are in poverty situations, which general economic progress, prosperity, low unemployment, etc., will not affect. Undoubtedly there are such groups. However, that is not our problem here today. The main problem is in respect to *Negro* economic status. It is certainly true that in a society in general, we run into diminishing returns in the reduction of poverty from general economic progress. We get more and more hard cases who, because of personal disabilities of one kind or another, are not going to be helped by general progress. They will constitute a larger share of the poor, and it is much harder to pull them up just by prosperity.

That would seem not to be the case with Negroes. I saw a study of Locke Anderson's on the relationship between the median incomes of various groups in the society and general, or over-all, median income. There are some groups whose income has almost no relationship at all to the general median income. The median income for the society as a whole can go up, and nothing happens to the median income of farmers, for example. They are insensitive to general prosperity. But the median income of Negroes is highly sensitive to general prosperity. A 1 per cent increase in general median income increases the median income of non-whites by 1.5 per cent, according to Anderson's calculations. So we have not yet come to the stage where we have reduced Negro poverty to such a hard core that it is not going to be touched by prosperity. Since we have not done enough, we are still in a phase where the returns from general prosperity are very high for the Negro. This means that a change from 5 per cent to 3 per cent unemployment is much more dramatic than those numbers indicate. It means a lot more than just putting 2 per cent of the labor force back to work. I have tried to explain that in my paper. It means that the whole tone of the economy is different.

One further comment concerns just plain income as against income received through employment—through occupational upgrading and so on. Obviously the latter is what we prefer; the ultimate objective is to make the general economy and the earning capacities of Negroes such that they will *earn* incomes comparable to the rest of the population through the labor market, through the occupational structure. However, I would not discount the value of just plain income, because it seems to me that conditions of life also affect future earning capacity. Alleviating inequality in consumption standards, even by just plain handouts, if you want to call them that, can help to get the next generation of Negroes and even some of the current generation into the position where they can earn their incomes from occupation rather than handout. So I do not think it is right to discount improvements, for example, in Aid for Dependent Children, to make public assistance not only more generous but less demoralizing.

**HUGHES:** I have a statistical question for Mr. Tobin and the others. In view of the so-called Frazier effect, does median income as a measure mean the same for Negroes as for whites? Has anybody gone into whether the measure has the same meaning for Negroes as for whites?

**HAUSER:** Median income has a lot of different meanings, certainly on a family basis, because Negro family income is more apt to be the result of multiple workers than is white family income. This, therefore, can have a quite different meaning for each person involved, as well as for the entire familial unit, from the standpoint of consumption patterns and needs, including what we might think of as overhead needs for getting that family income, quite apart from the other discussion that Mr. Moynihan goes into.

**HUGHES:** I meant median as such. How about the distribution around the Negro median income?

**HAUSER:** It is a distorted distribution.

**WILSON:** I am not an economist, but I would like to be presumptuous enough to agree with Mr. Tobin in calling attention to the fact that we ought not to discount aggregate demand. Surely if there is any one thing we can do, that one thing must be to reduce unemployment and to create the maximum number of job opportunities at all skill levels. My concern, however, is with the figures Mr. Moynihan gives, the ones that Mr. Hauser just alluded to. These figures trouble me. We should try to figure out now—at a time when the unemployment rate is relatively high and we have a considerable amount of political interest in dealing with poverty—how much of what we regard as the low-income Negro problem would disappear with an increase in economic activity and employment; for at a time when the unemployment rate has fallen, we may have lost, because of our political structure (something we may want to discuss later on), the impetus for dealing with the problem. We may then discover it cannot be eliminated by aggregate methods.

I have a feeling that because of the fact that income is earned rather differently by Negroes than by whites—because of multiple workers, because of the importance of the Negro woman as a wage earner, because of discriminatory patterns—that it behooves us now to make a judgment as to how big this category is of Negro families who would not be substantially improved by the reduction in unemployment from 5 to 3 per cent. I quite agree that reducing unemployment is an extraordinarily important thing both for Negroes and for whites, but the question is, for how many Negroes. I have a feeling that if we do not make the judgment now and try to design the policy in that area now, the political steam which we can now generate around the 5 per cent unemployment figure may be lost to us.

**FEIN:** I can think of no area, in the whole gamut of things that one ought to do, where it would be less important to make that judgment in advance. I say that for two reasons. First, I can think of no area—education, health, etc.—where one could get progress as rapidly as in lowering the unemployment rate, if one decided to do it. If it were going to take us twenty-five years to see the effects of the program and then we had to redesign the program, that would be a case where we would have to make guesses. But this can take such a short period of time that we can afford the luxury of doing it and seeing what happens. Second, as for the political steam that would disappear, I have yet to discern the political steam that has been generated by the 5 per cent unemployment rate. I do not see the political steam that is trying to lower it to 3 per cent; so I am afraid we would not even lose very much of that.

**MOYNIHAN:** I really am depressed by that comment. I can speak on that point, because we have with us today one of the men responsible for our problem: Professor Tobin. When we came down to Washington four and a half years ago, everybody talked about unemployment, unemployment, unemployment. We had to get through something about unemployment; and indeed when President Kennedy took office, there were more people out of work than at any moment since the Depression. What turned out was that "unemployment" was the shorthand for "economic growth."

The country just had not been growing in the 1950's. We had barely been keeping pace with our population. We got ourselves three men on the Council of Economic Advisers who tried playing around with the economy, and within fourteen days of their arrival—it is a statistical fact—the economy began to grow and has not stopped growing for fifty-four months. In the last fifty-four months we have raised our level of GNP by $150 billion. The country is swimming in money. The problem most people are thinking about is *too much* money—too many automobiles, etc.

Suddenly, once we solved the problem of economic growth, we found, at least from the Department of Labor's point of view, that people were no longer that interested in the problem of unemployment. We can go on with 5 per cent unemployment for the rest of our lives as far as the country is concerned, if we go on adding GNP at the rate of 5 per cent a year. I do not think we can get anybody in this country very interested in unemployment as such. How can anybody be interested? No one believes the figures. On the other hand, the fact of poverty is still there. The fact of welfare, of course, is unmistakably there. In any event, you can blame Mr. Tobin for our present dilemma.

**TOBIN:** I do not know what I am being blamed for.

**HAUSER:** Economic growth.

**TOBIN:** After all, Mr. Moynihan, it was not just GNP. I do not know if you are interpreting the results of the past four years as evidence that increasing aggregate demand does not alleviate the problem of unemployment. That is just plain wrong, because it has reduced it considerably in all groups.

You make me feel like a doctor who tells a patient that he ought to take three pills a day, and the patient takes one and then comes back and says, "Look, I've been taking one, and I feel much better; but I am still not all well." So the doctor is to blame?

**PARSONS:** There is one rather specific point I would like to make. We hear a great deal about the importance of job qualifications and, specifically, educational qualifications. Wouldn't the judgment of the hard-core problem and many of the repercussions of measures to increase employment have to depend on the selectivity of demand for labor with respect to qualifications? There are several people here, I am sure, who could comment on this.

**HAUSER:** I want to propose something for general reaction. I think it is relevant here. Reduction of unemployment still does not solve the problem of the Negro American. In Cook County, for example, the proportion of Negroes on welfare and relief—that is, unemployed—is something like three times the proportion of Negroes in the population. The question is—and this combines remedies in a way in which they are generally not put together—in focusing on the economic problem of the Negro American simultaneously with tremendous growth, whether we may find the need for perhaps deliberately designing what we call, in the developing areas, intensive labor projects. Because of the factor that Mr. Hughes was stressing a little while ago, the increasing differentially higher rate of displacement of the Negro by reason of his particular status and his arrival at a time when a lesser skill involves a greater economic penalty than was true of immigrants before him, we may have to design labor projects to give the Negro who is uneducated, unskilled, and, in a sense, uneducable if he is above some adult age (it is getting to be thirty-five in some industries) something to do by which he could get an income other than a handout.

If I may mention one specific case, take the packing-house workers. This packing-house union worked out an arrangement for retraining, presumably to get their workers transferred from the packing houses to other industries, and with retraining, they remain indefinitely unemployed. The notion I want to present is that although I agree completely with Mr. Tobin's aggregative approach, I think we may again have a special situation, requiring special treatment, which may mean we have to have a WPA or a PWA program or its equivalent, simultaneously with all the other things we have.

I would offer one other remark, Mr. Tobin. Looking at the four recessions we have had since the end of the war, I think that in each case if there had not been a USSR we should have invented one, because it turned out to be the best contracyclical device that our economy has yet discovered. The Berlin Wall, Korea, Sputnik—these are, somehow or other, statistically very much associated with the increase in government expenditures that took us or helped take us out of each of the recessions we have experienced since the end of the war. It may be that Vietnam and the Dominican Republic are preventing us from a further recession by continued prolongation of this economic growth.

**TOBIN:** I do not think that is entirely fair. It is certainly true that the political climate has been such that government expenditures for defense purposes are more easily passed through Congress—they seem more legitimate somehow—than other kinds of government expenditures. However, Sputnik was followed by a period of curtailment of government expenditures. This was one of the reasons for the recession of 1960. The more recent progress in the economy has been due to tax cuts rather than to increase in government expenditures. Government expenditure is not the only way to do the job.

**HAUSER:** We took this tax cut, though, before we had a recession.

**TOBIN:** We do not have to have recessions.

**HAUSER:** I am not disagreeing with you; if anything, I am just emphasizing the importance of going beyond what we have yet done to achieve this objective on a peacetime basis.

**TOBIN:** I think that is a very good point, because the War on Poverty and the Great Society—presuming that foreign involvements do not divert us from all this—give us an opportunity for the kind of legitimate expansionary fiscal policy, other than war, which we can and should exploit in two ways. First, we should be able to exploit it just from an aggregate-demand point of view, to get the kind of continuing fiscal stimulus to the economy that we need on a global level. Then we should be able to exploit it to see that the nature of the expenditures is such that they do, in a specific manner, the job of the War on Poverty that we want to get done anyway. For example, the last tax cut was a purely fiscal measure, to beef up aggregate demand. It has little to be said for it in terms of equity, in terms of structural reform, in terms of improving the position of low-income groups such as the Negroes. Some aspects of it do; but basically it was a neutral tax cut for the economy as a whole. I know that Secretary Dillon, when he left office, said that the most important job remaining in the tax field was better treatment at the low-income end. If we can harness the need for future fiscal stimulus to better income-maintenance programs and to other expenditures which would do some of the specific jobs we are interested in—not just transfers or tax deductions—then we can kill two birds with one stone.

**COHEN:** I think the implications of Mr. Wilson's remarks are that we require some kind of over-all strategy, and I think there are a number of interlocking strategies which might add up to a grand design. Mr. Tobin has given us a strategy in the economic field. We need one in education; and we need one in the social field to deal with problems of housing, family, self-image, etc. I think we are lacking in these other strategies, none of which can be effective by itself. Regarding Mr. Tobin's strategy, I feel that it is lacking in that it accepts the fact of a large, permanently unemployed group. I believe his point on assuring a living standard in the absence of an earning capacity makes that assumption; and, therefore, I strongly endorse Mr. Hauser's point that we must have in our society the capacity to provide jobs for those who are physically able.

**BERRY:** It seems to me that in our discussion this morning, we are talking about this business of improving conditions—feed the people and work them in some kind of way; and we have not touched upon the thing that probably just does not allow statistical measurement—the spiritual and emotional destruction of members of the minority group that we are discussing. I am talking about Negroes here. This emotional destruction, in terms of the way in which we live, is probably more devastating than whether a guy misses a meal or not and maybe much more permanent than being unemployed for a short period of time.

I am back to this whole business of the image, of the attitude of those who are in decision-making positions in white society. I just do not believe we are going to solve the problem we are after, unless we change the attitude of those who are dictating the program. The attitude, it seems to me, is one of just the relief kind of thing or letting Negroes work. Even if everybody is working, if we do not rearrange some of these status symbols, we are right back where we were, because the man, even though he has been improved as low man on the totem pole, still suffers the emotional destruction.

**REDDING:** I would like to ask Mr. Berry a question. I gather from what you have said that you are implying that one of the things we have failed to look at is the ghetto and the effect of the ghetto upon the Negro. I think that this is certainly something that ought to be looked into. I believe that many of the more peripheral problems could be solved if the ghetto problem could be solved.

**BERRY:** I would agree to that, except I think the great black ghettos in America and the white ghettos, too, are destructive. (Most white people live in a ghetto and do not know it, but they are behind the gate. The white ghettos are a little bit more polished than the ghettos that Negroes live in.) The black ghettos, with all their destructive forces, are a symptom of the more basic attitudinal thing that I am talking about. I think that the most important single factor that can be known about an individual in these United States is not his talent, his character, or even his money, but his color—even when one gets high up. Let me give you an example. All of you, I expect, have heard the name Dr. Percy Julian, world-renowned chemist, who has worked on cortisone, rubber-based paint, and so on. He is a Negro, a Ph.D., leads a very productive life, is rich, and has a pretty wife. He bought a house outside the ghetto, and the white people tried to burn the damn thing down. Now, what more, in terms of American requirements for success, can one have besides being a Ph.D. and rich and an inventor and having a pretty wife? He has nothing else coming. And they still want to burn the man's house down just because he is brown.

**FEIN:** Let us talk for a moment to a point that Mr. Hauser made about WPA projects, and so on. Without in any sense saying "no" to those, I would just suggest that some of the terms he used to suggest the need for such projects are terms that are really a function of the last ten years in our economy. I do not recall terms such as *uneducable* during the early 1940's, and one of the reasons that I do not recall them (part of it is my youth) is that they were not used. They were not used because we designed the job around the man, rather than trying to design the man for the particular job.

**HAUSER:** You are wrong about that. You are young. We had a hard core in the 1930's.

**FEIN:** Yes, but it was an awful lot smaller than what we now think is the hard core. I think if we tried to see how small that hard core really was, by a tight labor market that put a big burden on business to search for labor and to redesign jobs and to do its own educating of the uneducable, we might find that the hard core was something we could deal with a lot more easily because it was a lot smaller.

**GRAUBARD:** I think Mr. Pettigrew has something to say.

**PETTIGREW:** I would like just to mention this problem of attitude, although

I am sure it will come up in later sessions and in other papers. As a social psychologist, I have a vested interest in the concept of attitudes; but, nevertheless, I am disturbed a little by the implication of what Mr. Berry is saying. I think one of the great fallacies we have had in the field of race relations for many, many decades has been to worry about attitudes rather than about conditions. It is a crude but, I think, generally correct statement to say that attitudes are more often a result than a cause of most of our race-relation situations. We have to worry about the more basic issues which until recently were never even considered as part of race-relation concerns. The attitudes will take care of themselves, once we have a *fait accompli.*

**BERRY:** Can I respond to that? I think I almost agree with you, but I disagree in terms of a program design. I agree with you in terms of the attitude-versus-behavior discussion, when we are talking about people all over. But when we are talking about people such as us, who are sitting around here, thinking about designing a program, then the attitude that we take in terms of what we are trying to do, or the attitude that the decision-makers in the federal government take in terms of what they are trying to do, is crucial. They decide what to do, then go out and do it; and the people have to live with it, and their attitudes will be changed, as you say. But if *we* do not approach it with the proper attitude, we being the decision-makers now—us white guys I am talking about—then we are not likely to come up with a very good program. That is all.

**PETTIGREW:** You make a better case for social psychology than I can.

**BERRY:** I don't mind helping you guys here.

**TURNER:** The focus of our discussion at this particular point is trying to understand the relationship of economic stategy to whatever our ultimate aim or goal is. It seems to me we have two issues. One issue, and I think perhaps the foremost one for the Negro, is that he become randomly distributed throughout whatever opportunities and advantages and burdens there are in society. It seems to me that this issue is the core problem. There is a second issue. Most people would like for the burdens of society to be reduced to that minimum level determined by our knowledge and resources. One of the pressing points made by all the papers is the slippage that occurs and the multiple reaction to deviations in our economic cycles that occur for the Negro. If you look at it in this sense, the question is what kind of economic strategy do we need to maintain a firm engagement of the Negro in our economic structure. We need a strategy which prevents the slippage as well as promotes advances in any given part of our economic structure. What I am saying is that we need multiple strategy. We cannot talk about one or the other; both are needed at this point. In this sense, employment alone, as an economic strategy, can only partially succeed. We have to supplement it with strategies which seek to randomize the Negro throughout the occupational and economic structure.

**ROSSI:** I want to comment on Mr. Berry's point on attitudes and, at the same time, on Mr. Pettigrew's. If there is anything that is the least bit optimistic about the Negro's position in the United States since World War II, it is the fact that the attitudes of the white population have changed in a favorable direction. The white population has gone some distance, but they have not gone, certainly, all the way. Their behavior on various occasions all too known to us has not been of the highest. Why the attitudes toward American Negroes have changed at the same time that the position of the American Negro has shifted slightly and seems to be, in some respects, looking backward, we do not really understand. But attitudes toward all of the minority groups in American society have changed during the same period. We are shifting toward a more egalitarian society, at least in terms of our expressed beliefs; and this is a very important kind of climate, in which there are discussions of this sort and discussions of policies for helping Negroes and other minority groups.

The second point I want to make is concerning employment. Mr. Hauser made a very important point, that we perhaps have to consider creating labor-intensive types of employment, particularly for persons who have relatively little in the way of skill at this point and are probably hard to train. It seems to me that one area of labor-intensive employment which we will have to develop in the future, simply because of a number of problems that are going to come up in our society in this respect, is people-handling employment of one kind or another.Whether people-handling requires skill or not is something I do not really know. But certainly we are moving increasingly into a more heavy development of our educational system, which is a people-handling type of employment. We have not developed a very good division of labor inside our educational system yet, but I suspect that will have to be on the way. If we are going to talk about a mass mental-health program—residential and day-care centers and the like—it will also involve people-handling. Whether we can employ uneducable persons, in Mr. Hauser's terms, or hire more persons without verbal and quantitative skills in these occupations, I do not know.

**FEIN:** Just a short comment. We have translated the decade of the 1940's and the progress into one word; we have used the word *employment*. I went back after I wrote the paper and charted all of the indicators that I used in the paper: male life expectancy, per cent infants born in hospitals, infant mortality, median school years completed. Every one of them, without exception, shows its sharpest progress during the 1940's. It is a bit of a shorthand—and I think an incorrect shorthand—to say that the 1940's affected only employment. Apparently, all these other things moved right along with the employment and the income. That point ought to be remembered in terms of a strategy, because although it would not be sufficient simply to increase employment and income, the other things happily come right along with employment.

**MOYNIHAN:** I still do not have an answer to my first question, and I am beginning to get worried that we are going to move on to another subject pretty soon. What about *family structure?* This country does not need the American Academy of Arts and Sciences to tell us that full employment is important. That is a "law." We already have that. We all know about this. When we started to do the work for this paper, we assumed that what we could do with the family-structure situation was simply to show that the iron link between family structure and employment is just one more reason for doing something about employment. However, we began to get some data suggesting that we may have gone beyond the point where those simple relationships work, or work with the responsiveness with which they did earlier, and that we may have reached a point where the pathology is feeding on itself. I do not know. I am not sure of these terms. I just want to ask the question.

Let me state one general proposition; then I can give you some specifics of what we think about the family situation. In terms of absolute levels of ability, there is one pretty good test which is available to a great many people, theoretically all males: that is the Armed Forces Qualification Test, which all persons not in school and now turning eighteen take under Selective Service. It is a test that cuts off about the seventh or eighth grade of achievement. It is not an education test. It is not an intelligence test. It is a test of whether we can make a soldier out of someone for what it is worth to us to put in him. Of the Negro boys taking that test, 56 per cent fail it. Of those 56 per cent, half of them, for example, come from families of six or more children. That test seems to us to be a very hard indicator of ability. Anyone who does not pass that test just is not coping very well. We have found that there is a relationship between that kind of failure and family structure.

We have found that in about five or six specific indicators, for what they are worth, there is no question about it: the Negro family structure in this country has become weaker over the past fifteen years. The statistics are just as good as they used to be, I am sure. This thing is a steady weakening. We, for instance, calculated (it is not a rough calculation but a very uncertain one, I guess) that at least 56 per cent of the Negro children turning eighteen in this country have lived on AFDC at one time or another in their lives. Probably not much more than a third and surely less than 40 per cent of the Negro children turning eighteen have lived eighteen years with both their parents, as compared with, I think, 92 per cent of the whites. Is that right, Mr. Hauser?

**HAUSER:** Yes.

**MOYNIHAN:** The illegitimacy rate is soaring. In a central Harlem area last year, 44 per cent of the children born were illegitimate. The number of female family heads, broken families—all these things are there. The question is: Has that not reached a critical mass, so that it just no longer responds to the plain ups and downs that we have? I do not know.

**HANDLIN:** I had a comment on an earlier paper, but I would rather listen to someone else discuss Mr. Moynihan's paper.

**HAUSER:** Let me suggest a hypothesis that may provide a basis for discussion and a thought about Mr. Moynihan's question. A time perspective may be important. For one thing, as recently as 1910, 89 per cent of all our Negroes still lived in the South, 73 per cent of them in rural areas. Within fifty years, which is less than one lifetime and less than the lifetime of a lot of us around this table, the Negro has become transformed from 73 per cent rural to 73 per cent urban and is now more urban than the white. I would judge that at the present time, 1965, at least a third of the Negroes now living in our metropolitan areas have not been there more than fifteen years. It may be more disproportionate than that.

My time perspective, Mr. Moynihan, is this. Look at the family structure in that rural slum South, where a good many of our present extant Negro population were born, reared, and from which they have migrated. Look at the problems of transition and readjustment as a result of the migration into the largest of our metropolitan areas, where half of that population is now resident. Look at the general economic and social setting in that situation. My point is that this transition may simply be the matrix in which this type of disorganization of which you are speaking is to be understood, that is, that these are simply frictions of this adjustment. My hypothesis—and I suggest it because I have seen this type of thing in Latin America—is that it is possible that the first opportunity for the Negro to acquire the sex patterns of behavior, the family structure which characterizes middle-class white society, has been only through the access to white society produced by this tremendous migration within the course of just this last human generation. And it is possible that the Negro is going to acquire the family structure characteristic of middle-class white society by reason of his urbanization and metropolitanization and is now merely showing transitional friction. In Latin America, the indigenous Indian is beginning to acquire family structure like the rest of his white society, only after the process of urbanization.

Let us put it in a simplistic way. We talk about urbanization's having transformed the traditional family, and it most assuredly did. It may be that urbanization is providing the only opportunity the Negro has had, in his three and a half centuries in this society, to acquire what we regard as the standard or norm with respect to family patterns.

**EDWARDS:** I think this problem ought to be seen precisely in the way Mr. Hauser describes it, and I think it has another implication for us. Given the indices which are mounting, we can look at them in terms of two points in time, or a number of points in time. I think the increasing disorganization is in large part directly attributable to the attempt, as Dr. Coles points out, of these families to cope with some of the problems of urban life. The time dimension becomes important, from my view of this problem, in the sense that while we talk about strategies, we had better get our sights straight as to how long this might take us, no matter what strategies we work out. How soon can we expect results from any given program or programs? This becomes very important. We can sit here and talk about what we can do, but we ought to think about how much effort it would take even if we do it in the most efficient way, even if we have the right answers. Many of the problems, particularly the problems in family life, are so deeply institutionalized that they are not going to change.

The intriguing thing about Mr. Wilson's question is whether we can separate out the hard core from, say, the deserving core, as a point to attack. I am not sure just what this takes. There are so many variables involved that the effort it would require to figure it out would be considerable. I am inclined to believe that the kinds of situational programs that we talked about, such as employment and education, all will have some impact, but the impact might be minimal in some areas, and it would take a long time for us to see visible results. We can measure it in terms of reduction of unemployment from 5 per cent to 3 per cent. This may really not have the fertilizing and salutary effects that we think this ought to have in family life, but we cannot neglect it. The truth of the matter is that many of the attitudes, many of the changes in relationships which will go on in these families, will be the direct result of programs which happen in the community. These things, in terms of the attitude question, will have a great deal to do with improving life conditions for the families—the kinds of images they get.

If I may, then, make my major point, it is that the time dimension becomes important—a hindsight view becomes important—in understanding this kind of transitional problem. I think we have to put a time dimension on the forward look, in terms of what we expect from given strategies. The results are not going to be as forthcoming as some of us hope, even if we design up a problem. It may well be that we are in the process now of having the kind of pains which may have great payoff. If we look at what has happened to the Negro, not relative to the white, but in terms of the *absolute* dimension, we get a different perspective on this problem, even from the 1940's. Instead of having linear developments in trying to close the gap between Negroes and whites, it may be that the Negro is in the process of acquiring the kinds of skill, sophistication, and knowledge which will take an exponential growth. This is the way I think the problem may well develop. But we have to have some notion as to what we can expect, given any kind of program. I think we are likely to set our sights too high on that.

GEERTZ: Although I quite agree with some of the points about transition, I want to cast a rather dim view on the optimistic notion that time heals all wounds. I think that the thesis implicit in Mr. Moynihan's comments is that absence of policies in this area is in a sense strengthening the weakness of the Negro family. There is no reason at all that transitional states cannot go on for such a long time that they become almost unbearable. Although I think that in the long run urbanization will certainly change the Negro family, it does not seem to me that it will necessarily change it toward some established middle-class pattern that keeps reproducing as if there were some sort of evolution intrinsic in the whole system.

Along these same lines, I want to express my misgivings about a too strongly aggregative approach to these matters. Mr. Turner put forth what I think is one of the best definitions of integration I have heard: a random distribution of the burdens and opportunities of a society independent of race. I think the question to be asked of simply aggregative approaches and strategies is whether they are achieving this. Mr. Fein pointed out that some things are indeed very much associated with, say, the rise in general employment; but these are just the things that he happens to have measured, and they also happen to be the things which are most directly tied to things such as income. My point, to reiterate, is that there are many things which are not being measured and, as Mr. Berry said, some things that cannot be measured. We still do not know whether occupational mobility, residential dispersion, type of family structure, self-image of people, attitudes, divorce rates, relief percentages, etc. really are as responsive to these aggregative strategies as some people say they are. Until we differentiate our problem and look at it in detail and look at the actual relationships between real variables, rather than rely either on aggregative notions entirely or on generalized social forces such as urbanism, I do not think we are going to understand what is up, and I do not think we are going to have a decent policy to deal with it. This, I gather, is the essence of Mr. Moynihan's remarks. Somehow or other, we need to know more about the specific things that play upon the Negro family.

**BERRY:** About Mr. Hauser's remarks on the transition of Negroes and the inversion of statistics on farm-living and city-living in a fifty-year period of time, I think there is something that is awfully important. I do not think that any people in the history of mankind has ever been required to make this transition as poorly prepared for it as the Negroes in the United States. The fact is that after Negroes make the transition, the further assault of the ghetto is upon them. The poor Negroes who live in the ghetto suffer from every type of social pathology that is known to man—slum shock. When we translate all the horrible statistics that Mr. Moynihan has given—which I am sure are mathematically true—it is not so shocking, considering the circumstances in which Negroes have lived, that 56 per cent of the kids fail the Selective Service test. The shocking thing, under the circumstances, is that 44 per cent *pass* it, because they do not have any business passing the test with what we have done to them. Rather than proving that Negroes are unable to do things, what this proves, I think, is that Negroes are a magnificent people. The fact that they are even here is magnificent, after 352 years of systematic brutalization and deprivation—and it has been systematic.

What we are trying to do is find out how to reverse this thing. How can we reverse it? We talk about how Negroes are going to move to the city, Mr. Hauser, and become urbanized and learn white middle-class standards and goals and values; but they are not going to do it if we keep them in compounds, because the only way toward acculturation is association with a culture. We bring Negroes into the city, then keep them in compounds. Then, worse than that, we build these damn high-rise public housing projects, which people do not live in, but infest. Again there is a double assault in the ghetto of poverty and of misery; and misery does feed on misery. These people, the black poor, who are crowded into the ghettos of our big cities in most instances do not have any opportunity to associate with white people except at a point of hostility.

They do not have any contact at all. Their teachers look down upon them. The school system says they are uneducable, although we find out they can be educated in tutorial centers when they get out of school—educated by unskilled people, as a matter of fact, which indicates something else. They are the last men hired. They are called names. Doors are slammed in their faces.

We have a lot of theories about American life, such as the melting-pot theory. Hell, Negroes did not get melted, because you did not let them into the pot; and the only way they are going to get melted is to get into the pot; and the only way they are going to get into the pot is through a design for an integrated society. What we have now, what we are practicing, is a design for human destruction. Any Negro youngster who comes out of the black-poor ghetto and makes it at all, without a brush with the law or without becoming an unwed father (which I think we ought to talk about as well as unwed mothers)—any kid who comes out of those damn, big slums in big cities and makes it all on his own is a big, fat accident. He is a cultural mutation.

**COLES:** I would like to recall something that happened last summer in McComb, because we have been talking about hard-core groups. In one of the most vicious areas in the state of Mississippi, and particularly in McComb, within a period of three months, there was a rather significant social change. At Oxford, Ohio, the leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) group that I was working with felt that they could not ask any volunteers to go into this area. They would have to go themselves and set an example. It looked like the most hopeless situation imaginable for that project. Then there was an explosion in the Freedom House, and it pretty nearly destroyed the building. We saw, for the first time within the Negro community, over 200 people come together around the Freedom House and then assemble in the church. This was a historic moment for the Negro community, let alone the state of Mississippi and McComb, because what happened was that the Negro community manifested a kind of cohesiveness and organization around the issue of protesting that surprised everyone.

By this time I had long since abandoned any interest in individual motivations, but I was curious about which people had come into this church from the Negro community. It turned out that the people who had gathered there were not rural farmers and their children (and there are many farms around there, some of them individually owned for generations and some of them sharecropper cabins with Negroes working there). These people were not the Negroes in the established structure of McComb, the teachers, the few professional men, storekeepers, or those who were employed. The pool halls had been emptied. What we would call the hard-core delinquents—the group that if I were a McComb Negro I would think of as a hard-core, difficult-to-work-with group—had assembled around that destroyed Freedom House and later in the church and had dragged their parents with them in the evening. (Incidentally, for the first time in that region and probably for the first time in the history of the state of Mississippi, they had police protection from the state.)

It made me wonder about what is hard core and what is not hard core. Here was a hard-core group of most-difficult-to-work-with Negro children and families, suddenly becoming the leaders of the Negro community and the leaders in a very important phase of the beginning of the breakdown of the structure of the McComb community, white and Negro. I wonder, therefore, when we talk about hard cores in the cities too, whether perhaps we should think of the structure of the Negro community and what we want broken down or what changes we want. I wonder if some of the delinquents whom we find most difficult might not be the basis for all kinds of possibilities for social change within the Negro community and, for that matter, from the point of view of solving this problem. We tend to think of the Negro community at times as a kind of undifferentiated alternative to the white community; but I think there were possibilities within the hard-core, most-difficult-to-work-with groups that are perhaps more hopeful than the established Negro community in both urban and rural areas.

**PARSONS:** I wonder if there is not some kind of a central position in the Moynihan-Hauser-Geertz discussion. It seems to me that Mr. Moynihan stated very clearly a very basic problem, that Mr. Hauser put it in perspective and pointed out a direction of possibility, and that Mr. Geertz then warned against the dangers and difficulties. I do not see that it is necessary to side with one of them, though according to temperament and how much you know you might be more inclined to do so. I feel very strongly, however, about one major point that ties in with Mr. Hauser's. If the goal is coming *into* the main structure of the society, by way of the urban social structure, and moving up from the predominantly lower-class position and dispersing through this structure, and, as Mr. Geertz said, above all through occupational opportunity and the educational and other qualifications for taking advantage of that, then this is a crucially important path. That is, if the dangers Mr. Geertz very rightly calls attention to are to be avoided or minimized, it has to be within *this* setting and not within a structurally different setting.

**EDWARDS:** My feeling is that occupation is one aspect of it, and it may be the most important; but the whole structure of opportunity must be opened up. This is the vital point about the urban community. The thing which has affected Negroes most, and caused the persistence of many of these family patterns which we see accentuated in the urban community at this point in time, is the great isolation which Negroes have suffered. The society is becoming a more open society. It is true in occupation, in terms of legislation, and in terms of all kinds of voluntary organizations. This must be implemented in large part by opening up the structure in other ways. Take the matter of housing. It would not matter if Negroes had good jobs, if they could not live where they wanted to live. Therefore, around this general point, we must see other things—a whole stream of forces which play upon the urban community. I think we must see the problem in that perspective. When Mr. Hauser says "urban community," I am sure that the notion is that some things are done better there. Whether we like it or not, this is going to be the arena.

**PARSONS:** And now the Negro group is exerting much stronger pressure than it ever did before.

**MAYER:** I would like to go back to one of the points that Mr. Moynihan made. It is an extremely important point which has not been sufficiently discussed and which indicates possible action. The statistics which he quoted on the Armed Forces Qualification Test results are impressive. They show clearly that despite all the difficulties poor families in general and Negro families in particular are faced with, despite, for example, the problem of children being brought up with a maternal head of family under aid to dependent children, as long as the number of children in the family is small, most of them manage to cope. They cope well when there is only one child. The great majority of them still do well if there are only two or three children. But when the size of the family goes up to four, five, and above, then nobody copes. Half of the children who cannot cope are from families of six or more. It is obvious to me that such data show as clearly as any the need to make voluntary birth-control information and material available, cheap, and very easy to obtain.

**WILSON:** I want to suggest, before we go on with some of our questions and disagreements, that this conference, as it has proceeded so far this morning, to me has been absolutely remarkable. I think that things have been said here that would not and, indeed, could not have been said ten years ago. The social psychologist is telling us that attitudes perhaps are not fundamental but can be changed by altering behaviors. A representative from the Labor Department has been telling us that family structure may be more important than employment. Although I do not think they have been given full credit for having said this, we have economists here telling us—in Mr. Tobin's paper, for example—that we can now produce for employment. We only lack the political will, and we must turn our attention not only to the problem of political will but to the problems of certain structural changes. We have had Mr. Tobin describing at some length the problem of preschool education and birth control, welfare payments and family allowance.

I think it is important, I should add, that we not divide up into the aggregators and the structuralists or the attitudinalists. It is very easy to try to push economists into being simply aggregators; I do not think the economic papers we have before us are simply aggregative at all.

All of these things, it seems to me, are things which would not have been said at a conference about Negroes or the problems of American society just a few years ago. I think they all point in a common direction. I think, also, that although we may disagree with the precise formulation that has been given to us, the problem of the family is coming to be a central issue here. In some way, we are going to be returning to this theme throughout the next day and a half, even, I suppose, when we begin to talk about politics. I just wanted to call attention to how far, if not *we* had come, then our disciplines had come, before we allow ourselves to resurrect certain clichés which might indicate divisions or backward tendencies which do not in fact exist.

FEIN: I was struck by some of the remarks that Mr. Edwards made about getting a time perspective and taking a look at the future. When I wrote my paper, I tried, as those of you who had an opportunity to read the paper will recall, to get some kind of a time perspective by looking not at differentials, but rather at how long ago the white reached the particular level that the Negro is only now attaining. When I wrote the paper I was appalled: (A) The gap, in terms of time, was widening. (B) It was a big gap, in terms of time. Therefore, even if rates of progress were stepped up, it would take some considerable time for the Negro to reach the level that the white now has—to reach equality even if the white made no further progress. But as I listen to the discussion this morning about the almost completely closed society and its various facets, I am reminded that one might have written my paper with a degree of optimism. When all is said and done, the Negro is *only*—and I hope that word is not misunderstood—twenty years behind the white. This suggests that the situation is bad, but it is not the kind of a situation that is hopeless. If you look at differentials, the income is 51 per cent; but if you look at the time horizon, it is sixteen or twenty years. That is a heck of a long time for a person born and living today, but it is only twenty years. If the Negro today is where the white was in 1945 it is *not* a completely closed society; and progress, particularly if one adds special efforts of one kind or another, can cut that time gap rather sharply in our lifetime. The focus of my paper is on the horribly long gap but perhaps optimism rather than pessimism is called for, because the gap is a heck of a lot shorter than many of the comments would imply—and can become much shorter not in a century but in our lifetime.

HANDLIN: I wish to make a comment on the observations made earlier about a closed society and the direction in which equal opportunities are likely to come. I want to enter a caveat against what has been said here—a point that I make more fully in the paper which you will have this afternoon. While there is a certain sense in which we speak of an open society as a desirable model and of random distribution as a goal toward which we ought to move, in actuality, right now and in the immediate future, the opening up of economic opportunity is more likely to come through the use of the organized power of the Negro as a *group* and through the claim for and establishment of the right to certain kinds of preferential treatment—through the development of the solidarity of the group in pursuit of these goals. From that point of view, to speak of randomness or integration is a little bit beyond the point. This is a group that has defined economic characteristics; and it will be using its power, so far as it gets that power, toward those ends. I think it is important to be cognizant of that as an actuality, at least in the immediate future.

HAUSER: I would like to make some brief observations on a number of points which have developed, but I do not think there is disagreement on those points. For example, Mr. Geertz went beyond what I had in mind, speaking about urbanization as a process, when he suggested that any automation in the urbanization process might preclude program and interference and intervention. This was not at all what I had in mind.

I think, on the contrary, that what I had in mind was well stated by Mr. Parsons. Similarly, with respect to the earlier consideration of perhaps adding labor-intensive types of projects to absorb the Negro, I certainly think we ought to depend as much as possible on a free market to develop these kinds of jobs. I am quite aware that with respect to such things as the hard core, the unemployables of the 1930's—and I am old enough to remember them—became almost completely employed in the 1940's. What makes a person unemployable is partly a function of the environment, including the full employment environment, in which he lives.

The key point I would like to make at this discussion, because I think it affects a number of other points that have come up, is something that I have in my paper and which puzzles me from the standpoint of the kind of program or the kind of policy that would get around it. Incidentally, my topic, "Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro," was assigned to me; so I am not dealing with the problem as a whole, but with demographic factors. I was struck with the fact, which I think we would all agree on, that the demographic factor that opened up the opportunity for integration is *internal migration*. Internal migration took the Negro out of the ghettoized deep-slum South and put him into the metropolitan areas in the North, in the West, and also, as a matter of fact, in the South. Let me add that I define the term integration quite differently from the salt-and-pepper-distribution definition, as an opportunity for social interaction, for participation in a common life process—what is meant by assimilation or acculturation. The internal migration, I point out, was a necessary condition for setting in motion the wheels of integration, but it is not a sufficient condition.

The real problem, which appalls me and for which I do not see any quick answers, is that another aspect of this migration, the *magnitude* of it under the exigencies of the war, has produced vast enclaves of Negroes, far greater over shorter periods of time than anything we ever had in our foreign immigration. If we think just in terms of the physical measurement of the ghettos, the average Negro in a ghetto is at a considerable physical remove from any social interaction with the white in that metropolitan area. I think that, in terms of physical measurement alone, we may have transplanted the subcultural isolation of the rural South into such mass enclaves in the North as to negate the theoretical opportunity for social interaction. This may be the critical thing from the standpoint of effecting integration in any fundamental sense of acculturation or assimilation.

It is clear, since we have set down strategies, that one obvious answer is *open occupancy*. Let me say, incidentally, that this certainly must be stressed somewhere, wherever the programmatic aspects of this appear. But what also appalls me (and I am looking for answers here) is that I am utterly convinced that even if we had completely open occupancy, even if the Negro had the freedom to live wherever he pleased throughout these United States Negroes would still live in enclaves for an indefinite period ahead, certainly in the coming human generation. They would do this probably for the same reasons that our foreign groups lived in enclaves.

May I also enter a protest against the definition of integration as a random distribution of opportunities and burdens. This definition really fails to see the character of both the world and the society in which we live. We live in a pluralistic world. We live in a pluralistic society. To say that we will not have integration until we get a random distribution of Negroes is, in effect, to espouse a program of the type that they used historically in Canada with the Acadians. Yes, they got them integrated. They just intermixed them through the rest of the population to make sure they could not be in fifth column. I think the essence of integration in our kind of a pluralistic, free society lies not in the achievement of a random distribution, but in the achievement of a distribution that results from the fact that each person is absolutely free to determine for himself whether he will continue to live in an enclave or whether he will go out, so to speak, and live in the broader community. I do not think any of us is espousing forced legalistic random distribution of the Negro any more than this has been espoused in the past, but this has important implications. If the Negro, for a variety of reasons, continues to choose to live in the warmth of his own enclaves, obviously this will cut off or greatly retard any opportunity for social interaction of the meaningful kind that leads to integration.

Let me close with a big question, which at this point involves the Negro community itself, as well as the larger white community. How do we deal with the fact that, partly because of the pressures generated by World War II, after three and a half centuries of rural experience, within a period of fifty years the Negro has been drawn in a huge mass into a metropolitan society? Instead of having an isolated subcultural group in the South, do we now have indigestible enclaves in the North? Have isolation and lack of opportunities for integration simply been transferred to a different physical setting?

TOBIN: First, I want to agree very strongly with what Mr. Wilson has said. There is no conflict between aggregative diagnosis and aggregative remedies and specific diagnoses and specific structural remedies. On the other hand, those of us who emphasize the global environment, or the total picture, do so because it often seems that people have a rather nearsighted view of specific problems. I am always afraid of too specific an approach to such problems. It is like punching a pillow: We solve one problem here, and another pops up somewhere else. But as long as we are agreed, Mr. Turner, that both can go along together and need to go along together, I do not think there is any conflict.

Mr. Moynihan raised a very interesting question. I do not think it has been answered yet. He asks whether something is happening to the family structure in the Negro community that is somehow dissociated from the general economic environment. I am not sure that the statistics necessarily show that this *has* happened. It may be that the disintegration of the family, as shown in his diagram, does not have just a simple contemporaneous relationship to unemployment and other variables, but is a more complicated product of lags, accumulations of past unemployment, and so on. Anyway, we have the problem. Not being an authority, I am not sure how to do anything about it, aside from making general and specific economic improvements in the employment situation. I should think, however, that the problem of getting Negro men to assume the family role and to take it seriously, as is normally done in the rest of the society, is associated with the lack of job opportunities for them and the intermittency of their employment. Society puts a good deal of stress on economic achievement as the proper function of the man. When the man is unsuccessful because of discrimination, unemployment, or other things, I should think it would have some influence on creating the problems that Mr. Moynihan is talking about. I think that beyond trying to improve that situation in terms of economic opportunities, we must consider other specific things that can be done. There was some mention of family limitation. We ought to get that more openly on the table. Social policies in this realm could be adopted.

I have one further comment, on the idea of labor-intensive employment. One could set up employment projects, similar to WPA, in which the products of the employment would not meet the test of the market place. It would be done specifically to provide employment and income. I can see, also, where that might be a better way, in terms of self-respect, than passing out income dissociated from employment. But it would still be a stop-gap measure. If Negroes and other poor people in this society are going to earn the American standard of living, it is not going to be in labor-intensive employment in the long run. It is going to be in capital-intensive employment. It is only capital-intensive employment that can provide the kind of income that is the objective of the aspirations of people in this country.

**HAUSER:** It would be transitional at best.

**TURNER:** I would simply reiterate that a goal or *the* goal of trying to distribute the Negro randomly through opportunities and burdens is a different problem from trying to raise the median level of income for the Negro from $3,000 to $5,000. They may be related; and, in part, our difficulty is how do we relate the two strategies of, on the one hand, raising the level of income and, on the other hand, raising the level of status or equalizing status. Going back to Mr. Wilson's earlier remarks, I think that unless we perceive these goals as being different although related, we may get into trouble in trying to develop strategies for them.

**GEERTZ:** I just want to say a couple of words, since I somehow started all this. The first has to do with random distribution. I was talking and Mr. Turner, I assume, was talking about distribution in qualitative terms and not just random distribution of people through the society. I still think this is the most reasonable definition of integration—rather more reasonable than assimilation into white middle-class standards. But that just depends upon what you think we ought to have.

I do want to clear up, though, one thing which I thought I had said. Perhaps I was misunderstood. I am not against aggregative approaches at all. I was not opposing them. I was pointing out that we must be sure that the aggregative policies that are proposed will change the variables we want to change and not just the ones we can measure. I am not against a tight labor market. I am just very doubtful that it will wash away all our sins. I am not sure that it will do all those things that it is claimed to be able to do. It will have some effect on some of the things that Mr. Fein measured, but I am not so sure that some of these policies will have effects on things which are very important to us in this whole area.

My point was not that I am opposed to the two strategies, but that I think we should not try to test always aggregate measures. It seems to me a kind of circular argument. I want to be able at least to get at structural measures.

I wanted to say something else, about pluralism; but I have said enough already. I am a little bit doubtful about some aspects of the notion of pluralism based upon race, as a permanent feature of this society.

## SESSION II

**GRAUBARD:** It seems to me that we should now proceed with some of the other papers, returning to those of this morning when they seem relevant. I suggest we consider now the papers of Mr. Parsons, Mr. Pettigrew, and Dr. Coles.

I do not know how one can attempt to set forth in very brief form Mr. Parsons' argument; but, having said that it cannot be done, I would like at least to discuss some of his major themes which are relevant to the things we have already talked about and to those we will be talking about before this meeting is over. Mr. Parsons' principal concern is with the question: How can the Negro be made a fully participating citizen in our society? While he sees that legal rights and political participation in a society constitute necessary conditions for full inclusion in the societal community, he says that they are not in themselves sufficient conditions, even when taken together. What is required in order for them to become sufficient is the social component, the addition of social welfare, so that in fact certain handicaps that the Negro suffers will become more or less manageable. Mr. Parsons discusses the way in which the Negro today may have inherited the status of the immigrant as the immigrant has himself moved up. The difference, however, between the Negro's position and that of certain earlier immigrant groups is that the Negro has to start by acquiring the most elementary components of legal and political citizenship. He has begun to do this, essentially through the intervention of the federal government. This has been accomplished by legislation and court action. Mr. Parsons reflects on the causes of poverty and the role of poverty in keeping the Negro outside of the societal community. He considers family structure and the extent to which, in the absence of adequate family support and other institutions to help the Negro, the Negro is disadvantaged in a way that earlier immigrant groups were not. Mr. Parsons then proceeds to describe those conditions that must exist in society if the Negro is in fact to be included. He lists several, not the least important being that there exists in the society a commitment to values which make inclusion desirable. This feeling, obviously, must exist among whites as well as among Negroes. Both political and economic measures are clearly necessary; economic measures will not be sufficient.

Mr. Pettigrew begins with a discussion of racial roles and of relations between the races. According to Mr. Pettigrew, both Negroes and whites are capable of confusing their roles. Whites flatter themselves into believing that they are superior. Negroes may, by the way in which whites comport themselves, imagine themselves to be inferior. Organized churches have not been a conspicuous source of interracial contact within the United States—a point made again by Father Fichter. The educational institutions that exist today provide only limited interracial contact. In fact, as *de jure* segregation of schools decreases, *de facto* segregation is increasing. The employment pattern is not encouraging. Socioeconomic status does not seem to determine the attitudes of people in the area of housing. Mr. Pettigrew finds that in the matter of integrated housing there is a tendency for the white, middle-class, educated man to react to this not very differently than the way people of lesser education and lesser economic means do. There is a discussion of the white and the Negro Southerner. I think both because Mr. Pettigrew is a Southerner and because he feels that historically both the white and the Negro Southerner are members of the same subculture, he sees that there are reasons to hope that integration will occur in the South more quickly than it will in the North. In fact, integration, particularly of the residential variety, is not so far from being a possibility there as it is in the North. He urges us to realize that, in itself, increased contact between Negro and white will not produce understanding. Then he cites the definitions that Gordon Allport presents of those conditions which, in fact, do lead to trust between peoples who are brought into contact. It is not enough, he points out, simply to reduce anti-Negro prejudices in white society. Another very important point that he makes is that the U. S. government is not the only sponsor of institutional protection for the Negro, but it has become the prime agent of planned change.

Dr. Coles is concerned with describing the psychological concerns and character of Negroes, especially Negro children. He particularly wants to show the conditions of life that a Negro child experiences. The presence of danger—the acceptance of danger—is part of the Negro child's life in a way that it is not a part of the white child's life. This, as Dr. Coles points out, creates a specific sensitivity in the Negro child to certain problems and to certain forces. Negro youths, from a very early moment in their lives, have to gauge their relations to white persons. One of the most important tasks to face the social scientist today, he says, is learning how individual members of an aggrieved class of people can accomplish some sort of order or coherence in life, how they can manage to exist within the society, how they can manage to cope with the society. Much of the evidence Dr. Coles brings to bear on this problem comes from his study of migrant workers, many of whom are totally unequipped for our white middle-class world. Individuality, he says, remains one of the strong elements in Negro character despite the common suffering that they have been exposed to.

I cannot possibly do justice to these three papers in such brief comments. Perhaps I should leave it to Mr. Parsons, Mr. Pettigrew, and Dr. Coles to say a few more words.

**PARSONS:** There are one or two points I would like to make. First, it seems to me that Mr. Berry made a remark that is basically a theme statement for what I am talking about. However, I think that I would put it rather more strongly than he did. It should not be "all right" to be nonwhite. It should be taken for granted that the basic community is composed of various groups which have historically been characterized as white and nonwhite. I think we can say that this has progressed very considerably. Take the case of Dr. Julian, which Mr. Berry mentioned earlier. Given a level of value characteristics in other respects, then racial color becomes irrelevant. This bears very strongly on the legal side of the problem, but not only on the legal side.

It seems to me this leads over into a point that I discussed in the intermission with Professor Tobin. I think he and I are both putting forward aggregative aspects of the total problem: that the definition of the national community is in a sense analogous to the state of the economy; that the opportunity for full acceptance in the national community for any particular group is enhanced if the community itself is in a relatively self-confident and, if you will, expansive mood; and that this is a very important generalized condition that is difficult to pin down for specific groups.

I very much want to latch onto a discussion of the temporal dimension, which both Messrs. Hauser and Edwards brought up earlier. While in many respects the problem we are dealing with is unique, it is not totally isolated in our history. I think it could even be that, in the perspective of the present moment, most of us tend to underestimate how problematical the status of other groups has been. They were, to be sure, white; but they were not unequivocally acceptable from various previous points of view. I single out the groups that became very prominent in very large numbers relative to the population of the time, to so-called new immigration at the turn of the century, and particularly the Eastern European Jewish group and the overwhelmingly peasant, predominantly Roman Catholic groups. There are many, many complications to this, but I have the very strong opinion that, however much more difficult the Negro inclusion problem may be, having been through the phases that American society has been through with these other groups is an immense asset that ought to be taken into account in considering what conditions will most facilitate the full inclusion of the Negro group. I will not say that it was a necessary condition or that it was sufficient, but it is certainly a strongly favorable condition. Those are a few of the keynotes of my paper. I think we will also come back in this discussion to the question of attitudes and symbols and the role of the movement in clarifying those symbols of inclusion.

**GRAUBARD:** Mr. Pettigrew, do you want to add something about your paper?

**PETTIGREW:** My chore was to concern myself with contact between Negroes and whites as I think was brought out this morning. I tried to document the notion that there has been, ironically, proportionately less contact between Negroes and whites during this last twenty-year period of enormous and important social change in race relations. Then I tried to project it to 1984, to pick a fateful year. I do not think family integration, or contact at the family level, is going to increase significantly, although probably we will see the end of laws banning it in twenty states of the union. I do not see that religion will be a major source of contact in future years. I see work as the major source of contact and education as the next.

Housing will still be largely segregated, rather intensely segregated, even in 1984. But we will have a pattern of token housing desegregation in the suburbs, and whites looking around in their own neighborhoods will think there has been enormous racial change. Their own neighborhoods will have gone from no Negroes at all to an "invasion" of two or three Negro families. This will create a pattern in the suburbs of token desegregation of virtually all facilities; but, while this is going on, the ghetto will be growing ever bigger and will not have been cracked by 1984. What I am guessing is that housing will be the toughest single realm to crack. As Mr. Graubard mentioned, one of the reasons I say this is that unlike all other attitudes toward all other realms, this one does not significantly relate to education and status. Resistance to this is just as strong among the college-educated as among the grammar-school-educated.

I have tried to hook this up with the idea of stigma. I am always bothered by any comparison of the Negro American group with any other American group, simply because I believe that, given American history, the stigma against the Negro is absolutely unique. The fading out of this stigma is going to be a difficult process. We have never had a stigma comparable to it for immigrant groups, for any Roman Catholic groups, Jewish groups, or anyone else, including Indians, although it may be that the Indian group comes as close to having something comparable as any group we can think of. I predict that the stigma will be with us for a long time to come, but that it will fade. There is evidence, of course, that it has been fading, as Mr. Rossi mentioned earlier, at a verbal level and that it will start fading in many other ways. But it will be slow.

This leads to change considerations. I tried to talk about a "success vs. test" dilemma. (I would like to have some criticism on this for the rewriting.) It seems to me that people who plan private and public interventions in race relations are always faced with this dilemma. Will they skim off the cream in a kind of *success* alternative, whereby the program can hardly fail but will barely touch the problem? Or will they tackle the real *test* of the program, whereby the program may fail because it cannot crack the really hard part of the problem? I argue for a joint strategy to keep the program alive and also to evolve some way of tackling the hard-core issue.

I end by making a distinction which I see now was also being made by a lot of other people in their papers. We mentioned it this morning. The progress we have seen and will continue to see will be the progress of the middle-class Negro American. By 1984 he will be rather firmly entrenched in affluent America. It will be very conspicuous progress, as far as whites are concerned. It will be obvious to whites. The first of the problems Mr. Hauser distinguished this morning will not be licked by 1984, but that is where we will see the dramatic progress in the next twenty years. It is "the other Negro America," in which I have not really seen any significant breakthroughs yet, that concerns me.

COLES: I have tried to put together some impressions that have come of living in a region that I was not born to but have lived in now for six years. In the middle 1950's, when I came to this area as a psychiatrist, I was put into Mississippi in charge of an Air Force psychiatric hospital. I grew very fond of the region and stayed down there to study what happens to white and Negro children in desegregated schools in New Orleans, Atlanta, Little Rock, and other cities in the South. Consequently, I spent my time moving around in a station wagon from Negro home to Negro home and from white home to white home, living there and, I guess, becoming more of an anthropologist than a clinician. I soon extended this work to some interest in the sit-in movement. I worked with the youth there for four years. I attached myself to them, lived with them, and tried to find out what happens to them and to the people whom they confront. More recently I have been trying to see what happens to people who are migrant farm workers and sharecroppers. All this was done by talking with people, drawing pictures with children, and making other such attempts to carry a clinical office procedure into the everyday world and its problems.

The thing that has impressed me (I think perhaps I am getting at it in this paper) is some of my own education—the extraordinary depths of my misconceptions, as I look back at my education. How utterly ignorant I was, although supposedly trained in a field which presumes some sensitivity to human beings. I think that in that sense this paper presents an attempt to come to terms with my own past and my own difficulties educationally. I recall reading Kardiner and Ovesey's *The Mark of Oppression*, for instance, years ago as I was getting ready to work in this field. At that time it seemed like a great eye-opener to me, and I have heard stirrings here today that reflect the thesis of that book. Even more recently I read *Slavery* by Elkins and was quite taken with that at first. But both of these books and, indeed, a lot of my kind of thinking perhaps fail to do justice to what happens to people in life.

All I can find now, after reading *The Mark of Oppression*, is that there is a mark of oppression and that this is what happens to people. Somehow, however, I do not find that a lot of the Negro children I have met are anywhere comparably damaged. I am not so sure that they are any worse off than people in middle-class suburbs. I do not even know how to contend with this kind of ambiguity. I just reviewed a book called *They Harvest Despair*, by Dale Wright. It describes the plight of the migrant worker—unquestionably a plight when looked at from one point of view. However, I do not think I have ever seen despair in migrant workers, though I have seen it in myself and in a lot of us. I think that what I am trying to get at in this paper is, how do we deal with this kind of a situation? How do we deal with our own ways of thinking in confronting other people, whose lives are perhaps so different from ours that sometimes we are simply forced into endless repetitions of our own assumptions? Perhaps it is too much of a task to undo them and push them aside to look at other people.

But I think, after all, I am trying to find some connection between what we call *the* Negro and all of us. I am tired of hearing that only such and such a person can understand such and such another person. I went down South, and I kept on hearing from white people that you have to be a Southerner to understand what the South is like. To Negro people, you have to be a Negro to understand what it is like to be a Negro. I suppose I say to my patients that you have to be a psychiatrist to understand what is really going on in a patient and the patient feels that you have to be a patient to really know what suffering is. Somehow, many of the generalizations that we make today about all kinds of conditions and people and situations seem to be lacking in some kind of connection with what happens to *all of us*. I guess I wrote my paper with the idea of trying to undo this notion of my own mind about large groups of people and their characteristics and to bring in some appreciation for ambiguity and paradox in life—not celebrating it unnecessarily, but perhaps reveling in the mystery of it all.

**WOODWARD:** Both in reading Dr. Coles' article and in talking with him, I have been struck with the fascinating way in which he challenges so many of our conceptualizations of problems. I think it is a rare thing that such first-hand experience with the problems we are dealing with is brought before us. I hope that the conference can explore some of the implications of these experiences. As he says, it seems to be impossible to reconcile some experience with the people in the most oppressed spots—the Mississippi Delta, Lee County (Va.)—with, say, the Kardiner and Ovesey reportage, which I think predisposes us to a kind of fatalism about the effects of the Negro's experience in America. The implications of slavery and of segregation in the past have fallen into a pattern of pessimism and despair that a fresh experience with these people does not bear out at all.

If Dr. Coles is correct, it seems to me we need to rethink a lot of our basic assumptions about what is going on and to rethink our conceptions of the capacity of the Negro. Even in the oppressed part of the South, he finds Negroes endowed with spontaneity, gaiety, lightheartedness, courage, and indomitable optimism. These people have hope, perhaps because they have such a low level of expectation. But they are not despairing people. They are not hopeless people by any means. The type of leadership that they have produced in the last ten years has indicated that they have great potentiality. If Kardiner and Ovesey were right about them, we would never have had the leadership and the movement we have. I would like to see some of these things explored.

**REDDING:** I have been worrying about Dr. Coles' paper because I am not at all sure of the size of his sample. I am worried, also, because certainly one of the acknowledged protective devices that the Negroes have used is to block out from their contacts with white people what they really feel and what they really think. They are inclined to say what they think the white man wants them to say. In the book *The Mark of Oppression*, there was a much wider sampling. I wonder if this does not tend to render that book's conclusions more valid than the conclusions to which Dr. Coles comes.

**COLES:** *The Mark of Oppression* is based on the case histories of twenty-five people, as I understand it, only half of whom were seen longer than three months.

**REDDING:** But under conditions quite different from the conditions under which you saw people.

**COLES:** This paper failed to describe the conditions, but I will be glad to state them. This is based on individual work over four year's time and with 32 cases studied intensively, and numerous others less so. I spent three years with individual families and saw them weekly, two and three times a week in the case of several of the children. It was over a long period of time and not just a matter of going from one person to the other and talking to each briefly. I honestly feel that I heard quite a wide range of feelings expressed, not simply a kind of stereo-typed or immediately social or tell-me-what-I-want-to-hear response. In the case of the New Orleans children, we lived there for three years and saw them every week for three years, with some exceptions. This was a long-range study in depth, as was *The Mark of Oppression*. We used a similar kind of clinical technique and had the same problems of sampling that any clinical work has, from Freud's down to the present time. This is a legitimate area of discussion—what value does the clinical case history have?—and, of course, one that Kardiner and Ovesey talk about in their book. It was not, by any means, an impressionistic kind of tour of the South.

**PETTIGREW:** I do not think we necessarily have an either-or problem. I think it is perfectly possible, in fact I suspect probable, that both studies are right in describing certain segments of Negro America. In the case of Kardiner and Ovesey, they had only twenty-five cases, but indeed they actually (and they tell about it quite openly in the book) selected most of their cases for known pathology. They were looking for trouble, and they found it. That was the aim of the study. They also worked in Harlem. They had a Northern sample. You worked primarily in the South, Dr. Coles, and you did not go out looking for pathology. You took the people as you found them. I would suggest that perhaps your findings actually have more generality, but I would also say that there is a regional difference, which I tried to talk about just a little in my paper.

In the real psychological sense, there is probably more hope in the South than in the North among Negroes today, and this has been true for some time now. There are some survey data relevant to this. We talked to protest leaders. They will tell you they can organize a Selma with one-tenth the effort—well, they are not even sure they could organize Harlem. They certainly have not managed to yet. In the sense of the pathology, the mark of oppression in some ways may be more severe in the North than in the South, given the level of aspiration. That gets into the basic thing we have to consider, the relative deprivation that Professor Woodward alluded to. The fact is that the aspiration levels of Negro Northerners have been high for some time, but Negro Northerners—at least "the other Negro America" segment of the group—have not made conspicuous progress. About two-thirds of Northern Negro communities have not made significant progress. They have not seen *de facto* segregation break down in front of their eyes. Negroes in the South, and many of the Negroes Dr. Coles talked to, are living through a very exciting part of Negro Southern history. They see *de jure* segregation falling down right in front of their eyes. They can see progress.

This was just too late to include in my paper, but I will include it in my revision. A Gallup survey published the other day shows that in fifteen months, between 1963 and about six weeks ago, Negroes in the South say they are much better off. I forget the exact form of the question. It was something to the effect of "Do you get fair treatment?" In 1963, nine out of ten said they get unfair treatment, and in the last poll a few weeks ago, seven out of ten said they get unfair treatment in the South. There was no change whatsoever among Negro Northerners. There are many differences in the Kardiner-Ovesey data, but I believe that the regional difference is the big one. We need not, however, assume that one of the studies has to be wrong. I rather suspect that both studies found what they were looking for.

**EDWARDS:** Would there be an age differential, too, since the Kardiner-Ovesey subjects were somewhat older? Your perspective for the most part was on children, as I remember it. It might make a difference in terms of the spirit you capture, as one can see in working with adolescents, who in the nature of the case might be a little less starry about this.

**COLES:** I worked with the sit-in students, who are pretty well into their twenties, and with the parents of the children. I do not think it is just a matter of the children's age.

**HUGHES:** I want to throw in a point on American ideology about social problems. We seem to have an idea that we have a better case for proving injustice if we can show that it makes people sick. There is a tendency to say injustice produces neurosis. Then if we find out it is not so, we think we are not so bad off. There is not necessarily any relationship between neurosis and injustice.

**MAYER:** I am in favor of Dr. Coles' method. The approach to normal human psychology has often been one of extrapolation from psychiatric studies of abnormal cases, and the field of normal psychology has suffered from this. Considering the pressures put on Negroes, it is not surprising that if we look for pathology we find it. This does not mean that if we do not see acute pathology in some people, it must be there in milder form. It may simply show that people are different; while a relatively small number of people will be very much affected, a large number of people will not be affected to the same extent or may not be affected at all.

**BERRY:** We are certainly indebted to Dr. Coles for some fresh insights. I see merit in a good many of the points he made, including the business that we hear so often: "You have to be a Negro to understand what happens to Negroes." It is not entirely true that you have to be a Negro to understand Negroes, but it sure as hell helps. Even the people who go and live with Negroes and take pills to darken their faces never quite establish whatever it is they are going after, because they can always quit taking the pills. They can always go back to being white again. It is an experimental kind of thing, which is by no means the real thing because we do not have any black-no-more pills. As far as we know, we have to battle this out the whole way with each individual Negro. He is the experiment. He is under the microscope. He is not the one who is looking through the microscope. There is a great deal of difference. I see the Negroes in the city. I see "the other Negro America" that Mr. Pettigrew talks about. And I see both despair and desperation among these people as they live in the city.

I see *despair* as a part of the other Negro America, which has been so mistreated. The other Negro American is not fighting any more. He is like the blanket Indian who is determined, I guess, just to sit out this life. This is partly what throws some of our unemployment statistics off, because this group of people is out of the labor market. They are not even looking for jobs, so they get dropped from the statistics. When we say that Negro unemployment runs two and a half times that of white, we are low. That is just what the figure says. If you add what I think is a corrective, an additional 4 per cent for the discouraged workers whom we just forgot all about, the people who are not looking for jobs and therefore are not counted any more, then we are running three and a half to one in terms of unemployment.

The *desperation* also must be there. I am differentiating desperation from despair. Desperation drives people *toward* doing things. I do not think the people in the South whom Dr. Coles has studied would be driven to take the risks they have taken except through desperation. I do not think the people whom we admire so much in the South today—the people who run the risk of getting shot to go register to vote—are people who have not been driven to something.

But I am looking at this from the standpoint of how the other Negro America appears in the big cities. I think that racial troubles are related to all of the statistics we have been talking about: the statistics on illegitimacy, on broken homes. And we should add alcoholism and narcotics addiction. Those things did not just happen. I think the only explanation is that Negroes, who have been driven to seek some kind of respite from the permanency of the pain of living as black Americans, have found that there is some relief in alcohol, some relief in narcotics, and still further relief in trying to live in fantasy. I would just like to ask Dr. Coles if he might not rethink a little bit about this notion that seems to indicate that there may be some merit in getting the hell kicked out of you. If we used this background to seek some strategy, I would be very frightened of it.

COLES: I do not think, first of all, that I want to put myself out of business. I think I have seen plenty of psychopathology. However, I think that, in all honesty, one has to look at a particular life and come to a conclusion about it. I never saw addiction among the migrant workers and tenant farmers I studied for two years. I see it in Harlem all the time and in Boston, where I am now; but I did not see it in the rural people. I saw other things in them. I do not think I am trying to say that there is any virtue in social, economic, or political oppression. Nor have I failed in this paper to point out what happens to people who have lived as the various people I have described have lived.

The only point that I am trying to get across is that we must find out, for instance, when desperation starts in people. One way of doing it is to take clinical histories, to get to know someone like James Forman, as I have for five years. What is desperate about him? When did he start being desperate? How did he feel ten years ago, fifteen years ago? What are his memories of growing up? How does he recall his childhood and now experience his present life? I think if you did this, you would find that James Forman at twenty and James Forman at thirty-five are two different people. This does not mean that the oppression was any better or worse than it is or has been; it means that history has developed, that the society has changed, that James Forman *is* of a certain age, and that at a particular moment in his life something happened that got him engaged with a moment of history that produced things that we all know about. I think that the oppression is a historical fact. We know about that. I have never denied it. But I think it is of concern to us to find out what happens to people in ongoing history so that one way of behaving at one moment may become transmuted into another way of behaving at another moment. What happens, for instance, which makes people become desperate or despairing, when in the past they have been curbed and maybe even frolicsome in the midst of being curbed.

If you were to ask me what it means when we see the drunken happy times amongst migrant workers on Saturday night, I would not hesitate to go into a psychoanalytic description of the roots of this kind of behavior. I almost take that for granted. But I do not think that in our present culture this is the kind of thing to emphasize. It is all too well known. I do think it is important to look at lives with some sense of concern for the changes that occur in them, not only as a function of childhood memories, but as a function of situational things. In McComb, Mississippi, last year there were a group of people who behaved in a certain way, regardless of their childhood experiences and, for that matter, regardless of whether they were in despair or were not in despair. The crucial issue was not so much the despair as the dynamiting, the actions of the segregationists, and a whole series of individual incidents that challenged people—and they *were people* as well as Negroes. I think this may be an impossible problem. If what I have written is taken as a justification for persecution, then, of course, it is a dismal failure.

The other thing I want to suggest is that we look at the problem of urban living versus rural living; I think it is terribly important. We have a group of people who have been historically, socially, and culturally conditioned to one kind of life. But history and events have moved these people, in this massive migration that we all have been talking about. It is not enough simply to point out that suffering has occurred.

**BERRY:** It is a fact that in seeking ways of improving life in these United States, if people are going to follow the food line, then they have to go where they can work, no matter how beautiful the rural countryside is. It seems to me to be absolutely ridiculous to recommend as a strategy that people go back to live on the farm. I am back to my point of this morning: If one is going to succeed in this society as we know it, then one is going to have to be able to play the game by the rules of this society. One rule of this society has been to have very little concern for the individual. The individual has to go where the factory is. If they move the factory and a person wants to work, he moves, too. To hell with his family ties and the ground that he lives on.

My only objection to this aspect of what you have said, Dr. Coles, is not that it is not interesting, but that I do not see how it will help us get where we are trying to go. I think we are trying to seek a program of human renewal for Negroes in the United States, so that they can function according to the rules which middle-class white people have made. The white people say that the Negroes must live by those rules, but they do not let the Negroes come in to find out what the rules are.

**FLEMING:** I would like to move from this point to a point of strategy—something that might help us move forward. I think Mr. Pettigrew's point, that there is an important regional difference, is worth paying some attention to and maybe more than he has already paid in his paper. Impressionistically speaking (my sample is one, myself), I think that there is a basic regional difference in that things are moving in the South. There is visible progress. The enemy, so to speak, is more personal. There is a feeling that there is something you can get your hands on, something you can work against and with increasing success at the level at which the protest and response is going on in the South.

If we accept the notion that people gain strength, aspiration, and energy to strive from a sense of being able, at least potentially, to manipulate their environment and to cause a significant change in what happens to them, then I think we can understand the regional difference at least in part. Southern Negroes have much more of this kind of feeling than Negroes in the large, impersonal ghetto situation where it hardly seems worthwhile. The Negro in the ghetto does not know what to fight or how to fight it, and he does not see much tangible evidence that he is going to get anywhere by fighting it. This is not just a personal experience; it is a group experience. We talk a lot about *models*. The models for the Negro youngsters in the South are fairly numerous and getting more numerous all the time. They can look around and see Negroes who are getting elected to legislatures for the first time, Negroes who are achieving in a number of ways—even if it is by leadership in the protest movement, a status, an importance, a kind of power. Even if the individual himself is not a wheel and is not manipulating his environment, his models are there.

This leads me, in a roundabout way, to a point of strategy. I think there is a danger that we will underplay the importance of the relatively small group of Negroes who are arriving at what we call middle-class status. These people, at least potentially, have to be the models for Negro youngsters, if we take as the goal their achievement of middle-class status—so they can play by the rules of the game, Mr. Berry. What is happening to this relatively small fraction of Negroes at this stage in American history seems to me to be terribly important. What is happening to them, as has been pointed out by Mr. Moynihan and others, is that they are doing relatively very well. I think we can make a good case for this. But the fact is that the opportunities that are opening to them are very recent and, as the housing situation and other situations indicate, still much too limited. Therefore, I do not think that the arrived Negro middle-class people are as yet a convincing model for, let us say, the ghetto-dwelling youngster. People are not convinced instantly.

Somebody suggested an analogy at our lunch break. In a laboratory situation, if the experimenter shocks the subject every time he tries to open the door to the food and then suddenly turns off the electricity, he does not expect the behavior to be instantly modified and the subject to accept on faith that he will not be shocked. This is approximately what we are doing with our expectations of instant conviction on the part of Negroes that new opportunities are open. We will have to produce a lot more convincing proof, if we expect to make use of examples and models, which, I think, are the only hope for breaking this vicious circle of the ghetto psychology and plight.

**WOODWARD:** The notion of desperation as the motive or explanation for conduct does not seem to me to be correct. People do not act the way the Negro has acted in the last few years when they are desperate. They have responded to conditions far worse than they now face with apathy, defeatism, and despair. People who show the courage, energy, and confidence that these people have shown cannot be said to be desperate people or people acting in desperation in quite the sense that you say, Mr. Berry.

**BERRY:** Part of our confusion is what we discussed this morning when someone asked us to analyze class structure within the Negro community. It seems to me that you are talking about *the* Negro, and I was talking about *some*. There have been acts of desperation and heriosm throughout what we have called the revolution and earlier on the part of some people. But those who have design and who are leaders in the revolution were not part of the desperate people of whom I spoke. The people who have led the revolution are the middle-class people, whom I think you were referring to as apathetic. The whole revolution has been led by middle-class Negroes, not by lower-class Negroes and not by those people way down in the Deep South. You can name Martin

Luther King and all his deputies, James Farmer, James Forman, and all the other leaders. Most revolutions are not led by the people who are most depressed. I do not know of any revolution that was led by the people who were most depressed. The leaders are people who are riding the tide of expectation and are dissatisfied. The bird that is born in captivity does not really mind it. It is the bird that gets out of the cage occasionally and finds out a little bit about the world outside that is the most dissatisfied. So I suppose if we are going to have the kind of silly situation we live in now, we should have followed the rule of the old slave masters. If they wanted to punish a Negro, they taught him how to read.

**COLES:** A number of the children I have seen in the South have come from the very lowest rung of the socioeconomic ladder and have led their race into white schools. Of the four Negro girls in New Orleans, three of them were poor by any definition within the *Negro* community. Certainly many of the young people in the sit-in movements in Mississippi and Alabama do not come from the Negro middle class.

**BERRY:** We are not talking about the same thing. You are talking about some participants in the movement, and I was talking about the leaders. The leaders of the sit-in movements came from colleges.

**COLES:** I feel that there is some evidence that some of the leaders—leaders, I say, not participants—were not from the middle class.

**COHEN:** If I may, I would like to try to develop another subject. There seems to me to be a conflict between what Mr. Pettigrew has said and what Mr. Parsons has said about the relation, or lack of relation, of the Negro to the various immigrant groups in this country. I think this has strategic implications, because if the Negro is not like any other group, if the Negro has no relation to the history of any other group, then the Negroes as a group perhaps cannot be integrated into society in the same way as other groups have been. It seems to me that Mr. Pettigrew and Mr. Parsons were saying things that were somewhat different. I believe that Mr. Turner, in his paper, also has a different point of view. I hope that we will get some clarification.

**GRAUBARD:** Yes. I think we will also want to come back to Mr. Berry's and Dr. Coles' discussion.

**GEERTZ:** I was going to raise the same question as Mr. Cohen. I think the real issue is the one that Mr. Pettigrew raised. It is not so much that the Negroes are entirely different. But is there something added—this notion of stigma? I think there is, and I think it has not been characteristic of other groups. It is a different kind of an image, as Mr. Parsons pointed out very clearly. I do not want to argue this out in detail, but I think this is a really important issue to discuss: whether or not there is something very special and unique in terms of the stigma applied to the Negro.

**BERRY:** The attitude of the white people, that is what is unique.

**HANDLIN:** In my own view, this question can be exaggerated in the sense that immigrant-derived groups were different from each other. It is only in a vague sense that we can speak of *the* immigrants. The Irish were different in their experience from the Jews, and the Germans were different from both, and so on. In that sense certainly the Negroes, who are more different in color as well as in sociocultural background, are not like any of the other immigrant groups. They are not like any of *the* immigrant groups. The question is whether the uniqueness of this group is so different from the uniqueness of other groups that there is no basis for meaningful comparison. I personally think that Negroes are different from Irish or Italians or Jews, but that there is enough in common in their experience to make it possible to talk about them in comparable terms.

Being very conscious of the stigma attached to the black man's color now, we perhaps underrate the character of the stigma that was attached to other groups of fifty or sixty years ago. The racial view of what was a white man in, say, 1910 excluded an Italian almost as decisively—and on racial-genetic grounds—as it does a Negro in 1965. That has changed, but I think it is important to be aware that it has been there. I think it is also important to be aware of the fact that there were periods when the Negroes' color in some parts of the country was weighed as a much less consequential factor of separateness than other people's divergent ethnic heritage. In the Northern cities, such as Boston, where there were small groups of Negroes between the Civil War and 1910, the carryover of abolitionist attitudes created a very favorable image of colored people. Insofar as I have been able to make any estimation of these matters, in that period the Negroes not only ranked higher in social and economic status than people such as the Italians, who were then just arriving, but also were considered less separate socially. Of course, that has changed. But I think it is a mistake to accept the stigma as fixed, unalterable, and part of the necessary character of the group.

PETTIGREW: I have not argued that the stigma is unalterable. In fact, I said explicitly that I believe it is fading out, but fading out slowly. It may be the way I said it. I think Mr. Geertz just stated what I believe better than I stated it. I would not say the Negro's whole history was necessarily incomparable. Therefore, I did not detect a difference in my position from Mr. Parsons' position on this. We both talked about stigma, as a matter of fact. We wrote that independently. I do disagree with Professor Handlin rather sharply, because I think the stigma *is* unique; and because of the stigma, I think comparison is dangerous.

Take your own example, Mr. Handlin. You just cited the comparison with Italians. Italians were never slaves, particularly slaves in the American context; and I think slavery stamped this stigma in a very special way. If we believe Elkins, it was even a unique form of slavery which the United States perpetrated upon the Negro Americans. Evidence of this—and there are, of course, other reasons contributing to it—is that Puerto Ricans could have a housing dispersion in Chicago from 1950 to 1960 in a total degree greater than Negro Americans have managed in two generations in Chicago. Negro Americans in Texas have two more years median education than Mexican Americans, who come in with cultural and language problems, yet make only two-thirds the median family income of Mexican Americans. It is very difficult to cut through data such as these and argue that there is not something really special and particularly potent that is applying to Negroes which does not apply to other admittedly discriminated against groups such as Puerto Ricans and Mexicans.

**HANDLIN:** You do not have to cut through those data to make the comparisons you have just made. You have made comparisons, and all you have to say is that these are comparable terms.

**PARSONS:** I think I am to some extent the man in the middle. I would not want to deny either point of view but to try to reconcile them by saying that I think they are comparable, not on any simple quantitative basis, but as qualitatively different types that are systematically related to each other. My own view is that "Negro-ness" has become the symbol of an inferiority of status and that none of the white ethnic groups which have preceded the Negro in a partly comparable status in the social system have had that particular primacy of stigma. However, it has seemed to me legitimate to relate the Negro stigma to the general stigma of presumptively foreign exclusiveness. The Catholic problem is much complicated by the ethnic diversity of the Catholic groups and the long period over which they have been important, but I think it has come to a certain head with reference to the problem of organizational solidarity within the society. In my paper I have called it "the state-within-the state emphasis" (in quotation marks, because it needs many qualifications). I think the Negro has in common the exclusion, because of a presumptive and largely projected relation to a value pattern of our society which creates a very difficult problem of admission and inclusion. I think the only thing I would want to commit myself to at the present point is that our having had relative success—and only relative, of course—with the other groups creates a somewhat more favorable climate for dealing with the most difficult. They are different kinds of situations, but they are systematically related rather than randomly related. Neither this group nor any of the others is completely unique.

**HUGHES:** I think Mr. Berry is right. The big thing in this country is that one should not be colored. I think we should perhaps look at the stigma, then look behind it at the culture. I happen to be descended from Appalachia people who were there before the land became as poor as it is now. I can tell you that while lots of people there have strong race feeling, once the race feeling is gone, they can talk to Negroes. There is a basic commonality of values. Of course, the difference is, given the stigma, that when the white boy from the South went North there might be a slight stigma on him, but he did not go through a long period of urban stigma. However, when the Negro comes up North, give him a few years of Northern urban life and that commonness that I think Mr. Woodward and I are both saying is there disappears.

But it is amazing, in spite of the stubbornness of this stigma, how completely it goes sometimes. I have known many cases of Southerners who one day or another simply said, "It is a fake," and acted the rest of their lives as if the race stigma were a fake. And when they did, they may not have understood the Northern city Negroes (who have another kind of experience), but they were very effective, in the way of the Tom Pettigrews, I suppose, in understanding the problem very well. But I think we do have to distinguish the future of the stigma from the future of the Negro as an American with a value system, religion, and so on.

**MAYER:** If we are looking for a precedent in terms of evolving a strategy, I think we are much too marked by the title of Gunnar Myrdal's book, *An American Dilemma.* There is a much better simile to be found in Europe than is available in the history of the United States. For at least a thousand years Europeans were essentially divided between a noble class and serfs, and the serfs were slaves and had every stigma of slavery. They could be sold. They could be bought. There was no question of their marrying into the nobility, and, in fact, the nobility exercised every possible effort to preserve the purity of the race. Counting the quarters of nobility on all sides—parents, grandparents, great-grandparents—was not simply a matter of snobbishness; it was done to preserve what was felt to be (although the word did not exist) genetic superiority. This system broke down very slowly, in probably no less than 200 or 300 years, essentially through the intervention of the central government (the King) who made noblemen out of successful commoners. The rate accelerated to such an extent that suddenly at the end of the eighteenth century nobody believed in innate, hereditary superiority anymore, and the French Revolution occurred. It would be interesting to follow the way in which the extreme stigma of being a commoner as compared with being a nobleman disappeared. This may parallel what we are dealing with now. Thus, in many ways the problem of the Negroes in America now is much more similar to the problem that most of our great-grandparents had to face in Europe than it is to the problem of any of the particular minorities in American history.

**HAUSER:** Mr. Chairman, I think that here again the introduction of a time perspective may help in part to unscramble the problem. I also feel that I want to reinforce the position that Mr. Parsons indicated. I think much of our discussion is a little bit reminiscent of the controversy on idealism and nominalism, and I want to make a plea for conceptualism. The example we just heard from Dr. Mayer is very appropriate. Moreover, I think we can see it right in our own history. I would like to reinforce Mr. Handlin's point on this, because, having in mind the history of three and a half centuries, I doubt very much if this so-called stigma for the Negro today evokes more passionate, categoric, prejudicial response than the response, let us say, of the Pole who spat on the ground when a Jew was mentioned because a Jew was a Christ-killer. A Jew was never a slave, but he was a Christ-killer. (Something, by the way, for which he may soon be absolved. It depends on the vote.) It is clear that the Italian never was a slave, but the Italian was a gangster. If we went right down the list of possibilities, I doubt that we would find that the stigma with which the Negro lives is worse than, say, the stigma of papism in the mind of the primitive fundamentalist Baptist. It would be a great mistake, in terms of a strategy, to assume that we are dealing with something that is tremendously more difficult to overcome than other problems which have been overcome in the course of two or three generations at the most, even within our own national history.

I would like to close with an implication for a strategy. I think a strategy is to be found in devising means of social interaction. Mr. Pettigrew discusses quite adequately, with special reference to the criteria of Allport, the strategy of social interaction that would maximize what I think has always been generically the answer to this kind of problem, namely, to provide a basis for interaction that will break down the categoric response, that will modify the imagery, that will show the stereotype to be in reality false. I think this is where the strategy must lie, and I think that this may be implemented by the four criteria which have been laid down by Allport, as reported by Mr. Pettigrew in his paper. This has very important implications as we turn to various sectors of interaction: education, work, housing, religion, and so on.

**WOODWARD:** I do not for a moment think of this stigma as ineradicable, unalterable, or constant. I agree with Mr. Handlin that it has varied from time to time, from region to region, and even from city to city. However, I am afraid this analogy with the various immigrant or ethnic groups does violence to my sense of the history of the problem. We forget that, except for the Indian, the Negro is the oldest ethnic group in this country—even older than the WASP's, because more of them have come over since the Negro ceased coming over than came over before. He may have entered the urban ghettos and the consciousness of urban scholars only in the last generation, but the Negro has largely descended from eighteenth-century Americans. Negroes were here long before the other groups had come in any appreciable numbers. Yet the Italians, the German groups, and all the rest of them have never had, relatively speaking, the impediments in marriage or in opportunities, the slavery experience, and the segregation experience. It seems to me unhelpful to insist on this comparison. I find myself in Mr. Pettigrew's camp.

**TURNER:** I think that I also agree with Mr. Pettigrew, but perhaps for different reasons. Probably I feel stronger about it than he does, but I hasten to add that this is not a discussion which will be settled for years to come.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** We could take a vote, too.

**TURNER:** There are, unfortunately, very few things decided by vote. But I think there is another way of looking at this. The stigma in the case of the American Negro has become and perhaps was originally the rationalization for locking in a kind of behavior which would permit exploitation of a group with lower status and with less ability to defend itself. I think that this will not change until the stigma becomes dysfunctional or, in other words, until it becomes too difficult to apply. There are two ways of approaching this problem: First, to create a situation where it is impossible to conveniently identify the group to which one seeks to apply the stigma. Second, to create conditions under which it is no longer functionally important and no longer gainful to apply the stigma. To make it dysfunctional for whites to apply the stigma to Negroes it is necessary to raise the ante. If it costs more to apply the stigma in this way such behavior would become dysfunctional.

It seems to me we cannot expect to have the Negro existing as a cultural group without carrying certain kinds of defense and protest functions. However, as we look at other cultural groups in this society we can see that while defense functions still exist to a certain extent their importance decreases as the individual members find acceptance in the total society.

When we talk about the application of the concept of cultural pluralism to the Negro there is another assumption which is argued and contended quite vigorously both within the Negro community and in the larger community—namely, that there is a Negro culture. Some people feel that there is. We speak of the Negro values of the Negro religion. I am inclined to feel less and less that a Negro culture exists and that to the extent that there are life patterns of feelings and behavior these may be more appropriately considered subcultural symbols. These subcultural symbols appear to be rapidly fading out and will probably disappear in a relatively short time. Essentially what one has left as a source of cohesion is a banding together for defense purposes. It seems to me that this is not enough for distinguishing a cultural group. It may be enough to distinguish a group, but not necessarily a *cultural* group.

**MOYNIHAN:** I would like to suggest to Dr. Turner that there may be something that we can learn from a nonwhite group—it is right before our eyes and is really rather astonishing—along the lines of the strategy we discussed of making the stigma dysfunctional and perhaps finding that the problem of color disappears. I think it can be done in this country much more readily than we think—and I did not come here to be optimistic. I had been vaguely aware of this but had never thought much about it. I ran into it simply in trying to correct the "nonwhite" figure, which we use in the Labor Department, to produce the Negro figure. There is a racism in our statistics: A person is white; or there is something he does not have, and then he is nonwhite. That is how we divide everybody. But that nonwhite group contains one group of people whom, it seems to me, we should know more about than we do. I think it has to be said that no ethnic group in this country has ever been the subject of as much formal, federal, racist oppression as the Chinese or Japanese. A lot of it has also been local. I believe, for example, that to this day, statutes of the state of Idaho forbid the Chinese to vote. They can stand up with anybody's sorrows. And yet the 1960 census tells us some fascinating things about these people. In the 1960 census, the Chinese and Japanese were lumped together, possibly because census-takers find they cannot tell a Chinaman from a Japanese. They all look alike.

**BERRY:** This is true. I mean, it is true that the census-takers cannot tell them apart.

**MOYNIHAN:** One fascinating thing is that the proportion of Chinese and Japanese with no education—zero years—is ten times the proportion of white people with no education. And that exact same set of people, in the exact same year, had more than twice the proportion of their population in college or graduate school as had whites, had twice the proportion of their population employed in professional capacities as had whites, and had more than twice the proportion of their population employed in managerial or proprietary positions as had whites. As a matter of fact, we in Washington have thought how useful it would be in this country if we broke down our statistics and reminded ourselves now and then that there is a group that is not Caucasian that is twice as smart and twice as successful. The Japanese and Chinese have one-half the unemployment rate of the whites. They have one-half the marriage-dissolution rate, divorce rate, broken-family rate of the whites.

I do not know what the truth is, but I have the impression that twenty-five years ago these people were colored. They were so colored that they were a race apart, and when World War II started, for example, we put the Japanese behind barbed wire. Those who protested were not heard because they were, after all, colored people. Twenty-five years later, it seems to me, they are not colored anymore, except in terms of our census data. Am I wrong that they have ceased to be colored? They are Japanese; but if daughter brings home a Japanese, father is more likely to see the high energy physicist than the Japanese. In any event, I think that having solved the class problem, we have solved a color problem.

**GEERTZ:** It is just as easy to argue that they never had the stigma, despite the formal oppression.

**HUGHES:** The statistics that Mr. Moynihan speaks of—the number of Japanese children in college, their unemployment, and all the other things—would have been essentially the case in 1920.

**MOYNIHAN:** I do not see how that could be.

**HUGHES:** It was, though. I know because I happened to have been interested in the Orientals in the twenties. Their marriages were not broken up. They were in business. There was a stigma, but they were in college just the same. And they were not in juvenile court.

**HANDLIN:** Yes, but the stigma was there. The resistance to intermarriage was strong. The barriers to social contact were formidable.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** They were different, though.

**PETTIGREW:** The Chinese and Japanese were never slaves.

**GEERTZ:** That is right. It is not the same.

**HANDLIN:** The exact same points were made about the Chinese. They were excluded in 1882 because they were coolies—unfree. The big difference is the number. I think a very consequential fact in dealing with the Negroes is that there are nearly 20 million of them. It is much easier to accommodate a very small group and to adjust to their presence than it is to accommodate and adjust to nearly a tenth of the population.

**HAUSER:** Add concentration to that, Mr. Handlin—numbers and concentration. These are very important.

**EDWARDS:** So that I will not be misunderstood, I want to say in the beginning that I recognize the uniqueness of the Negro problem. I recognize that there are some handicaps, in terms of lack of opportunity, which the Negroes suffer at this point in history. Conditions are somewhat different now from when the earlier immigrant groups were arriving. One of the differences is that those groups came at the latest when the Industrial Revolution was moving into high gear. The opportunity structure, certainly with regard to dirty work, was much greater, as Professor Hughes suggested.

But I think one thing we ought to direct our attention to is the fact that in looking at strategy and intervention we tend to take a very formal approach to the problem. This is reflected in the kind of reasoning which we employ: reasoning from specific cases which have happened in the past and projecting that into the future. It occurs to me that there are all kinds of unwitting and irrational things which are happening, which may not really solve the problem, but which will have some effect upon the problem, and these do not quite get into the equation. We do not fully assess some of the things that are happening and will happen in even larger numbers with more intensive effect in the future.

I am inclined to be a little bit pessimistic about any short-run, rapid gains; but I am not inclined to be quite so pessimistic as Mr. Pettigrew seems to be. However bad the situation seems today, as compared with when the great stream of immigrants came into our economy in the nineteenth century, we have never had a time in our history when the government has been so forceful in trying to redefine certain situations and, thus, at the same time, in contributing to the definition of what is desirable and what is undesirable. We say that one does not change race in quite that way, but changing the situation will have some impact upon race.

Look at the other end of the spectrum—go into some of the schools with the youngsters. I think we tend to minimize the generational problems. Obviously, we are going to have trouble as long as we have the present generation. Someone has said that death brings about social change. As the generations move on, we are going to have, I think, a tremendous wellspring of attitudes, feelings, and rapport which these youngsters are building up. I see the junior-high-school level and the senior-high-school level. We know that these youngsters get prejudices imposed upon them from parents and in all kinds of formal ways. But I think all of these things are erosive, and in time they have a tremendous impact upon the definition that is given.

It is difficult to predict from today's data. We cannot fully assess what the picture will be, with all the intervening variables that are likely to come into being. My feeling is that the stigmas of the past are going to have a profound influence and that we are going to make slow progress for a time, but that after a period of time there will be a tremendous forward leap in terms of the feelings and the behaviors of people toward one another. I would not want to say when that will happen, but I think there is this constant building up at certain levels which we do not, in our formal approach to this problem, actually assess.

**PARSONS:** With reference to Mr. Turner's remarks, I want to say I think he was getting right on the track. This group solidarity, including the problem of a special group subculture, should not be considered in too exclusive an either-or context, relative to participation in other respects. Apropos of the Oriental, I am very fond of a little story. I happen to be a daytime inhabitant of a building of which the architect is Yamasaki. I was discussing this on one occasion with a colleague from the University of Washington, and the name Yamasaki came into the discussion. And my colleague said, "Oh yes, he is a Seattle boy, isn't he?" His Japanese origin was altogether secondary to his home town. I take this as a symbolic indication of what I would call pluralization. That is, Yamasaki is a Japanese American, but he is also a distinguished architect, and he is also a Seattle boy. I think this is beginning to happen with the upper group of Negro Americans. For example, to me Ralph Bunche is a distinguished Undersecretary of the United Nations. He is also a Negro American. One could run through Robert Weaver, Whitney Young, and a list of other Negro Americans who have become distinguished people. They have plural significances, just as when we mention Einstein as the symbolic distinguished theoretical physicist of this century, we might say, "Oh yes, of course, Einstein was a Jew, wasn't he?" But we would not necessarily say, "That Jew, Einstein, was also a distinguished physicist." I think we are moving in the direction of pluralization.

I myself feel strongly that it is important that the Negro American group develop an increasingly differentiated identity. I do not think that culture, in the narrower sense, is the only basis of it. I think that the very fact, which has been mentioned, of their common heritage of American Protestantism (and the role that religious leaders have taken in the movement) and their residence in the more general conscience of the nation are helping to establish a group identity. Another dimension of that seems to be very particularly the identification, which was brought out in Dr. Kilson's paper, with African nationalism and cultural development and, more broadly than that, with the nonwhite people all over the world. I have an impression that there is an opening which has already developed considerably, for moving out of the position of a status ascribed by the white majority in this country to one of much greater autonomy, which links into a number of different contexts.

Finally, I would like to question Mr. Woodward's implication of a very long involvement of the Negro with us. It seems to me, the segregated status in the South—which was the overwhelmingly predominant status until World War I—was such a special status that (perhaps I am overstating it), in effect, the mass Negro immigration *is* new immigration. It is not that it has been here for 300 years. There are, however, different aspects of this problem.

**WILSON:** I would like to make pretty much the same point that Mr. Parsons just made. To do so, I would like to return to our friends the Chinese and Japanese, whom Mr. Moynihan so auspiciously threw in. I suppose I return to them because I was raised in California where the Chinese and Japanese were *the* colored minority, in sufficient numbers and concentration in San Francisco and in Los Angeles, where I lived, that color bias and oppression were directed at them. There were no Negroes at that time, but there was a high concentration of Chinese and Japanese, as there is of Negroes in Boston today. The discrimination was rigid. It was sanctified by law. These people often could not own land in the state of California. They could not hold office. They were excluded from almost all aspects of life: economic, political, and social. It is interesting, in the light of Mr. Pettigrew's remark about projecting alter egos, that in the case of the Chinese and the Japanese we projected both an id and a superego. We thought the Chinese were lascivious. (Is it true what they say about Chinese women? What goes on in those Tong rituals?) At the same time, we thought they were crafty, wily, and deceitful. They really had a unique distinction. They were the combination Negro and Jew.

Now, after only one or two generations, while there are undoubtedly traces of discrimination, Chinese and Japanese move about with almost complete freedom in California. Things have even gone to the absurd point that in California last year, when the state put on the ballot a proposition that would make open-occupancy ordinances unconstitutional, some Chinese and Japanese voted for it. They did not want "colored" people—that is, Negroes—moving into their neighborhoods. This is an enormous change in one generation. It seems to me that if we had begun to analyze the problem a couple of years ago in terms of *stigma* (whatever this means), we would not have been able to predict this outcome. I do not think that the concept *stigma*, left undefined, is very helpful. What we are talking about here are *behaviors*.

A crucial fact, it seems to me, is that during this period—and I want to return a bit to this morning's conversation—these families were strong. They were in many cases, as Mr. Hughes quite rightly points out, overeducating their young at a very early age when the oppression was still very great. The fact that they came from, in some sense, whole cultures and were carriers of whole cultures and had memories of whole institutions and had experience in a wide range of business, political, and social life meant that they were able to develop and maintain a pattern of behaviors, which over time made it clear to whites that the crucial aspect of the Chinese and the Japanese was not their color. The crucial aspect was that these people were good customers. They were not criminals. They were good businessmen. You could deal with them. You could bargain with them.

It seems to me that, when we talk about the stigma of the Negro, it is easy to make references to slavery, 300 years, Africa, or color. But it seems to me it is more appropriate now to talk about behaviors and how much these behaviors differ in one group that is "colored" from those in another group that is "colored." I think that these behaviors are quite different. I think that they are different because of the way one group has been treated as opposed to the other and also because of the fact that urbanization is only now occurring among Negroes whereas rapid urbanization occurred quite a long time ago among the Chinese and Japanese.

I am making a plea, therefore, on two points. One, might it be possible to avoid the word "stigma"? This word involves assumptions about what is in the mind of the beholder as well as what is burned in the soul of the beholden, and these assumptions, I think, have not been perfectly spelled out. Perhaps we ought to talk about the behaviors and the cultural residues which serve to confuse in people's minds judgments that ought to be based on achievement rather than ascriptive criteria. Two, might we return, if we are going to discuss the meaning of stigma, to some of the comments we were making this morning about the relationship between historical stigma and family structure, learned behavior patterns, and culture?

**FEIN:** Let me address my remarks specifically to Mr. Pettigrew. It strikes me that one could say almost facetiously that one man's stigma is another man's badge of honor. How the individual bearing the stigma reacts to it is important and is relevant to some of the remarks which have been made about group solidarity. The stigma can give strength. Certainly in the case of the Jews, the stigma (and I would not want to argue whether it was as great as the Negroes' stigma) gave the group some strength. Perhaps it was because the individual could choose whether or not he wanted to bear the stigma; he could leave the group. The Negro has not had this choice. The individual Jew who decided to stay with the group could gain a certain strength from the fact that he made that conscious decision. He could have spent some money to have the shape of his nose altered and ceased to be a Jew. No one would have known he had been a Jew, particularly if he moved to a new community. But if he did not choose to undergo the operation, he could gather some strength from the fact that he chose to remain with the group.

The Negro has to be a Negro; he cannot leave the group. But he does have one choice: He can choose to be involved in a group activity from which he can gather strength, namely, the civil rights movement. For the Negro this can play a most important role in shifting what was a stigma to a very positive thing. You know: "Were you in Selma?" or "Were you in the march on Washington?" and so on. There is at least the possibility that although the Negro cannot escape being a Negro, he can be identified as a special kind of Negro or he can lack that identification. If he takes that identification, he may gain strength from it.

**COLES:** That is just what I was going to bring out. Certainly one has seen this in student after student. I have heard them say words such as "I feel different" and "I have never felt like this before." I think this involvement —this feeling—has been very important. It also ties in with what was brought up earlier about the generational gap. Many of the children, even the six- and seven-year-olds, have fought their parents for the right to go into schools. There are all the teenagers going into schools and the youths involved in the sit-in movements. On the other side of the street, one hears white children from segregationist homes saying, "This is a different country from what my parents have taught me it is." (I think that at some point we ought to bring in the influence of television on social change.) They see this. They feel it. And I think that what has been shared by both races in many of the Southern schools has been a sense of their own time, radically different from what either white or Negro people of another generation have ever known.

There is one other point I want to make. I think it ties in, by the way, with what Erik Erikson has called so beautifully "a more inclusive identity" that draws upon more than what has been and reaches out for something that has not yet come. I think of it in terms of an event that happened to one of the Negro children we were working with. This teenager from Atlanta went North to a school here in New England, and he found himself lonesome and homesick for Georgia. He eventually came in contact with several boys who were also from Georgia but who were white. He and three of these boys became friends, and they used to play records with Ray Charles singing "Georgia on My Mind." They were Southerners abroad. This was their identity. One heard them talking about *our* problems as Southerners (against the North). I would suspect that this has some implication for a strategy of how people can find things which have been pushed aside by history, events, or whatever, but which are latently possible for use in binding people together and making them think about one another in new ways.

**BREEDEN:** I find Mr. Pettigrew's *role* terminology more helpful than the *stigma* terminology. It takes two to make the play go on, and perhaps the experience of the Chinese in California is partly the result of their not playing the role which white people attempted to impose upon them. In our discussion of the history that makes the Negro stigma different, perhaps we are really saying that a role has a kind of permanence, first, in terms of the psychology of the Negro and white because of the history and, second, in terms of the institutions that it formed because of the long persistence of the role-play.

A point I would make regarding involvement in the civil rights movement is that since the movement has begun, not the phenomenon of "passing," but the phenomenon of "passing back again" has occurred with a number of people. I also have some information (completely unscientific) that during their six-week involvement in the organizational activities of the Boston school stay-out, youngsters who had no intention of going on to college suddenly decided that they could make it in this society. Before that involvement, they were playing another role. In terms of strategic considerations, I do find the concept of role useful. The concept of stigma seems to draw me away from strategic thinking.

**ROSSI:** There is one item of information I would like to throw in against the concept of stigma (which I think is merely reformulation of the old you-must-change-attitudes-before-we-can-get-anywhere argument). I emphasize again the real and very significant changes which have taken place over the last twenty years. Take a look, for example, at the white college-student population and their participation in the civil rights movement. Participation may be minute in terms of the total undergraduate population, but it is certainly significant as far as the students' visibility is concerned. The amount of acceptance of interracial dating and even of interracial marriage in the college-student population, if we take that as a bellwether type of population, is really quite considerable. It is close to a majority who would accept for themselves and for others interracial dating; and it is a very sizable minority who would consider interracial marriage—providing their religions were all right. This is really a significant move, and it looks very much like the way in which the Orientals' position has changed. How long it is going to take before the fellows on the Northwest Side get it is, of course, up to the Catholic Church.

**HAUSER:** I am not too seriously concerned with whether or not we decide there is a stigma, as I do not think it is going to be very important from the standpoint of implications for strategy or program. However, focusing on what has been said, especially in Mr. Pettigrew's paper, I want to suggest that there is some bad demography and some bad human ecology that is being introduced as evidence for stigma. If you want to defend stigma, at least get rid of the argument—you used it orally, Mr. Pettigrew, as well as in your paper—that the relatively quick dispersion of the Puerto Rican indicates that, at least in terms of residential segregation, the Puerto Rican is faced with a different kind of problem. I think this is a very specious argument. You are talking about some 10,000, 15,000, or perhaps as many as 20,000 Puerto Ricans, as against 800,000 or more Negroes. I think that this is a specious argument; it does not prove stigma.

The other point I want to make is that, because there is a little bad sociology in what Mr. Woodward said, it may also be questionable history. I think it is correct to say that the Negro has been *with* us for three and a half centuries. I would argue, however, that he has been *among* us for less than one generation. He has been among us for a smaller amount of time than our twentieth-century immigrants, including the Italians, the Poles, and the Jews. He has not yet begun to have social interaction with us. I would say it would be relatively unimportant if he had been three and a half centuries in Asia or Alaska or Iceland, from the standpoint of what we are talking about: his integration, involving social interaction and participation in the common life. He happened to be in the rural, slum South.

Because I may have developed a phrase that makes sense, I will repeat it. The Negro has been with us for three and a half centuries, has been among us for less than a generation, and has not begun or, more accurately, is just beginning to enter the process of social interaction. I would argue that we can understand the stigma in terms of history, but I think it would be absurd to say that the history proves that there is a *special* stigma. The Negro's stigma may prove to be as eradicable as the stigma of any one of our immigrant groups.

**COHEN:** We, of course, are terribly unhappy about the present situation. At the same time, we are not serving a cause in failing to note the tremendous progress that has been made in the past twenty or twenty-five years. I have not seen the history of the past twenty-five years quoted adequately anywhere. I think a service would be performed if we stated it. I would like to suggest that we might be right in the midst of the same kind of change that has taken place with regard to other groups, whose status has changed rather rapidly as I think the Negro's status has changed. I believe even social interaction is now coming. I would like to challenge Mr. Pettigrew's statement that there is no difference among groups, regardless of their education, concerning their acceptance of a Negro as a neighbor. The data he quotes are from 1955. I would suggest that there has been a considerable change since then. I would also indicate to Mr. Berry that for every case of Percy Julian, who is upper-middle-class or perhaps upper-upper-class, I can show you fifteen or twenty cases of acceptance. Indeed, we are now getting to the point in suburban areas in New York where no party is complete without a Negro. When there is a sharing of responsibility for a party, one person brings the drinks, another brings the potato chips, a third brings the hot dogs, and a fourth person brings the Negro.

**BERRY:** I know some Negroes living in suburbia. And I know about this other danger that we run into when we first begin to make some inroads toward liberalization. We run into the situation Mr. Cohen is talking about: Instead of making the Negro a scapegoat all the time, we make a kind of pet out of him—which is just as bad.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Is it as bad?

**BERRY:** Well, it is better for you guys. You get one. But the trouble is that when we fully achieve this concept, there will not be enough Negroes to go around.

I want to make a serious point about stigma. I am inclined to like the concept. I think that Mr. Pettigrew pointed the finger at the real problem that we are dealing with: *attitude*. I am not going to leave this, because the problem is the attitude of most white men, who look at color as a stigma. In terms of strategy, we talk about compensatory education and special training for the culturally deprived; but I think one of the strategies we need to develop is how to educate the so-called white culturally overprivileged. They are our trouble. Instead of putting all of our effort into trying to change the disprivileged Negro, we need to put some of our effort into trying to change the overprivileged white. He is likely to be the decision-maker, who is likely to live in the suburbs and run everything in the city without knowing what the hell he is doing. I would like to see us develop a special strategy to work on this class of white Americans.

**TOBIN:** This morning Mr. Turner defined integration as a sort of random distribution of Negroes in all strata of society.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** No. A random distribution of opportunities.

**TOBIN:** Not a forced randomization, but essentially a situation in which the probabilities of being in different strata and different occupations would not depend on race. They might depend on preference, but not on race. It seems to me it was a good definition. On the other hand, Mr. Parsons indicated, I think, that he would expect Negroes' entry into full participation to be similar to the entry of some of the immigrant groups. They might not be generally distributed or mixed through society. They might have subsocieties or subcultures; but they would still have high status. With that background, I think Mr. Woodward's remark about history was quite relevant. He indicates that it is much harder to find anything in the culture, tradition, and history of the Negro group to support them in a pluralistic role in society. The Jews, Irish, Italians, Orientals, and other groups had cultures, language, and perhaps even religions of their own. It seems to me that the Negroes do not have that same degree of independent tradition and culture to support them in any kind of full participation in the society, except complete integration into an America that is color-blind. I do not think Mr. Woodward's remarks had to do so much with the question of stigma as with whether it is possible for us to find any way in which the Negro can come into full status in this society other than by the society's becoming completely color-blind. The Negroes simply do not have the tradition that would enable them to follow the pattern of the Jews or the other groups which were mentioned.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Maybe the civil rights movement gives them something for a while.

**TOBIN:** Maybe, but the whole purpose of the civil rights movement is to be only temporary. If it succeeds, it will cease to be an integrating force.

**BERRY:** In order to achieve the color-blindness that you seek, for a period of time we shall have to be positively and affirmatively color-conscious.

**BREEDEN:** Does the place that a group takes in American society depend more on the group's culture and tradition or more on the needs of the society into which it enters? I am not certain whether there is a historical and cultural determinism that leads a group into a place in American society, or whether there is at least interaction between the places that are there and the places that people are fitted for. Against some of the background we laid out this morning, I might suggest that the economic future and the kinds of places that will be there will have something to do with Negro assimilation or integration, as indeed various immigrant groups took places partly in relation to the development of the economy at the time when they came on the scene.

## SESSION III

**GRAUBARD:** I know there is something Mr. Hughes would like to say, so I will begin by calling on him.

**HUGHES:** I think to some extent we have been spending our afternoon on either-or. I suppose the American Negro suffers under the most stubborn, socially depriving stigma that we have ever applied in this country; even so, it applies only to some things. It does not apply, for instance, to mother's milk. And other people have suffered under other stigmata. We have to ask: To what kinds of participation, in what social roles, does the Negro stigma apply? It is obvious that these may change from time to time.

It is still true, for example, that a Negro man cannot be the grandfather of a white child. The child would not be white, even though he looked white. That is the way this particular stigma works. We do not allow biracial bilateral American kinship, although I think what Mr. Rossi said indicates that this rule might break down—that in Hyde Park (Chicago), Cambridge, or Greenwich Village, people might have biracial bilateral family reunions.

Canon Breeden also asked about the roles to which a given social stigma applies. It is quite clear that the racial stigma is not applied to as many roles as it used to be. But if we want to know what roles it does apply to, we have to determine what roles there are. What is the structure of our society? It seems to me that this was the big point in Mr. Parsons' paper. Although our society is very open in some ways, it consists of a lot of more or less closed and endogamous nuclei, which have a common style of life and common values. Maybe one can marry into them, or maybe one can marry out of them. It depends on how exclusive they are and on what happens to the intermarriage of the people in them.

I would like to hear some discussion about this; and I hope that, if there is any talk of stigma in the issue of *Dædalus,* it will be defined with regard to the various social roles to which it applies. For example, it does not seem to apply to Japanese architects in Washington. We say that Yamasaki is a Seattle boy and do not find it necessary to say that he is a Japanese boy. I do not think that we can define stigma without talking about the structure of the society.

**PARSONS:** I would like to follow that up by reemphasizing the very great importance of aggressive pluralization of the social structure in a dual sense. (This is sociological jargon, but it is hard to describe the phenomena without it.) For one thing, the individual participates in many different contexts, and the line of social development has been a progressive increase in the range and diversity of those contexts in which an individual participates. It is a well-established generalization that this phenomenon is a function of socioeconomic status *within* Negro society. The members of the lower groups participate very much less than the members of the higher groups.

The other dimension is that there is an even larger diversity of group structures than of individual participations, but the membership of these groups is segmental and partial for the members. It is not total. It is not that being a so-and-so, one participates in such-and-such groups and only such groups. One individual participates in one combination, and another individual participates in a different combination. This makes it progressively less possible to categorize people by any one criterion. An individual is not a so-and-so; he is a *lot* of so-and-so's, as Mr. Hughes said.

It seems to me that, with this, the status of generalized inferiority, which has come to be the Negro status, becomes progressively more anomalous from a structural point of view. The whole problem of generalized inferiority has been masked in American society because the lowest status has been occupied for the most part (with pockets, such as Appalachia) by the most recent immigrant group. This has come to be viewed, therefore, as a temporary status. It may be a lifetime status for the immigrants; but their grandchildren will not, for the most part, be in that status. The Negro is the last, the end of the line. I do not think that we are going to have again the kind of mass immigration which we had in the late nineteenth century.

It seems to me that a combination of these circumstances makes the present situation particularly strainful. It is hardly conceivable—unless there were a general social breakdown—that the reduction of these strains would take the form of permanent consolidation of the inferiority status. This could have happened in the postbellum South, but I do not think it can happen with the movement of the center of gravity of the problem to the metropolitan North. That being the case, there is going to be very strong pressure to bring the Negro into the pluralization system. And the more he comes in, the less is it compatible with this generalized categorization.

**BERRY:** You know, we get new problems as we go along. We have been talking about the possibilities of breaking down things in the South when *de jure* is gone, but the Southerners are already coming up to Chicago to find out how to do it *de facto.*

**PETTIGREW:** I want to apologize for introducing the word *stigma.* In a meeting of people from many different fields, one of the problems is terminology. A term which has a special usage in a particular field may convey some other meaning to people from other fields. Many people took *stigma,* perhaps because of its connotation of "birthmark" or something like that, as implying immutability. The term does not have that connotation in social psychology. I am afraid that we wasted at least part of the afternoon on that misinterpretation. I still am going to use the term in my paper, but I will define it more carefully and will do so along the lines that Mr. Hughes has suggested.

I would like to come back to a point Canon Breeden raised earlier about the effects of the revolution on Negro Americans, as opposed to its effects on the structure, important as that is. It seems to me, on the basis of what social psychology knows now about changing people, that the movement almost replicates every ideal aspect of a situation which changes people. As Canon Breeden indicated, role terms help here. The revolution takes the "Negro role"—the role of inferiority—and stands it on its head. It pretty nearly requires the participant to violate the role in almost every particular. When you are supposed to be passive, you are aggressive. When you are supposed to stay out because you are not wanted, you go in—particularly because you are not wanted. You have group support for it. You get group reward for it. It is publicly done. It has every known major characteristic for maximal change in the individual.

This has two implications. First, when 200,000 people marched down Pennsylvania Avenue, some people said that it probably did not change one Congressional vote. I think it did, as a matter of fact. Whether it did or did not—I will leave that to Mr. Wilson—it was still worth it. It was worth it if it lost a few votes, it seems to me, for the therapy it provided for 200,000 people, white and Negro.

The second implication is with respect to advice commonly given the Negro. No one here has reiterated this fallacy. Maybe, however, it is something we should emphasize in *Dædalus*, because it is often heard—even among reasonably well-intentioned people in American society. People say that the Negro ought to scrub up, that he ought to concern himself with improving himself and improving the ghetto, that he should stop wasting his time in the streets, in boycotting, and so on. I think, from the point of view of the maximum-change possibilities of participation in the movement, that he is doing two things simultaneously: changing the structure *and* changing himself by virtue of his participation.

**BERRY:** If they would let Negroes work, then they would have to picket on their own time, and there would be less of them picketing.

**COHEN:** What proportion of the Negro population is in the movement that you are talking about? You are speaking rather generally, Mr. Pettigrew.

**PETTIGREW:** I think, as I was saying earlier, that the affluent Negro America is getting most of the gains of the revolution so far. I think, also, that it is affluent Negro America that does most of the participating and, therefore, gets the gains that way, too. Dr. Coles mentioned that some lower-status Negro children did participate in changing the South. I think that is the exception and not the rule. A great need of the revolution is not only to change the structure for the other Negro America, but to gain widespread participation from lower-status Negroes. So far, I do not see any mass participation by lower-status Negroes. I would like to be corrected if anyone has data to the contrary.

**KILSON:** I think the young leaders, although most of them are people who somehow got a chance to go to college, are of lower-status families. James Forman is an example. Another is Thomas Atkins in Boston. His father was a steelworker in Gary, Indiana. Atkins was a college boy; he was a graduate student at Harvard University before he went into protest. There is an element of the lower-status factor that has leaped into the new leadership.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** By generation.

**KILSON:** Yes.

**COLES:** One of the big issues which is now attracting attention, and which probably has a lot of people worried for a number of reasons, is what the role of these activists is going to be. A large number of them want to go into a kind of community work, in both rural and urban areas. They are really more concerned with challenging class structure than with dealing with the racial issue. On the other hand, there are the students who want to go to Washington and get embroiled in lobbying and similar activities. This has marked a decisive split in the sit-in movement and, I think, a very interesting one for us to think about. There are different implications, depending on which of these two tendencies predominates and which will be allowed to predominate in the kind of society that we have.

**HAUSER:** I am just going to add a footnote to the question that Mr. Pettigrew raised. If we look at the evidence there is, including the experience of Saul Alinsky, who organizes communities for "People's Organizations," we find not more than 6 per cent participation.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** That is a good deal.

**HAUSER:** Yes, it is.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** In national surveys, Negroes show about 5 per cent participation.

**HAUSER:** About 5 per cent? That is considerably greater participation than in labor unions.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** What do you mean by "participation"? Five per cent doing what?

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Five per cent reporting that they have participated in some way. It does not have to be in protest.

**BERRY:** However, I think there is a great error—even a tragic error—in thinking of the movement as just a demonstration. There is a whole lot to the movement besides walking down a street or sitting-in. It seems to me that, when we stop to think of the research, the education, the planning, the strategy, the raising of money and contributing of money, we have to conclude that there is a very, very, very high percentage of Negro participation in this revolution. We have to recognize that the revolution has a quiet drudgery side as well as the flamboyant demonstration side.

**PETTIGREW:** A third say that they have participated in a boycott by not buying something. So if we want to use that more general definition, then participation is much higher than 5 per cent.

**GEERTZ:** Not only that, but any social movement has leaders and activists and an audience. We have to think a great deal about what people who never go out in the street are learning from the Negro newspapers and, as someone mentioned, from television. How are they really seeing things? A lot is going on in the minds of people who do not say much and do not do much. It is a sort of reevaluation process. Certainly it has gone further with people who lead demonstrations. But a lot of people who would not go near a demonstration because they might get fired, nevertheless have gone through some very, very important psychological changes.

**BERRY:** I submit that the people who pay for a revolution are *in* the revolution. This is very characteristic of revolutions. This revolution is being paid for by middle-class Negroes and liberal whites.

**HAUSER:** We are talking about two different things here, incidentally. Participation in a revolution is quite different from active participation in an organization in the sense of attending membership meetings. Mr. Pettigrew said that 200,000 Negroes and whites got therapy out of the march on Washington. I think that 200,000 is a very small fraction of the number who were tremendously influenced by that march.

**GEERTZ:** Nationalism is very similar. For example, it was a very small, élite group which led Indonesia to independence, but the impact upon every peasant in Java was fantastic. I do not think one should make too rapid a judgment about what is really going on. The Dutch always said, "Who is in the movement? Just a few upper-middle-class, ex-civil-servant Javanese." And the Dutch were not wrong. Those were the people leading the movement—a handful of men. There were maybe fifty or a hundred of them, at the most. But the effect upon the society was rather more profound than that.

**HUGHES:** During the war, a man came out from the British propaganda office to Laval University in Quebec. He told a group of French Canadian professors, who were questioning him about Indian nationalism, that there was only some small percentage (one-fifth of one per cent, I think) in the Gandhi nationalist movement. At this, the French Canadians all laughed, knowing that one does not measure it that way. We have to say what the relationship is between the people who are active in the movement and the others.

It would be interesting to have a paper in *Dædalus* on the structure of the civil rights movement, with regard to both the people who are participating and the people who are not active but who are watching and listening and are deeply affected. This, it seems to me, is the new thing about the Negroes' interest in this country. There have long been NAACP's and Urban Leagues, but we have to determine what influence the movement has on all Negroes and on the society.

**GRAUBARD:** Actually, this is the theme of the article which Kenneth Clark has written, and Professor Clark has wired me to say that the paper is on its way.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** What is his subject?

**GRAUBARD:** His paper is essentially on the leadership and the way in which the protest movements have operated. It perhaps emphasizes leadership more than other things. That was what he was originally assigned, with the same freedom everyone else had to take that theme and develop it as he wished. But I have not yet seen the paper or an outline of it.

**FLEMING:** In trying to judge the significance of participation and leadership and structure, we have to look at the strategies of the movement. Strategy is what makes the difference. Mr. Pettigrew introduces another dimension. There may be, he says, a tremendous psychological effect on the participants. However, as far as immediate social change is concerned, maybe the participation in the movement needs to be big, or maybe it needs to be small. Maybe the movement needs to be heavily funded, or maybe it needs to be lightly funded. It depends on what the movement is supposed to do.

Mr. Turner mentioned the possibility of raising the pricetag on discrimination and segregation as one way of making the stigma dysfunctional. This is what has worked in the South. There is no question about it in my mind. It is about the only thing that has worked thus far. The problem is to find an equivalent technique that we can use as we begin to focus on the more stubtle and more difficult economic and social conditions in the big cities of the North and, in time, of the South. If, in these discussions, we are looking for new ground to break, I hope that Professor Clark, if he is dealing with strategy, will address himself to this problem. I think there is a certain amount of floundering going on as to how a protest movement of this kind should address itself to that complex. How can we make it too expensive for the people in the North to go on, for example, preserving housing patterns?

**WILSON:** This is an area about which something ought to be said, but unfortunately there is not much that can be said. I do not think we will be able to find anything to say in time for the fall issue of *Dædalus*. We have to deal with the structure of the organization, the function of strategies, the many facets—some only dimly perceived—of the civil rights revolution. There seem to be two curves moving in opposite directions: As the intensity of the movement and the number of participants in the movement increase, the amount of *research* being done decreases radically. Not many people know much about the movement in any systematic sense, although everybody knows something about it, and a few people know a great deal about it from personal experience. There is also another factor. I think some Negroes, quite understandably, are getting a little research-shy. People are becoming, quite rightly, much more cautious about discussing these matters. They no longer regard themselves as bits of evidence which must be served up for the social scientists' inspection. I am not optimistic that we can produce an article on this subject right now. It would have to be a highly interpretive and, I think, highly speculative essay.

**MAYER:** I, too, would like something on this. It is very apparent that the character of the movement's leadership is changing so fast that it tends to make even recent research almost obsolete. If I may be autobiographical for a minute, just two weeks ago I stopped being the chairman of the Boston branch of the Northern Student Movement. I had a board which was made up of twelve people of whom nine were white and three were Negro. I am glad to say that we have now been replaced by another group of whom eleven are Negro and one is white. This has an important implication. The Northern Student Movement has about 1,100 tutors from various colleges. Most of them are white, and they have been used to working under white leaders. They are now going to work under the leadership of Negroes. Such a change may have a profound effect on the Negro's view of himself.

**HAUSER:** I want to say a word about this notion of *cost* as a factor in getting behavior changed. Let me speak to the extreme, although that may not be what the people who have spoken about cost had in mind. Saul Alinsky believes that the bridge between white and black is green. He says that there is no other way except to make discrimination expensive. There are realms where this is probably true, especially where there is an institutionalized and legalized social order enforcing segregation, as in the South. However, given the trends since Franklin Roosevelt's day toward a welfare society and consciousness of issues, it might be well not only to emphasize the function of making the cost high, but also to emphasize the positive approach. We should get attitudes changed not simply because the price is too high not to change, but because it is the thing to do. There is mounting evidence that this may be characterizing at least large parts of the country. The white population is not utterly hopeless; it gives some signs of being educable on this front.

The changing attitudes of the white population is, by the way, one topic that is missing from the proposed issue of *Dædalus.* There is some very good information on changing attitudes. The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) has twenty-two years' worth of information which might make a very good article.

**BERRY:** I am going to make a very brief comment on leadership and research. I was impressed with the comment that leadership is changing very rapidly. Some of it is (although some of it is still pretty stable). This caused me to comment to my colleagues at the National Urban League that the jobs of race leaders used to be for life, but now they are working on an hourly basis. They can be had any time.

I will give us a point on research. It seems to me that the activists—the direct actionists—are very interested in action research which has a point. I suspect that we have in Chicago the largest research department of any group working permanently in race relations. Our research has some meaning to people—real meaning, right now. It is intended to lead toward immediate programmatic activity for ourselves or some other group. All the direct actionists are very interested in this. But what they and some others of us are sick and tired of is the technique of researching the hell out of Negroes and never doing anything—using this, as it has been used in the past, as a tactic for delaying movement toward redress of wrongs. We do research, then appoint a committee to evaluate it, then let it die.

With respect to the cost factor, I do not think it is very vague. I think it is very clear. For instance, in housing, there is a way we can make discrimination cost. We know the way to make it cost. There is a way we can make any kind of discrimination cost. We have more governmental tools today to make it cost than we ever had before. I am back again to attitude. When the government has the attitude that makes it want to use the tools which it has, then it will use them. Until it has the attitude that makes it want to do this, it will not do this. The implications of Title VI in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are so vast and so broad that the people who are supposed to do the implementing do not know what they mean. They are very reluctant to do anything, just as we never have lowered the boom with the President's Committee on Government Contract Compliance. Until we lower the boom, the discriminators in industry are not going to believe that the government means it.

We went all the way around Robin Hood's barn on the civil rights bill to make sure that we did not have housing in it. Maybe that was a strategy to get it through. But the President has powers on this, and we can use them. For instance, we are getting ready to submit a brief on site selection in public housing in Chicago. We believe that the selecting of sites in the middle of big ghettos is an intent to keep people separated and to intensify segregation; and we believe, therefore, that it is in conflict with the laws for any federal government money to be contributed to that.

There are a variety of ways of making discrimination costly. For instance, if we could ever change the custom so that stigma would be attached to the discriminator, as is happening now here and there, then people would not want to discriminate so much any more. I think we can determine quite a lot about what the costs are, and a whole lot of people who would discriminate for nothing will not discriminate for a quarter—and if it is a half-dollar, pretty soon they will say, "To hell with it, I have got to make change."

**COLES:** I want to mention something that happened last summer in Oxford, Ohio, when the students in the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) got together before we went to Mississippi. On the spot were several sociologists and a political scientist who had come down from the University of Wisconsin and the University of Michigan. There was a whole afternoon spent in discussing whether to allow these people to stay and, if so, what the implications were. Eventually the students voted not to let them stay. The students were concerned about how much should be known about ongoing activity in today's society, in which knowledge is widely disseminated even when it is published in relatively obscure journals. This is a problem. We no longer have people like de Tocqueville running around the country and writing essays which are very narrowly distributed. The concern of some of the students has been interesting to watch. I think that what we say and how it is interpreted may be a problem for all of us who are involved in this movement.

**GRAUBARD:** As I indicated this afternoon, I want to insert some of the outlines of the papers from people who are preparing papers and have not yet completed them. Professor Freund has consented to speak to us about the paper which he will write, and I would like to call on him now.

**FREUND:** I am very sorry that I do not have more prose to set before you. I did prepare a half-page outline, which I am passing around—and which makes me feel guilty of tokenism.

I have tried to deal with a very special segment of the general subject of the civil rights movement and the law and to relate the subject to more general considerations. The first theme I have in mind is the relation of the movement to general currents in the law. That has two aspects: first, what I call the pour-over from recent general reforms into the civil rights movement and, second, the pour-over from the civil rights movement into more general movements in the law.

Let me illustrate what I mean. In connection with the influence of general reform on the civil rights movement, one thinks of the great advances in criminal procedure under the aegis of the Constitution and the federal courts: the right to counsel, the tightening up of standards of voluntariness of confessions, the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. All of these bear very directly and, in some communities, especially on the Negroes and the civil rights movement. The same thing is true of legislative programs. We talked at length this morning about the poverty program; and I dare say we will talk about educational changes—the relation of higher quality education and more relevant education to the movement.

Incidentally, this whole interplay seems to me to give opportunity for more collaboration, at least on the level of leadership, between the civil rights forces and the more general interests and concerns of other groups in the community. That is to say, there is no reason that the civil rights groups—the Negro leadership—should not become involved, as I think there are signs that they will be, in the effort to reform the law of bail in criminal cases or the effort to abolish capital punishment. It seems to me these areas of collaboration have some obvious general value for mutual understanding and cooperation.

The other aspect is the pour-over from the civil rights movement itself to the general currents in the law. Here we have had some very remarkable developments, indeed, which are perhaps less obvious. I am thinking, for example, of the development of the law of freedom of speech and press under the impact and the stimulus and the pressures of the civil rights movement. I am referring not merely to the law of demonstrations and public assembly, e.g., picketing, but even to freedom of the press itself. You recall the *New York Times* libel case of a year or two ago. It was a direct outgrowth of the civil rights movement because the material in question was an attack on the police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, published as a political advertisement by a civil rights group. The verdict against the paper for $500,000—an obvious threat to freedom of the press—was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. This made new ground, constitutionally speaking. It was not easy to find the constitutional ground for this, because some of the material in the advertisement, though false in rather trivial particulars, was nevertheless false. And the size of the verdict is ordinarily not a matter for the federal Court to review. But in the context of freedom of speech, the Court evolved some new constitutional doctrine to the effect that defamation of a public official was not actionable at law unless it was knowingly false or done with reckless disregard of truth or falsity. This is a general development in the field of freedom of the press and was hailed by many, as well as by the *New York Times* itself.

However, there is a certain price we pay for this and a certain ambiguity rather typical of the liberal dilemma, if I may comment on that for a moment. Shortly before the *New York Times* decision, there was handed down in the state of Washington a libel verdict of $40,000 against some Birchite groups and a local newspaper, in favor of John Goldmark, a very progressive member of the state legislature, who had incurred the wrath of the extreme right and was smeared as a Communist. The verdict of $40,000 was a remarkably generous one in that particular community. Unhappily, the decision forced the district judge in Washington to set aside the verdict in favor of Goldmark. My point is that we have here a rather striking advance in general constitutional law precipitated by the civil rights movement.

Similarly, in connection with the legal representation of, I will not say indigents, but persons of moderate means, one of the crying needs is for more adequate and more steady representation not only in terms of court counseling, but in terms of advisory counseling. The NAACP got in trouble with the state of Virginia on the ground that its maintaining a panel of lawyers for civil rights cases was unlawful champerty and maintenance, in the old common law terms. A lay organization was being interposed between a man and his lawyer. The Supreme Court upset this decision; the court ruled in favor of the NAACP. This was another pathbreaking decision so far as constitutional law is concerned. Within a year after that, the decision was applied in favor of the Railway Brotherhoods, which had a plan of maintaining a panel of lawyers for personal-injury cases. That plan had been declared illegal in almost every state where it had been tested. The Supreme Court, under the momentum of the NAACP case, felt obliged to apply the same principle, since the principles of law are neutral and not loaded. So we have had a very striking advance in what has been a crying need and an advance in the name of the Constitution, rather than by the more laborious process of state-by-state legislative and judicial reform.

Of course, there has been quite a change in the whole relationship of state and federal courts. Federal courts are not showing the same deference to state courts that they formerly did. Our whole concept of federal-state relations is undergoing reexamination under the impetus of the civil rights movement. So here again there is, or at least should be, a coalescence of interest from another direction, between the civil rights leadership and civil libertarian groups.

One looks for analogues to this fast-changing body of doctrine, and it is very hard to find one. One thinks, perhaps, of the effect of the Industrial Revolution on the law—employers' liability acts and workmen's compensation laws, for example. But the effect of the Industrial Revolution took much longer and was predominantly legislative rather than judicial. The reliance on the courts as the spearhead of change is quite new. Compare the attitude of the civil rights movement toward the courts today and the attitude of labor toward the courts when they were having their revolution. At least before the Wagner National Labor Relations Act, the courts were stigmatized as the source of labor injunctions. Labor distrusted them and would have nothing to do with them. It took a while for labor's confidence to be established under the National Labor Relations Board, and, after all, there we had an administrative body which was intermediary between the litigant and the court.

So in all these ways, I think, the movement has had quite a remarkable effect on the doctrine, structure, attitudes, and presuppositions in this country toward the law and the court.

The other theme which I plan to deal with is what I call legal-ethical problems of equality. First of all, there is the problem, which was touched on this morning and perhaps deserves separate treatment in a paper, of preferential treatment versus color-blindness. The attractive phrase *color-blindness* was not invented by Justice Harlan in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, but by Albion Tourgée. (Mr. Woodward will know Mr. Tourgée, the lawyer-author, who wrote a Reconstruction novel, *A Fool's Errand.*) The phrase came from a brief filed by Mr. Tourgée. It was taken up by Harlan in his dissent. And, of course, it was a rallying cry of late for the liberals in the civil rights movement. It served its purpose for a time, but we should remember that it is a phrase which is not in the Constitution. It is always dangerous to take such a piece of rhetoric as a touchstone. It is always dangerous to parse phrases which are not the basic source of one's doctrine.

Harlan himself—if I may digress—though he has been much canonized by civil rights leaders, was quite doctrinaire and, as we would think, unrealistic and illiberal in other respects in his cast of mind. For example, not only equal protection of the laws but freedom of contract became a shibboleth with him, as when he wrote the opinion holding that to outlaw yellow-dog contracts was unconstitutional since it violated the liberty of contract of worker and employer. He held that it was unconstitutional to classify businesses differently—cooperatives and corporations, for example—because it denied equal protection. I think he is an object lesson in the dangers of doctrinaire, absolute thinking, though in the case of color-blindness, as of the time, it looked to be a liberal and promising doctrine. The lesson, it seems to me, is that one need not be doctrinaire in order to be principled.

I think that violation of the principle of color-blindness, for the purpose of transition toward a greater equality, is perfectly consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and that it remains a discretionary matter of policy for school boards or for legislatures. Whether compensatory treatment is mandatory is a more difficult question which gets into complications that I do not have time to develop. That is, if imbalance was in some way caused by state action, if the state was responsible in some way, then the state may be under a duty—not merely a privilege but a duty—to redress it by preferential treatment. It seems to me that in cases of imbalance it would be appropriate to conduct inquiries into the extent to which some governmental agency was responsible in some form for the so-called *de facto* segregation.

My final theme is not equality of treatment by the government, but rather equality of obligation on the part of the Negro civil rights movement—obligation of fidelity to law. This raises the whole problem of civil disobedience and how the law should deal with it. I would suggest that there are various evasive techniques availible to the law for accommodating a moral defense to the mandates of the law. There are, by design, many discretionary elements or soft spots in the law to accommodate this sort of problem. One is the prosecutor's discretion as to whether or not to bring any proceedings. Consider the Boston school boycott. It is perfectly conceivable that we might have had a prosecution, but there was no necessity for it, and no step was taken to bring the matter to court. If a case is brought to court, there is discretion in the jury to acquit without being accountable in any way for acquittal. There is discretion in the judge to give a suspended sentence. There is discretion in the executive to pardon or commute. These evade the basic hard question, but they are useful.

I would also make a perhaps more fundamental and philosophical point. If we inquire into the basis of fidelity to the law, and we conclude that it rests on some philosophical premise of a social compact, that is, a reciprocity of rights and duties within the society, then if we find that one group has been systematically excluded from participation in the community, may there not be a legal as well as a moral exemption for them from accountability to the law, at least in respect of an effort to gain that kind of participation? When I say participation, I mean participation in the self-governing process, which would include not merely the right to vote but, I think, equal opportunity or appropriate opportunity for office-holding, for appointment to Civil Service, for places on the police force, in the probation service, and the various other policing and supervising and administrative activities of the state.

**BERRY:** Why not equal opportunity for participation anywhere where any government money is used? That is what Title VI is trying to achieve. You enumerated certain areas, and I presume that by enumerating certain ones you were excluding others.

**FREUND:** I was talking in terms of civil disobedience. You are making another point.

**COHEN:** Professor Freund, who would determine whether the civil disobedience was directed against a justifiable grievance? Who would decide, for example, whether an elected body should contain members of minority in proportionate numbers? Who would determine whether blocking traffic or putting an electric station out of commission was a justifiable kind of act? What lines can be drawn? I am not asking these questions in any unfriendly manner.

**FREUND:** I agree that this is difficult. In the first place, I did not mean that there ought to be a quota system of employment. That is too mechanical. As to what activities are justifiable, I said those related to the civil rights movement. I think we would have to apply some principle of least force or least disruption possible. I am not suggesting that to burn the schoolhouse because it is segregated or to burn the city hall because Negroes are not employed is privileged. I take civil disobedience, in the classic sense, to be nonviolent, to be symbolic, to be aimed at the conscience. I do not have in mind upsetting subway cars or setting fire to buildings. I have in mind such a thing, let us say, as not sending children to school, which would be a violation, let us assume, of the school attendance laws. I am speaking of the kind of thing which is civil disobedience, which is an offense, and which is related to a lack of opportunity for participation. I am not now speaking of a school boycott in a city which has political participation by Negroes. I am thinking of communities where the Negro does not have the other outlets through the political process.

**HAUSER:** Would it be all right to burn a superintendent of school at the stake?

**BERRY:** I have a match.

**FREUND:** I think Martin Luther King could answer that one.

**PETTIGREW:** You mentioned, with respect to *de facto* school cases, that you think they will eventually hinge on whether there was government involvement in what brought about the *de facto* separation. Could that be involvement not by the school board itself, but by some other government agency?

**FREUND:** Yes. It is only a guess, but that is my meaning. There could be school board involvement, such as in deliberately choosing to build a new school in the midst of the Negro ghetto instead of on the edge. But there might also be, for example, state court enforcement of restrictive residential covenants. If that contributed to the *de facto* residential segregation, we could relate that to the school problem.

**PETTIGREW:** Or even use of urban-renewal funds to maximize ghettoization? That would include almost every city in the United States.

**FREUND:** If it were closely enough related to the particular school district case, I would so argue.

**LERNER:** Mr. Freund, do I understand that in your analysis you find it possible to get along without any resort to higher law concepts? Do you feel, on civil disobedience for example, that we can get along without the traditional higher law concept which the Supreme Court had in their contract property cases, and without the kind of higher law concept which the Southern whites keep invoking? There is no comparable higher law concept in your analysis.

**FREUND:** It seems to me that the Constitution cannot be divorced from higher law concepts. I think the whole concept of equality, which is both philosophical and constitutional (after all, we have an equal protection clause), is colored by higher law concepts. That is to say, one of the things the civil rights movement has sharpened is our awareness that equal justice may be based not merely on the proportionality of need, merit, or achievement, but on inherent worth. Now, where do we get that? The Constitution does not spell out the criteria of equality. This has been a perennial philosophical problem, at least from Aristotle down. There is a choice of meaning. The idea of equality as meaning inherent worth of the clay human being in certain fundamental relationships, such as the right to life or the right to counsel, is both higher law and constitutional.

**HUGHES:** I would like to ask a question, which I am sure you can answer very quickly, Professor Freund. You have not mentioned one of the leading problems of Mangum's book, *The Legal Status of the Negro*: who is a Negro and how much is a Negro's reputation worth? Maybe the problem does not exist anymore; Mangum's book was published twenty-five years ago. Do I gather correctly that this problem is gone?

The other thing I would like to ask is this. You spoke of increasing recourse to the courts instead of legislation. Is this a general movement in other countries or only here and in Canada?

**FREUND:** That is a good question. I think that, at least throughout the Western world, there has been a definite trend in the direction of constitutionalism. So-called constitutional courts have been established since World War II at a great rate. Of course, Germany is an outstanding example. That court is very busy. They have a procedure called constitutional petition, which gets one right into the constitutional court for constitutional questions. Italy has just established a constitutional court. Without pretending to be an expert in the field, I would say that the movement has not been limited to this country. As an aftermath of the experience with totalitarianism, there has been an increased emphasis on constitutionalism, that is, on the judicial role.

**BERRY:** I have a small question. Am I correct in my belief that all constitutional rights are personal, that the rights belong to the individual and have nothing whatsoever to do with any subgrouping to which he might belong and against which prejudice might be lodged? And am I correct in my belief that all constitutional rights are present? I take that to mean "now," not "with all deliberate speed," for instance. If that is correct, what can be done to secure these rights for Negroes, Indians, and some other people *now*? It seems to me we could make a broader attack than this piecemeal thing we have been doing in the civil rights movement.

**FREUND:** What you say is true; but, as with most maxims, it has to be counterbalanced against other maxims. You know: The early bird catches the worm, but haste makes waste. Constitutional rights are personal and present. On the other hand, the remedy of injunction by a court of equity is an extraordinary remedy (I am quoting the maxims) lying in the discretion of the court. If one goes into court and asks for that extraordinary remedy, even in a constitutional case there is a certain leeway for the court to tailor its relief to the practicalities of the situation.

I think this was the technical ground for "deliberate speed." It was a suit in equity for an injunction, and historically and classically the chancellor has discretion as to the particular sanction or relief that he imposes. I think the federal courts are showing that at last they are getting a little impatient with "deliberate speed." I think this is one of the weaknesses of our excessive resort to the courts. It would have helped if Congress had laid down some guidelines, that is, if they had had compulsory plans of orderly desegregation. They could have done this under the enforcing power of the 14th Amendment. Now, perhaps, we are coming to it through the leverage of the conditions of the federal handout. This is perhaps the best way of all. I think the courts need help from the executive and legislative branches of government. This was also the issue in the poll-tax debate.

**FISCHER:** There is the new regulation which has been issued by the Commissioner of Education on the required desegregation of certain grades at certain times. Isn't this likely to make a very important change in the situation in the South with respect to schools?

**FREUND:** I would think so. It has a very good sanction which does not require endless litigation.

**BERRY:** That is making segregation cost.

**FREUND:** Money is one of the world's great civilizing agents.

**WOODWARD:** I wonder if the situation is quite so hopeful. We now have about 60,000 white children in schools with Negroes in the desegregated districts. About half of the districts are to be desegregated at this time. I wonder whether the new regulation won't simply produce that many more token desegregated districts. Is that too pessimistic a view? It seems to me that it is possible that this will happen.

**EDWARDS:** It is possible, and we may eventually have to come back to the courts in some way. However, the Commissioner's order is so specific that if he holds to the hard line, it is going to speed up the whole business, I think. The terminal date for complete compliance is 1967. All the school districts will now comply. I think we are going to see a great deal more policing in this instance.

What I am struck with is that when Mr. Griswold mentioned this as a possibility two years ago, in one of his soundings off as a member of the Civil Rights Commission, nobody paid any attention. Most of the people in Washington were strangely silent, as this was drastic. But two years later, we have this written into the Civil Rights Act. What is significant, I think, is that a whole series of things has happened in the intervening years that pushes this forward and gives it a kind of acceptance which it previously did not have. This is the speed with which this kind of activity can move. That is why I say that, as in any social movement, there are differential speeds on different fronts. Some things move rather rapidly, and others encounter more resistance. It is hard to say exactly how fast we are going in the total movement.

I am very hopeful about this particular measure, because, although we are looking at education specifically, it is going to apply across the board. I think we are going to see all kinds of evasions, but we will see the countereffects since the government is committed. The net effect, I think, will be a big push forward.

**WOODWARD:** My colleague, Alexander Bickel, seems to be skeptical about the total results.

**FLEMING:** There is a further response to the question. We ought to note that there has been a recent convening of the Deep South governors by Governor Sanders of Georgia for precisely the purpose of slowing this thing down and diluting the effect of the Commissioner's guidelines or regulations. It seems to me that the only way to answer this is to make one's personal prediction of how firm President Johnson and those around him are going to be in implementing the thing. It is quite right that the Commissioner's criteria are remarkably strong and would produce more than the kind of token change you are talking about, if they are applied without dilution and evasion.

**REDDING:** It occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, that another paper is missing. We should have a paper on the resistance and the modes of resistance.

**GRAUBARD:** This will be discussed in one of tomorrow's oral reports.

**HAUSER:** I hope someone will cover the important contribution that Governor Wallace and Sheriff Clark are making to the acceleration that Mr. Edwards is talking about. If we did not have these people, I think we would want to invent them as instrumentalities to help.

**FOLEY:** I might mention, in this regard, that in Mississippi, about a month ago, I had a lengthy conversation with Governor Johnson. His attitude is, I think, quite progressive. There are quite a few marches going on in Mississippi right now, and the state of Mississippi is just permitting them. There is nothing being done about them. The marchers are not being harassed. And, therefore, we do not read about them in the news.

**HAUSER:** It's a pity. If they keep doing that, they will slow down the movement.

**COHEN:** Governor Johnson is not saying anything. He is speaking more to people from Washington than to people from Mississippi. But he is doing all kinds of things. He is firing anybody in the government service—including the state police—who is a member of the Ku Klux Klan. I agree that he and others in Mississippi are going to move as slowly as they possibly can. However, I think the civilizing influence of money is, indeed, bringing civilization to Mississippi.

**FOLEY:** I will give you a good illustration of the civilizing effect of money. I was the first head of a federal agency or department to go to Mississippi in four years. I had some good meetings in Greenville and in Jackson, where about 150 businessmen and bankers showed up. However, when I got down to a city noted for its Ku Klux Klan activity, only 12 came and, prior to the meeting, did their best to avoid talking to me. I did not talk about civil rights. I just talked about how the Small Business Administration could help Mississippi with its economic development programs.

The person who had tried the hardest to avoid me was the mayor—apparently because I had stayed in a Negro motel the night before—but I noticed that after he heard what the Small Business Administration might do for business and community development is his city, he started talking to my Mississippi field director. So I kind of moseyed on over to ask him what was going on. He wanted a loan for his drugstore! Of course, I put that right at the top of my list, and I correspond with my field director every week to find out that the loan is coming.

**HUGHES:** Did you ask if he lets Negroes drink their Coca Cola inside the store?

**FOLEY:** He is going to have to if he gets an S.B.A. loan.

## SESSION IV

**GRAUBARD:** This morning, I would like to change our method just a little. We have the papers of Mr. St. Clair Drake and Mr. John Hope Franklin, who are both out of the country. We also have with us ten other papers, some submitted as recently as last night, with the authors present. I hope that each of these authors will give a brief presentation of the argument in his paper. In addition, there are a few papers which have yet to be written. Perhaps these authors can tell us at somewhat greater length what they intend to discuss in their papers. I would like to treat the papers in groups, as we did yesterday; but I shall play this session somewhat by ear, for my greatest concern is that we get the maximum comment from you on the papers. Let me begin by asking Mr. Wilson to comment briefly on the argument in his paper.

**WILSON:** My paper is on the Negro in politics. It was largely written two months ago and, therefore, as someone said, is already out of date. Before it is printed, I suspect it will be completely out of date. At least with respect to my paper, I am hoping that *Dædalus* comes out in looseleaf binders.

This paper is essentially an examination of the prospects for a *Negro-white political coalition* on behalf of those interests which Negroes and whites may have in common. As an expository device, rather than as an effort to deal with a particular argument, I selected a recent article by Bayard Rustin, who in effect calls for a grand liberal coalition among Negroes, trade union leaders, white liberals, the intelligentsia and the like for the furtherment of socioeconomic change. He argues—quite rightly, I think—that the really significant problems facing the Negro are socioeconomic and that the accomplishments which can be attained by "a stroke of the President's pen," so to speak, or even in many places by a stroke of the mayor's pen, are becoming fewer and fewer. The real problems involve the reconstruction of an economy, a society, and a cultural system, which will result in the further improvement in the life chances of Negroes in the mass.

I try to show that the recent pattern (at least the pattern with which I am familiar) in Negro politics is a pattern which has never rested upon any single grand coalition but is a shifting pattern of multiple coalitions. The most important dividing line in Negro politics is between North and South. The politics of the Negro in the South are quite different from those in the North. It is almost possible to write two different papers on the subject. And, within the South, the politics are quite different, depending on whether it is possible for Negroes to enter the party system and thus in some sense become professionalized politicians or whether they must act in an amateur political capacity, so to speak, as civic leaders trying to bargain with the white establishment for certain marginal changes.

The result in the South has been that the Negro vote has been quite independent. The result has not been what many social scientists, including myself, might have expected: that the Negro vote, once enfranchised in urban areas, would be very hard to mobilize because there would be no well-established and well-oiled party machinery in the Negro community to do this. On the contrary, it has proved possible to organize and direct the Negro vote with astonishing success. Examples of this were the Allen versus Maddox mayoralty election and the Weltner congressional election in Atlanta. The unanimity of the Negro vote is quite remarkable, and the turnout at the elections is not substantially different from the turnout of white voters.

Coalition in the South has, in most cases, followed one of two patterns. One has been, in a few small or rural areas, a corrupt coalition between local Negroes who enter into a tacit alliance with the county sheriff, largely for the purpose of maintaining the sheriff's illicit activities. Probably as many Negroes in the South have been registered to vote in order to maintain jai alai or pelota or the numbers game as (until recently) were registered as a result of Civil Rights Commission activities. This pattern of the manipulated vote, which Professor Alfred Clubok has talked about, is, of course, a special case and, I think, will be the declining case.

The more normal pattern is for the Negroes, when they are effective politically at all, to be a part of a *tacit* coalition with upper-middle-class and upper-class whites, particularly white businessmen. The Atlanta coalition, which I described at some length in my paper, is the classic example of this. Not in every city is such a coalition possible, because not in every city is there a cosmopolitan white bourgeoisie which places a high value on racial peace because of what they take to be the importance to the city of maintaining a good national image and encouraging industrial development. There are many communities that are dominated by the small, Main-Street merchants who have localistic rather than cosmopolitan orientation, who do not value rapid industrial development, who do not care about a national image, who are not involved with the federal government or with national corporations, and whose allegiance, therefore, is to the local pattern of influence. In such communities, it has often been much harder for the Negro to establish any effective coalition. In the South, in many cities and, indeed, in entire states, such as Mississippi, the absence of a cosmopolitan white bourgeoisie is one of the chief factors inhibiting further gains for Negro politics.

In the North, of course, that pattern has been quite different. Here the vote has not been independent. The vote has been committed, at least since the late 1930's, to the Democratic party, locally and nationally, with a few minor exceptions. The vote has largely been taken for granted. The question has not been the direction of the Negro vote, but the size of the Negro vote. The turnout has varied enormously, depending upon organization. In Chicago, in the machine wards, it is possible to get a very large turnout; similarly, in Philadelphia. There are communities in New York and California where there is no powerful organization, and the Negro turnout is often quite low. This bespeaks the fact that politics is intrinsically less interesting in the North, because the choice between candidates is never a choice between the segregationist and the integrationist or between people of differing degrees of commitment to segregation. The choice is between two people who nominally profess integrationist goals, but whose real activities are often seen—quite rightly, I think—as irrelevant to the interests and life chances of most Negroes. I do not think we have to erect any theory of alienation to account for the low turnout of Negro voters. It can be just as easily explained on the basis of rational self-interest.

The question is what form of organization will grow up to take the place of the now dying, almost dead, big-city political machines. In communities, such as Boston, which are notoriously disorganized, the civil rights movement probably speaks with the greatest authority. In other communities, leaders with various personal styles—Adam Clayton Powell and Cecil Moore, at one end; J. Raymond Jones and Augustus Hawkins, at the other extreme—have risen to play a kind of personalistic politics which has not been dependent upon the creation of a large organization. Here, when a coalition exists, it is again a multiple coalition. For certain issues, particularly the nomination of state-wide or national elective officials, the coalition traditionally has been with the trade unions at the leadership level. But there has never been any fusion of interest between rank-and-file Negroes and rank-and-file whites in the trade union movement.

On local matters involving the provision of services, the coalition is a quite different one, usually with the upper-class white suburbanite, who in county elections usually votes with the Negro on issues such as increasing medical care for the indigent and providing public facilities largely for lower-income people. Here the lower-middle-class white deserts the Negro coalition.

GRAUBARD: I think, perhaps, it would be best if we started by discussing Mr. Wilson's paper.

COHEN: Mr. Wilson, would you say that there was not a clear-cut choice in the last presidential election?

**WILSON:** In the 1964 election? Of course, there was a clear-cut choice.

**COHEN:** Would your theory hold that there was not a degree of self-interest anywhere on the part of Negroes voting for one candidate or the other?

**WILSON:** It was a very special election, Mr. Cohen. There had not been a similar election before; and, although the Democrats are going to be running against Barry Goldwater for the next twenty years in every Negro precinct, no matter who the Republicans nominate, there is not going to be quite the same kind of election again. In most elections for mayors, aldermen, and governors, the choice is not that clear; and I do not think it will be that clear again in elections for President.

**COHEN:** Was the turnout significantly different in this Presidential election?

**WILSON:** I do not have systematic information on turnout in this election. My impression from some communities is that it was somewhat higher but not significantly higher.

**COHEN:** Then I would suggest that, in addition to lack of self-interest, there might be other reasons for low turnout in some communities.

**WILSON:** I think this issue cuts both ways. On the one hand, we could say that it was in their self-interest to see that Goldwater was defeated. On the other hand, it was so clear that Mr. Goldwater was going to be defeated that the "I'll stay at home, let George vote" pattern may have taken over. We often get the highest turnout in close elections, rather than lopsided elections, so this is not a uniform pattern. In the case of a close election and a real choice, I would imagine we would get a very high turnout. However, given a meaningful choice in an election that no one for a moment thinks is going to be very close, we get this cancelling-out factor and, consequently, a somewhat but not significantly higher turnout.

**PETTIGREW:** In the South, the coalition of the upper-middle-class white with the Negro has not always been there, as Mr. Wilson knows. I have been studying, in terms of race, elections of the past twenty years in five Southern cities. In recent elections in all five cities, precisely the pattern which Mr. Wilson described has emerged in the 1960's, but it was not typically there in the late 1940's and early 1950's. What really catalyzes this pattern is precisely what he said. We can locate it in a time series of elections. The whites often are voting solidly together on straight race issues which do not cost anything; then suddenly the schools close or a factory announces that it is not coming, and within, say, six months the upper-middle class begins to have a higher turnout and flips over to the Negro position. The Negroes do not come to the whites; the whites come to the Negroes, in terms of the vote. The lower class and, particularly, the lower-middle class turn out very big during a crisis. They were, for example, very pro-Faubus, or Faubus's equivalent. But when the crisis begins to fade and token desegregation has been accomplished, the turnout of the lower-middle class goes way down. Then the Negro and the upper-middle-class white coalition begins to look powerful, because they still continue their high turnout and control the elections.

**WILSON:** The coalition is triggered by something that cuts to the self-interest of the upper class, it seems to me. When economic advancement, maintenance of law and order, or their public image seems to be seriously threatened, this pattern and this coalition begin to form if demography permits it—that is, if the upper-class whites have not moved so far out of the city that they cannot be reached.

**WOODWARD:** This pattern of Negro and upper-class white coalition rings a lot of bells. It seems to me that this is the fourth massive participation of Negroes in Southern politics. There was Negro participation during radical Reconstruction in the 1870's, then in the independent party movements of the 1880's, and again in the Populist movement of the 1890's. In each of those cases, the ultimate result was polarization along racial lines; and it seems to me that we have indications of that happening now, as we have advocates of it on the state level. You said, Mr. Wilson, that the possibilities of radical Negro politics are remote. I think what you mean is that the possibility of their success is remote. I think there are certainly possibilities of experiments in this line.

**WILSON:** The experiments are most likely to occur in those states where the white resistance has been most extreme: in Mississippi and in parts of South Carolina and Alabama. We do undoubtedly hear the left militants of SNCC and CORE advocating a Negro party and a radical polarization. It is possible that they will try it in a serious way, but I think it will not succeed. Outside the Black Belt, there probably will not be an immediate effort to establish a party along racial lines, because the resistance has not been strong enough to force the Negroes back into a single strategy.

**FICHTER:** Besides discussing the political impact of businessmen and trade unions and the class position of people, in your paper, Mr. Wilson, you made a couple of passing references to organized religion. I wonder if you would discuss that a little bit, particularly in terms of the kind of influence that organized religion had in the Al Smith campaign as compared to the influence it is having in the civil rights movement.

**WILSON:** I think it is a different kind of religious participation. It seems to me that, on the white side, the churches have played a quite remarkable role in lobbying for civil rights legislation, in participating in the march on Washington, and in being willing in various local communities to picket city hall and the like. Mr. Berry was telling me that one of the most significant changes that has occurred in Chicago since I left is the willingness of the white ministers to speak out. I think there is quite a clear cleavage, however, between the churches which are either upper-class in style or which believe in the perfectibility of man here on earth and the fundamentalist sects. I am talking about Unitarians, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists, as opposed to Baptists and Methodists. The activist group now is not the group, it seems to me, that was active in the Al Smith campaign. The point in my paper was that this group has had a considerable amount of influence on the political and moral climate of the country. They have made it extremely difficult to be publicly in favor of sin—very difficult to vote against civil rights measures, especially in communities with relatively few Negroes.

I think the churches are not effective and probably cannot be effective on some issues, such as developing welfare or income redistribution programs or dealing with the housing problem. I think that they are victims of internal inconsistencies in their own position: self-interest, on the one hand, versus ideology, on the other. But where the issue is clearly moral, where it is aimed at legislative enactment or the redress of grievances, I think the churches have been and will continue to be an extraordinarily effective force.

**HUGHES:** I want to ask a question on social structure. You were speaking of the upper class in the South. We hear a good deal of talk about the changing character of the class structure in the South. Kincheloe, who some years ago was president of Tougaloo College, near Jackson, Mississippi, said it was getting impossible to get trustees for his Negro college. The new vice-president organization-man type, who is now the upper class there, is afraid to be a friend of Negroes. The only white man he could get to defend him, the only man who felt secure in his position, was the Episcopal bishop. We do have some information and ideas on the change and the nature of the upper class, on who is secure in his position and who is afraid of the customers. I think it would be very relevant to Mr. Wilson's paper, and to Mr. Pettigrew's and Mr. Parsons' as well, to have this spelled out a little more.

**BREEDEN:** I wonder about the indigenous organization in Mississippi and the attempt to relate local political organization, through the Freedom Democratic party, to the national impetus. The challenging of the Mississippi delegation in Congress and the implementation of the 14th and 15th Amendments on that level seem to me to be an attempt to capitalize on the national strength that has had power in Congress and to relate it to local political organization in a very unique way.

**WILSON:** I agree that the impetus is there. The crucial problem that I see is that the cadres in Mississippi—COFO and SNCC and the like—fundamentally do not believe in organization. I am not sure they really believe in power. They are unable to organize; and while I know it is quite difficult to organize grass-root, door-to-door, precinct-by-precinct programs for voter registration, it seems to me that this is going to have to change. The ideology of the movement places a great value on anti-organizational norms, on voluntarism, on a Quaker-like sense of the meeting in the determination of policy and program. There is very loose coordination of the elements of the organization. Thus, there is an antipathy between the ideologies of the movement and the requisites for effective political organization. If it is going to be effective, the ideology will have to be modified sufficiently so that some value is attached to organization.

**BREEDEN:** I think there is a transition taking place. It appears that the Freedom Democratic party's requirements for political organization are beginning to take precedence on the local scene.

**FLEMING:** I just want to add a caveat about the use of the word *coalition* in describing the white upper-middle class and the Negro voters in the South. In my observation (which is not universal), this is not so much a coalition as it is a concatenation of voting interests. These people do not get together and join their political interests. They are united through a candidate or an office-holder who plays on their respective self-interests, so that their votes come together at the ballot box. This is a little different from a coalition.

**WILSON:** Yes, I agree. I tried to use the term *tacit coalition.*

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Was the Atlanta coalition tacit?

**WILSON:** No, I think there was a bit more explicit coalition there. The Atlanta Negro Voters' League does sit down with Ivan Allen and, before him, with William Hartsfield.

**FLEMING:** But they are the candidates. They are the beneficiaries of these votes. That is, the two groups do not sit down *together*; they sit down with the man who stands to profit from their respective voting interests.

**WILSON:** Yes, but even that is a somewhat greater degree of deliberate coalition-making than the tacit coalition that we find in other communities. It is just a matter of degree.

**BERRY:** But Hartsfield is different from everybody else. He is indescribable in terms of categories.

**FLEMING:** He developed this thing in the South.

**BRANTON:** I, too, want to question the use of the word *coalition.* Certainly in Atlanta and throughout the rest of the South, Negroes are not called in at the decision-making level. They do not help to decide what candidates will be supported or what candidates will be offered. Almost without exception, including Atlanta, the political power structure gets together and selects the candidates; and then, after these candidates have been selected, Negro political leaders are invited in, and it is suggested to them that these candidates probably would be the best candidates for the Negroes to support. In many instances this is true. Negroes have no other choice but to go along with these candidates, who often are the more desirable candidates. But certainly this is no coalition.

I also want to question the accuracy of a couple of statements in Mr. Wilson's paper, and then I want to challenge one outright.

**WILSON:** There is one factual error. Let me admit to it now, in case it is on your agenda. I described Mr. Allen as a Republican. You have heard of Freudian slips. That was a Marxian slip. I know perfectly well that he is a Democrat.

**BRANTON:** That dispenses with one. There is another item I would like to question, although you may be right. In talking about Congressman Charles Weltner, you implied, Mr. Wilson, that when Congressman Weltner's district was divided, as a result of the redistricting, he ended up with a substantially higher percentage of Negro voters. I do not think this is true. In fact, you imply that Weltner ended up with all of Fulton County. Actually, Fulton County was divided, and its eastern portion was put into the Fourth District where James Mackay is now the congressman. This includes a rather substantial Negro area, including all the Auburn Avenue area, the area where most of Martin Luther King's parishioners live, and all of Atlanta which is in De Kalb County. So percentage-wise, I do not think that there has been any substantial change. It may well be that, eventually, with the effort on the part of the city of Atlanta to shift all the Negroes to the west side, through urban-renewal and other programs, Weltner may end up with substantially more Negroes in his district. But I do not think that is the case now.

**WILSON:** My recent percentages give him a higher Negro proportion, but I will doublecheck this because it was an estimate. I will not let this get into print unless I am sure it is right.

**BRANTON:** I was just checking that. You may be correct. But there is one thing that I really want to challenge. I note that you, as well as other authors, have talked about the rift and the split in the Negro civil rights groups. I have been working pretty closely with the national civil rights groups for the past three or four years, and, frankly, I just do not see the kind of split or rift that is frequently mentioned. The voter-education project, for example, was a cooperative effort in eleven Southern states. It involved five major civil rights organizations and a number of strictly local organizations. This project called for the very thing that certainly could create a rift: the division of monies and the allocation of areas in which to work. But I just did not find that kind of rift or that kind of complaint.

In July of 1963, seven or eight civil rights organizations formed two separate corporations: one under the Council of the United Civil Rights Leadership and another known as the Committee for Welfare, Education, and Legal Defense. These organizations have continued to exist since that time. (In fact, I just resigned two weeks ago as executive secretary of the Council of the United Civil Rights Leadership, because I am going to work for the federal government.) The heads of the major civil rights organizations meet about every month or six weeks. They sit down together. They talk about problems. They discuss strategies. They discuss ways of working together. But every time we turn around, somebody is writing an article about "the rift"—without referring to any specific example of it. I argue that, basically, that rift simply is not there.

If you are talking about a rift in a local situation, this is understandable. But what has happened is that the press, overnight, makes some local person an instant leader. There might be somebody leading a rent strike in Florida or somebody leading a proposed boycott of schools in Chicago or Boston, and the press runs out and interviews the person for a story. He might be a local NAACP or CORE leader who has become disgruntled with the national leadership, so he issues a statement that his national leadership is going along with some conservative leadership in another organization. In order to retain the loyalty of the masses of local followers, the national leaders are sometimes forced to remain silent or, perhaps, to pay lip service to the local organizations. However, these situations certainly cannot be described as indicating rifts in the national civil rights groups or in the national leadership.

I would like to ask you, Mr. Wilson, to give me an example of what you were really pointing to when you mentioned that there is this rift and that the movement would surely divide. Where are they divided? Please give me some example of what you described as a split, because I just have not been able to see it.

**WILSON:** Mr. Branton, the words *rift* and *split* are yours, not mine. I do not believe they appear in the paper.

**BRANTON:** No, I do not believe that you used the actual words.

**WILSON:** I am not saying that there is a permanent cleavage that cuts through the movement and that everybody is choosing sides. However, in situation after situation calling for crucial strategic or tactical judgments, we find quite clear differences in organizational outlook and tactical sense. The ultimate objectives, at some level of generality, are surely identical or very nearly so; but when it came, for example, to the question of whether to accept the seating compromise at the Atlantic City convention of the Democratic party, there surely was disagreement. In the organization of and participation in the march on Washington, surely there was disagreement as to how this should be done and even as to whether it should be done.

In city after city (politics are largely localistic in our country, with most of the crucial decisions made on the local scene), whether it is with regard to a march, a picket line, or a boycott, we find differences of opinion. Indeed, I find it very hard to imagine a community—say, Chicago, a city with one million Negroes—which would have a single, united leadership structure. It seems to me that there is not a united leadership and could not be a united leadership, unless we assume a degree of homogeneity associated with race which I do not believe there is.

Of course, what one might see as rift, another might see as simply a trivial dispute or simply a question of emphasis or timing; so a good deal depends on how one phrases this. I find differences in emphasis, outlook, strategy, and tactics among SNCC, CORE, the Urban League, NAACP, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. They are not permanently divided. They do not disagree on ultimate goals. But they have quite different senses of with whom they should be allied and what the proper tactics are. I think it is quite appropriate, despite the fact that some newspapers like to capitalize on signs of dissension, to point out these things.

**BERRY:** I think that the way Mr. Wilson has described his understanding of what is happening is entirely useful and acceptable. However, I think that the way in which it was placed in his paper is unfortunate. Mr. Wilson is now saying that it is perfectly natural that large groups of people have differences of opinion about timing and about tactics. That is right. This is not peculiar to the civil rights movement. But, as a matter of fact, I think that you will find that, on all important matters, every one of the major civil rights organizations is in absolute accord as to the goals.

The fact that there are differing approaches and differing tactics is altogether a useful thing. Those of us, for instance, in Urban League and SNCC get about as far apart as is possible. We in Urban League believe, as far as our program is concerned, in working for equality of opportunity through research and community organizations and negotiation and the manipulation of whatever power we can get hold of. SNCC is an organization which has been engaged in recruiting the magnificently undisciplined to do various things at various times. This does not mean for one minute that the Urban League does not support SNCC or CORE. It does not mean that at all. We have no monolithic leadership. This is the reason we talk about the "big seven" (although that is probably too few).

I think that in this issue of *Dædalus*, either in Mr. Wilson's paper or in some other paper, it ought to be pointed out that in the civil rights movement as we know it today, there is no more scrapping than one finds in a family. Everybody tried to make out big splits in Chicago—they are vying for leadership, and they are going to throw out this guy and put in that guy. This is newspaper talk. I told them at the time, "If you do not believe we are together—if you will not listen to me—then just jump on one of us and try to do something, and you will find out." And they did not jump on us. They at least believed that. In the civil rights movement, we say, in a homey way, that to build a democracy requires quite as many different skills as to build a house. We need the bulldozer and the architect and the plumber and the roofer; and if we did not have all these different skills and different approaches, we would get a funny-looking house. I think that those who are sophisticated in this movement respect one another and help one another, and I hope we get to the point where we can even love one another, because the battle is going to be tough enough that we will need to.

**FICHTER:** I feel that there is an area of research which we are not getting at (maybe we cannot): the *ad hoc* decisions in a movement which is moving. This is not just a long-term organization; this is something that is happening every day and every week. I wondered about this in Selma, as I watched the people waiting for Martin Luther King to come. How did they go about making the decision to come to Selma? We really do not know. What is perhaps equally important is how the opposition makes its decisions. How have they made such terrible mistakes each time? Maybe they did not make the decisions; maybe they just happened.

I would like to push that a little further. It is not a question of rift so much as a question of decision. How do the two sides in this ongoing struggle come to the decisions which have to be made—often within an hour or within a day—and then carried out? Do they meditate about whether a decision was successful or not before they make the next decision? Do they throw it open to the vote of everybody who happens to be on the church steps at the time? How do they do it? I think that we do not know.

**WILSON:** You are quite right. There is not any research on which we can draw, and it is a very important question.

**REDDING:** One of the papers touches on this business. I think the suggestion is that the decisions which are made by the activist groups are made with a definite effort to confuse the opposition, so that the opposition will make mistakes. I should not be surprised if this were true.

**FICHTER:** Yes, but there are all kinds of levels here. For instance, standing outside the church at Selma was a circle of Unitarian ministers who were discussing very seriously the ethical aspect of defying a judgment of the court; and standing around a tree was a group of University of Chicago professors and clerics, led mainly by a couple of lawyers, trying to come to some other kind of a decision. In the end, practically everybody walked across the bridge.

**BERRY:** You see. You can't do anything until Martin Luther King comes.

**HANDLIN:** I agree with Mr. Berry that we frequently have expressions of solidarity. An attack on one civil rights group mobilizes the support of all. I think the Urban League has cooperated with SNCC, although I am not so sure that SNCC has cooperated with the Urban League. From what I read about the activist groups, it does not seem to me that SNCC has sustained quite that level of amity and collaboration.

What I would like to know is whether Mr. Berry really believes that the ultimate objectives of all these groups are the same. I know people in SNCC who are talking of the civil rights movement as a means toward an end. Is that the same objective as that of the leadership of the Urban League? There *are* different points of view. I do not see why there should not be. The blanket statement that everybody in civil rights is working toward the same end is just not true.

**BERRY:** You said *everybody* in civil rights, Mr. Handlin. I was talking about the civil rights *leadership*. I said categorically that all responsible civil rights groups were working toward the same objectives, and that is true. As for "everybody," I am sure that you know as well as I that in social science one just does not refer to "everybody," or "everything," or "forever." Those are forbidden words. You know it, and I know it. I do not know how to answer you, because I am flabbergasted by what you said. Ask me again in another way, will you?

**HANDLIN:** Let me put it another way. Do you think that the organized leadership of the organized civil rights movement could sit down and formulate a common set of objectives—what the good society is, and what the Negro's place in it should be?

**BERRY:** Surely.

**GRAUBARD:** I think we will get back to that when we discuss both Mr. Handlin's and Mr. Turner's papers. Mr. Cohen has been waiting to speak.

**COHEN:** Perhaps in a desire not to hurt the civil rights movement, we are glossing over this rift. There *are* rifts. I listened in Selma to some of the talk of the SNCC people; and, with some reserve, I should say that their comments about Martin Luther King were less than complimentary. In fact, their entire posture, which is beginning to take form, is, I think, at odds with the large part of the civil rights movement. I think it is gravitating toward what is formulated brilliantly in a forthcoming article, "New Styles in Leftism," by Irving Howe. I believe that there is a significant rift between this group and the rest of the civil rights movement and that this will become more apparent as time goes on. I do not think we should ignore this.

**REDDING:** But aren't you saying that SNCC is moving *out* of the civil rights movement? Isn't this what it amounts to?

**COHEN:** Yes, but they still consider themselves and are considered to be part of the civil rights movement, and they are getting substantial support as a civil rights organization.

**HUGHES:** May I raise a point of order as to the nature of this discussion? I would like to suggest that the purpose of our discussion is not really to reach any agreement, but to outline the different points of view so that the people who are writing papers will know what they are. It seems to me that our discussion is becoming a debate.

**MOYNIHAN:** It seems to me that there is a dualism in the civil rights movement which was reflected somewhat in Dr. Redding's remark that SNCC may be moving out of the civil rights movement. This may be a dualism which has relevance to the prospect of political alliances and which is also fundamental to American politics. We are a society founded on two political ideals: that of *liberty* and that of *equality*. These are not the same, and they are not attractive to the same people. Many an American who would carelessly die for liberty is appalled by equality. Many a person who is devoted to equality is rather troubled by liberty and would just as soon not have too much of it.

Through our history, liberty has been the American middle-class *beau idéal*, but equality has never had much social standing. (The Declaration of Independence begins with equality, but the Constitution does not mention it until 1868.) Nevertheless, however little the middle class may approve of equality in contrast with liberty, equality is a fundamental democratic urge. It keeps coming back; we cannot get rid of it. But when it does emerge, in various large movements such as the trade union movement, it is fiercely opposed. People who are bitterly opposed to it cannot understand why anybody would be for it.

The biggest single event of the civil rights movement, in my view of the last ten years, was when the white middle class of America suddenly saw this as an issue of liberty. We moved uncompromisingly on behalf of the Negro American, because we will not let people's liberties be denied in this country. I think we have gone through a decade in which most of those liberties have been resoundingly confirmed. If need be, we can recreate Selma endlessly, and every Selma will lead to yet another law. The Southern whites cannot win on that issue. That issue is over.

The problem is equality. Who will fight for equality? Everybody is free to vote, but 56 per cent of the Negro youths fail the Selective Service test. That is not equality. Many times there is a semantic confusion. People talk about equality of opportunities, which is really a form of liberty. That gives people the right to take the test. It does not guarantee that they will pass in anything like equal proportions. In the North, we are going to have to ask ourselves questions about what we will do in the name of the equality which, it seems to me, the Negro movement is leading to. There will be demands which are not familiar and are not acceptable. For example, the demand for preferential treatment is a demand which is not acceptable to people who believe in liberty almost to the exclusion of equality. The *New York Times'* reaction to the idea of preferential treatment was one of horror.

Dr. Tobin says that we know how to create a tight labor market. I agree. We do not have to have 10 per cent unemployment of the Negroes in this country. We have chosen to have it. The decision not to have it would be a decision for forms of equality which, curiously, this country is very reluctant to accept but which, it seems to me, the civil rights movement must increasingly demand. Out of this comes a dualism and a rift not only perhaps within the movement, but possibly with people who, in most recent times, have been the closest allies of the movement.

LERNER: My question is partly linked with what Mr. Moynihan just said and partly moves away from it. Mr. Wilson has been talking, at least in part, about coalition politics or alliance politics; but there are, of course, two other kinds of political action. One is *balance-of-power action*, particularly, let us say, in New York, where the Liberal party has demonstrated its capacity to use it. I wonder to what extent Mr. Wilson feels that, not coalition politics, but balance-of-power politics is indicated for the future as an important political movement by the Negroes.

The second is independent political action. I wonder whether it is not true that once certain ideas are launched, they take on an importance of their own which they did not seem to have at the beginning. For example, there is a good deal of talk and thinking among those who want independent action: one, about the "Establishment" and, two, about the "Power Structure." Once we start talking about these concepts, they can be turned not only against the white establishment and the white power structure, but also against the Negro movement itself, the Negro establishment, and the Negro power structure. I wonder whether there is not, in those concepts, the germ of something which may produce a basic split inside of the movement both for freedom and for equality.

I have not studied nearly enough what is happening in SNCC and some of the other movements. However, I suspect strongly that there is, especially among the younger people—not just younger Negroes, but also younger whites, particularly those on the left of the movement—a strong hostility to any kind of establishment, any kind of power structure. This may, in the calculable future, operate toward some kind of independent political action and toward some kind of action which, along Mr. Moynihan's lines, will not be content with anything except a radical egalitarianism. And it may operate for narrowly Negro purposes, rather than for purposes having to do with the total American cultural pattern.

**WILSON:** You are quite right that there are other political strategies besides coalition politics. As I read it, however, the history of American politics is overwhelmingly a history of coalition or alliance politics. As a political scientist, I tend to think of the alternatives in organizational terms. Perhaps this is too narrow a perspective. The balance-of-power strategy, as exemplified by the Liberal party of New York City, is a possibility in some cities. Certainly it has proved effective in New York, but there it has financial backing and organizational underpinning. I do not see any comparably strong and well-financed organizations that could do it, except on a very *ad hoc* basis, in the Negro community.

As for independent politics, I agree with you, Mr. Lerner. I, too, sense a strong antiestablishmentarian feeling. In certain parts of this movement, some people would like to run somebody against a Faubus *and* against Martin Luther King. Whether they are *in* civil rights or not, I will ignore for the moment. How this will manifest itself organizationally is what I cannot decide. I cannot imagine them doing what they might want to do: running Paul Goodman for President—or for anti-president. They cannot resurrect Albert Camus. I do not know how to respond to your question, although it is a very intelligent one, Mr. Lerner, because I cannot conceive of how this would express itself organizationally at the present time. I simply do not know.

**COLES:** When SNCC first opened its office in Atlanta in 1961, they had me stamping envelopes, because they were not about to trust anyone with anything more than that kind of job. Since then, of course, there have been all kinds of developments. I think it was a brilliant stroke when Robert Penn Warren entitled his book, *Who Speaks for the Negro?* We might extend the question to SNCC. I do not know who speaks for SNCC. I think there are many voices. SNCC was deliberately founded as, and still in many ways is, a coalition within itself, with all kinds of elements running around in it.

Some of this may be related to the whole problem of youth. In two years, half of the country will be under twenty-five. Youth is practically becoming a social issue in itself. There is not only the campus movement and its relationship to civil rights, but there are the problems of whether to lower the voting age, how to deal with young people, and how they, as a phenomenon in and an influence on our society, exist and get along.

I am aware of the hazards of extending psychiatric observations to political issues, but I would like to say this. I watched what happened in Atlantic City during the Democratic National Convention. I do not think that anything I say by any means accounts for everything, but I did observe that a lot of these young people were exhausted. They were suffering from what I would call (and have called in professional journals) *battle fatigue*. They were bitter. They had been fighting—some of them for years. I call this *bitterness* because I think it is bitterness. Of course, this presents a problem for me, observing because I think observations have to be made, yet feeling a little worried about the use my observations will be put to by others, such as segregationists.

There should not be a controversy over the issue of rift, because, for certain goals, there is no rift in the movement. However, it makes no sense to deny that there are many ways of thinking and that these are very, very significant and are becoming even more significant. There is no question that, to some extent, SNCC serves as a medium for a lot of people, particularly white people, who are interested not only in civil rights, but in a lot of other things. They have never made any bones about it. There are also many people in SNCC who have no idea of what a lot of other people in SNCC are thinking about.

Last summer, in Ohio and in Mississippi, one was impressed by the wide variety of people who came. There was the whole range of American politics. There were the canny New Yorkers and Californians, the naive Midwesterners, the religiously motivated, and so on. Whether or not these people are dupes, I do not know. I will say that I was impressed by the honesty of some of the so-called leaders of SNCC in at least stating publicly what they wanted, in warning about the possibility of death, and in describing the circumstances that the project envisioned. I do not think there has always been such explicit honesty about ideology from some of the people in SNCC. But in ongoing history, caution, circumspection, and even artifice are not solely a function of SNCC. They are constantly practiced by the federal government and by both political parties. I think we have to relate the political stratagems of this organization to our national life and its political climate and the way things are done.

**BREEDEN:** I want to comment that it seems to me that a good deal of our discussion relates directly to Dr. Wilson's paper, in terms of the problems of political organization in Mississippi. One can talk abstractly about coalitions, etc.; but the raw fact is that if anyone tries to organize Negroes for political participation in Mississippi, he is putting his life on the line. This is a little different from coalition politics in New York City. It may not be entirely different, but it is sufficiently different to lead to a different intensity in terms of decision-making.

I would like to make one other point, also. It is, of course, difficult to say "SNCC" and have some single meaning attached to the name. However, I think it is true that there are very few places in the movement where direct political action is going on. We have generally looked at the civil rights movement as a kind of pressure-group movement, not as a direct-political-action movement. It is the development of some direct political action in many cities of Mississippi, and, of course, in the Freedom Democratic party, that means we are talking about different kinds of things, from the pressure group to the political party.

**TURNER:** I think the discussion serves to point out (for me, at least, since I have made some mention of possible areas of disagreement) the need to be quite clear about the nature of disagreement. For example, one distinguishes between disagreement among individuals and disagreement among organizations. One can distinguish between disagreement as to objectives or end goals and disagreement as to the means of achieving those goals. There is even another area of distinction which needs to be taken into account, namely, that the actual detail of the civil rights struggle varies in time, in dimension, and in scope from community to community, as well as within the same community, from time to time. Thus, we have the possibility of the misappropriate use of strategies and the misperception of what the appropriate strategies are, by people both within and outside of the situation.

**PARSONS:** I was very much impressed by Mr. Moynihan's statement. I think he put his finger on a very fundamental aspect of the whole situation. I myself am inclined to use the term *equality* teamed with the term *liberty*. I think that underlying American society there is a value complex in which these components stand in severe tension under certain circumstances, but are also intimately linked with one another. Lipset's recent book, *The First New Nation*, has a very illuminating treatment of that in the perspective of American history. My interpretation is that in the civil rights movement's post-World War II phase, the whole issue of the status of the Negro became a critical national issue in the context of this underlying value pattern. As Mr. Hughes stated yesterday, the development of our society had reached a point where the older insulations and compromises were no longer tenable. They generated just too much tension at certain points, and something had to give.

I would agree that we are completing the phase in which the components run along together. The problem of the South—denial of the more elementary civil rights, the legal rights and political voting rights—has masked the inherent tension in other areas. Now that it is approaching the phase of being a mopping-up operation, I quite agree that the case of the Southern segregationist is hopeless. There will be a lot of very nasty rear-guard action, but the segregationists cannot possibly win unless something very drastic happens to society as a whole. The problem, then, moves into the question of the institutionalization of basic equalities. This is a nationwide problem, and it is centered in the North. Mr. Moynihan put it very, very clearly. It is a crucial shift of phase in the general movement.

**TURNER:** I wonder if we should have a paper on this. Do we have anyone really touching on these ideas from a philosophical point of view?

**GRAUBARD:** Not explicitly and not even implicitly.

**EDWARDS:** Let me ask Mr. Wilson a question. He seems to be very pessimistic about Negroes' moving into elective office, largely because there is not enough capital in the Negro community and not enough solidarity among the civil rights leaders themselves. If we look at the present, this pessimism may be warranted to some extent. But what about the future? I am referring, of course, to Mr. Lerner's point about the possibility of balance-of-power politics, as Negroes become registered increasingly in the South while residential segregation continues in the Southern cities.

WILSON: In revising my paper, I will look for indications of pessimism on that point and excise or revise them. I think it is quite clear that there is going to be a substantial movement of Negroes into elective office in the South. If I said otherwise, I will change it. I clearly foresee Negroes' moving into office, particularly partisan office. However, one of the disturbing points which I did not mention (I think I will, in my revision) is the fact that the South has fewer cities with partisan elections than almost any other region in the country. Nonpartisanship is going to work considerable hardship on Negroes, particularly when it is coupled with at-large elections. I have a feeling that in nonpartisan, at-large elections for city government offices, the Negro is going to have a hard time getting into office, because it will be easier to organize the vote on a Negro versus white basis. But in partisan elections for state representatives, for partisan local offices (for congressmen and so on) the Negro is certainly going to move into elective offices at increasing rates. The white politicians who are now in office will either have to change their tune or get out of office. Half the Southern congressional districts are 20 per cent or more Negro. We do not have to register many of those Negroes for the white politicians to get religion on the subject of at least obvious race-baiting. What their inner souls look like I will leave to their Creator.

FOLEY: I think that Mr. Moynihan's comments were extremely helpful. In effect, he is pointing out how many white Northerners will support the Negroes' right to vote, but not their right to live next door. One means liberty; the other means equality.

I suspect, however, that his comments do not apply to Mississippi and Alabama. This refers to something which Mr. Hughes was asking: What is going on in the Southern white upper class? For the last couple of months, as many of you probably know, the very wealthy white Southerner has been coming around. The Committee of One Hundred in Mississippi and the Committee of One Hundred in Alabama—the 100 top business leaders of each state—have come out publicly saying that while we may not like the Civil Rights Act, we somehow or other have to go along with it for the sake of peace and order. I do not think this is in response to the stimulus of liberty or of equality, but rather, in Mr. Lerner's terms, to the stimulus of the balance of power. This is not a coalition. It is more an accommodation.

There are different weights now on the balance scale. There is the weight of the civil rights movement. There is the weight of the federal government and the economics which that implies. There is the additional weight which both of these factors apply within the Democratic party, where a great change is taking place inasmuch as there has to be an integrated delegation at the next Democratic National Convention. So I suspect that in Mississippi and Alabama it is strictly a balance-of-power politics, with no coalition yet. Something is going to have to take place in the next couple of years.

GEERTZ: In view of Mr. Lerner's comments on the antiestablishmentarian, new-left sort of approach of at least some wings in the civil rights movement and Dr. Coles' comments on youth becoming an issue, Mr. Wilson might want to add a section to his paper. Somewhat along the lines that Professor Freund developed yesterday, Mr. Wilson might consider the pour-over from the civil rights movement into general politics and vice versa.

What strikes me is the way in which a good deal of the civil rights action has become paradigmatic for other kinds of politics. For example, we now have teach-ins on the Vietnam issue and marches for all sorts of things. This pour-over from civil rights into the general political stream is interesting, as is, of course, the reverse—the appearance of suburban politics, the breakdown of political machines, etc.

I think this might make an interesting discussion. It also might provide a way to discuss the "rift" problem. Without worrying about the problem of ideological unity, we might be able to account for some of the variations that obviously do occur in the movement.

HAUSER: I find our discussion of the Negro in politics extremely stimulating (as all our discussions have been), but also a little bit frustrating. We have, at this point, taken Mr. Wilson's paper and cut it off from allied papers. It seems to me that in order to answer some of the questions which have been raised (for example, about the objectives of the civil rights movement and its various elements), we have to consider the question which Mr. Handlin raised about desegregation versus integration. On a macro-ideological level, there may be considerable basis for, if not rift, at least disagreement in positioning. However, it may have little or no implication, to the extent that the differences may not call for very much variation in the intermediate goals and specific objectives regarding education, employment, housing, etc.

I think, also, that even though the civil rights movement itself is not identified with a formal political party, it is a political movement. The paradigm to which Mr. Geertz has just referred and the analogy which was suggested by Mr. Freund's discussion yesterday seem to me to be very important. For example, I think that the Negro in Chicago has just achieved a major political victory, even though he is completely the captive of the Democratic machine. If we look at simply the formal political structure and the Negro's participation in it, we must conclude that the Negro has been ignored. What I am suggesting is that the Negro is a captive of the Democratic party. He has had no voice in the making of political decisions. In Chicago, he has been completely frustrated by his inability to get Mayor Daley to do anything on the educational front. Yet, it seems to me, we ought to make note of the political impact of the Negro through the civil rights movement—his political impact independent of his formal participation in formal political organizations.

Also involved here is the interesting dichotomization in the paper by

Mr. Turner and Mr. Young. I feel that it is a false and, in some ways, dangerous dichotomization of power versus acculturation as processes by which objectives may be achieved.

These kinds of considerations are relevant to a discussion of the Negro's role in politics. We should look at the politics in the broader sense, in terms of the informal and indirect effects as well as in terms of the formal political order.

**GRAUBARD:** I would like now, if I may, to ask Mr. Fleming to summarize for us the argument in his paper.

**FLEMING:** If Mr. Wilson thinks his paper is getting out of date, he should have *my* problems. Since this paper was finished, just one month ago, a number of things have happened to make it out of date. At least I know about one of them at the outset. I spoke of the coordination effort that Vice President Humphrey is heading, and I said that what comes of it will depend in considerable degree on the quality of the staff selected. For better or worse, that question has been resolved. We have with us the newly appointed executive secretary of the President's Council on Equal Opportunities: Mr. Wiley Branton. Of course, I will go on to say that I think the question has been resolved happily.

My paper, unlike virtually all the other papers, is not so much conceptual as it is narrative of a sequence of events in the federal approach to civil rights over the last four years. Reading the other papers and attending this conference have made me very conscious of the extent to which a concept is viewed as a luxury in the nonscholarly realm I inhabit. In fact, there is something suspect about concepts, and I do not have too many in my paper. I think that there are some concepts implicit in my attempt to sum up some nuts and bolts of federal civil rights action in the Kennedy-Johnson years; and, in the revision, I will try to summarize at the end some of the implications that seem to me to emerge from my view of what has happened since 1961 in the federal role.

The story I am trying to tell is one that everybody is familiar with in essence: the story of increasingly vigorous and far-reaching federal action, in large part in response to crisis and to the rising militance of the civil rights movement. Starting with the freedom rides, the ultimate target of protest and demonstration—even when ostensibly local, as in Selma—has been the federal government itself. Protests and demonstrations have been very largely efforts to enlist greater federal power behind the civil rights revolution, and they have been successful efforts to a large extent.

It seems to me that we can also observe weaknesses of one sort or another in this process. Civil rights people, liberals, others who are interested, and governmental figures themselves have often at least talked as though the *establishment* of a new principle of support for civil rights at the federal level—through legislation or executive action—was the same thing as the *implementation* of the principle. There is no doubt that we have had tremendous gains in these four years in the adoption of new concepts and new commitments at the federal level. However, in terms of the impact on the daily lives of people who suffer from discrimination, not much has happened yet. The tools are only now at hand, and even yet there are a few conspicuous exceptions, as in the housing field, where there are no really effective federal tools. Therefore, the vigorous and skillful implementation of the federal civil rights programs—the achievement of the liberty part of the equation—must be the next major concentration at the federal level, in terms of civil rights *per se*. Also, I think that we can see that this is part of our political process: new programs, the passage of new legislation, the issuance of executive orders, and so on.

There has been a rather hearty collaboration among a number of elements, including the administration and civil rights groups, in arousing what may be regarded with hindsight as undue expectations. Everything has been a matter for great expectation. Knowledgeable people, however, have been able to foresee that most of the measures could not create instant and revolutionary improvements. I think that the tremendous importance attributed to the so-called stroke of the pen—the housing order that President Kennedy finally issued in 1962—was really a kind of mutual deception that everybody was playing on everybody else. It was seldom publicly described as what it was: the establishment of a good principle of federal commitment to equality in federally supported housing, with little prospect of a major impact on segregated housing in this country. In fact, there has been no major impact.

This has some implications which perhaps ought to be made clearer. I think we have to conclude, without impeaching anybody's intentions, that, relatively speaking, the excessive reliance on executive action—which was the apparent promise at the beginning of the Kennedy administration—has not worked well and, without a legislative mandate, probably cannot work well on those things that are external to the federal establishment itself. My reading of the events of the last four years is that not until there was a legislative mandate did the executive actions which were taken early in the Kennedy administration begin to be effective. They were not legitimized enough to be strongly pursued against the countervailing tendencies, priorities, and pressures.

We have a good bit of legislation now, and we are about to have some more in the voting field. However, there are a few gaps that are going to cause trouble sometime. Housing is one. Another is the whole problem of the physical safety of the people working for civil rights in the South. Protection is, as yet, a contested area and one for which a clear solution is not in sight. I think there is going to be pressure for much more drastic federal intervention to prevent violence or to bring to justice those guilty of violence—to protect the lives and liberties of people seeking to exercise their rights in the South and those trying to help them.

There is another interesting principle that has emerged in these four years. Many people are beginning to recognize the dependence of effective federal action on support in the private sector. President Kennedy recognized this the summer after Birmingham. I think President Johnson recognizes it by instinct. We may expect to see considerably more executive leadership directed toward trying to mobilize and animate important institutional forces in the private sector, including the civil rights forces. If it is not apparent now to thoughtful observers that the federal government, because of the restraints and checks and balances which operate in the establishment, is as dependent on civil rights pressure to move in this field as it is on its own general commitment, then it never will be clear. I think there is no question that President Kennedy saw this very clearly. When Birmingham broke and a chain reaction hit the country, his first reaction was probably something to the effect of: "Now we can move." To speak of what the federal government ought to do, without recognizing the need for this kind of build-up of pressure and consensus as a prerequisite to strong federal action, is, I think, again to deceive ourselves. There has to be a lot more private support in the period to come. Presumably Mr. Branton, in addition to coordinating inside, will reach his coordinating tentacles outside to help forge this coalition of interests.

I end my paper with the note (which I do not try to develop) that the new ground to be broken is on the egalitarian question, rather than the libertarian question. This, of course, ties in with what Mr. Moynihan said. To a large degree, this is a Northern problem—a problem of the big urban areas outside the South. I think that in terms of establishing new principles, new concepts, and new approaches which will have a major effect on the lives of Negro Americans, this is the area in which President Johnson and his successors are going to have to innovate. As for the old Southern-civil-rights-problem syndrome, the tools are at hand; it only remains to use them effectively and courageously.

**GRAUBARD:** Thank you very much, Mr. Fleming. Incidentally, while all of that is implicit in your paper, I am delighted to hear from you that you intend to make it explicit.

**BRANTON:** I would like to ask Mr. Fleming a question. I understand that there is disagreement among legal scholars as to whether the President has the authority to extend the housing order to cover federal savings and loan associations and commercial banks. If this legal question cannot be resolved to any appreciable degree of satisfaction percentagewise among the lawyers, should the President go ahead and sign such an order and run the risk of having some federal judge throw it out?

**FLEMING:** I do not think that questions such as these are resolved percentagewise among lawyers; they are resolved qualitatively. Ultimately it has to be the President's own judgment as to whether he wants to do this. Maybe Mr. Freund would comment on this. I am not a lawyer and feel some diffidence about this. I find it hard, as a layman, to believe that the Supreme Court of the United States is going to invalidate a broadened executive order by the President.

There is another consideration that is a little too complicated, particularly for a nonlawyer, to go into at length. The problem is not simply one of the President's authority to broaden the order to cover those institutions through the regulatory agencies. It is also a question of whether those regulatory agencies can enforce the order. We are dealing with something that is several levels removed from federal authority. We have banks, which are themselves private institutions, making loans to private builders; and they are regulated by the independent federal regulatory bodies. The President is issuing an executive order to create a chain of responsibility right down the line to enforce this requirement.

This does present some knotty problems. I have, however, a strong sense of inevitability about this whole question. It seems to me that the federal responsibility for intervention in the housing field is so great and the problem so severe that one way or another, legitimately or illegitimately, by an executive order or by legislation, the housing issue is going to have to be reached. Right now there is no priority for it. The civil rights groups are not paying any attention to housing and are not putting on any pressure to speak of. The minute they do, this will become a tremendous issue.

**BERRY:** Can banks operate without federal insurance?

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Yes.

**BERRY:** What would happen to a bank without it? Could it operate successfully?

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Not with my money.

**BERRY:** All banks insure the first $10,000.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Not all of them.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** There are very few that do not. There are very few that are not covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

**BERRY:** My question is: Can banks operate *successfully* without federal insurance?

**UNIDENTIFIED:** No.

**BERRY:** Then the federal government has an awfully big club.

**FLEMING:** The problem is how to use it.

**BERRY:** They know how to use it.

**BRANTON:** I realize that there could be some enforcement problems; but I tend to believe that merely upon the issuance of an executive order, despite the fact that we may not be sure of enforcement provisions or regulations, the vast majority of Americans would conform. Is it good in your opinion, Mr. Fleming, to go ahead and issue such an order and iron out problems of enforcement and compliance at a later date?

**FLEMING:** That is my view. If we had to solve all the problems of enforcement before we took a step like this, we would not have half the tools we have today. For example, we are struggling right now, trying to figure out what Title VI means. I would not argue that we should not have passed Title VI until we had figured out all the nuts and bolts of making it effective.

**BRANTON:** Don't you think that we ought to move in that direction in the housing field?

**FLEMING:** Mr. Branton, I hope you will. I really do.

**BRANTON:** I get the point. Issue the housing order.

**BREEDEN:** I hope we will discuss the protection issue, also. If you recall, two issues were being raised in Selma: voting rights and protection. The protection issue was submerged in the voting rights issue. I think that this is a very weak statute, as Mr. Fleming points out; and the policy raises tremendous questions about the relations between federal authority and state and local authority. Nonetheless, it is critical. It also plays right back into the problem of ideological tension and alienation from the order. One begins to look at the Presidency and the establishment in a different way when one has to deal constantly with authority that does not seem to be used to protect fundamental rights.

**FLEMING:** Yes. I think this is one of those very sticky questions of federal-state relations which probably can be solved only by congressional action —that is, if this problem continues to be severe enough (as I think it will) for these tensions to continue. Any treatment of this question is a little difficult right now because the President does have the Attorney General at work trying to devise a new statute. As I suggested in my paper, I have a hunch that it is not going to go far enough to resolve the tension. But we cannot say that flatly, since we do not know what Mr. Katzenbach and his people will come up with. They are going to propose some legislative action in this field, and they probably will do it the day before the *Dædalus* issue comes out.

**HUGHES:** It seems to me that most of our talk in these two days—certainly Mr. Freund's presentation yesterday—indicates that solving the problems of liberty and equality involves basic questions about our Constitution and about the relationships among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. I hope that the effects of a problem such as this upon our Constitution and upon the balance of the three branches will be brought out. It would add great value to this issue.

**GRAUBARD:** I agree.

**FOLEY:** With regard to how we are going to enforce Title VI, I think there is an awful lot the executive can do without legislative support or judicial support. I am getting back, I guess, to Mr. Berry's emphasis on attitude. In our agency, the Small Business Administration, we make loans, two-thirds of which are made in participation with a bank. I had a task force working on the problem of how we were going to enforce Title VI in our agency, and they finally just despaired and said there was not anything to be done. I said that, indeed, we would just call the loans. They replied that we have never done that before, and I said that we were going to start.

The question, then, is how we are going to know which ones to call. (We make something like 10,000 or 11,000 loans a year.) The answer is that we will just use our common sense. I do not think that we are going to have too much of a problem in Minnesota, but I am going to watch it in Mississippi. I am going to have a group traveling around, particularly emphasizing the South. We do not have to get 100 per cent of the discriminators. All I need is one in Mississippi, and every bank in that state is going to be on guard. The same will hold in Alabama. I do not think it is going to be too hard to catch one. And I cannot see that there is a legal issue in regard to savings and loan associations, because the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has jurisdiction over the savings and loan industry which is quite comparable to that of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. What I am saying is that I think the method of enforcement in all of these cases is withdrawal of federal support, and all we have to have is the determination of the federal agency to do it.

**FLEMING:** I agree with you, Mr. Foley. My point was that for rather large-scale innovations executive action is not as effective as legislative action. As you know, a lot of people urged President Kennedy to put into effect, in the absence of legislation, what is now Title VI, that is, the provision for withholding federal funds. But he declined to do this. I do not think that we could have had the Title VI program under an executive order. That was my point. An example of it is the executive order on employment which President Kennedy issued. The sanctions of the employment order are spelled out beautifully and at great length, yet there has not been a single hearing held or contract terminated under that executive order since 1961. Sanctions which reach out of the federal establishment itself simply do not seem to be strongly enforced in the absence of congressional backing. This has been the case up to now.

**FOLEY:** I wonder about that. In the Small Business Administration, our lawyers determined that Title VI only applies on loans that we make in participation with a bank and that it does not apply to the employment by the loan recipient. So I issued an administrative order that it was going to apply, and our lawyers have determined that this is entirely proper and legal. As a matter of fact, Senator Javits and Senator Hart argued, in a lengthy legal brief, that there was executive authority to cover these areas without Title VI. As some of you may remember, both Senator Javits and Senator Hart pushed the executive agencies to issue these orders prior to the passage of Title VI.

**FLEMING:** I am only generalizing from what has happened to date. We will watch the Small Business Administration for a new pattern.

**COLES:** I want to pick up a theme which was mentioned by Professor Freund yesterday and which applies to this paper. There is a contradiction, perhaps inevitable, in the feelings of many of the people in the civil rights movement. They urge the government on and ask things from it; yet they feel great suspicion and hostility to it. For instance, there is the demand that the FBI assume a new kind of role (which, I think, would make it an entirely different kind of organization), and yet there is intense suspicion of the FBI and its leader for a variety of reasons tied in with political views. There is the demand that congressmen set up investigations in certain areas, and yet there is intense suspicion of the Congress and its activities in this field. I think it might be interesting to discuss the rather ambivalent attitude of the civil rights movement toward the federal government and how this perhaps involves the whole problem of the liberal and his relationship to state authority. Certainly, one cannot help but notice the rather constant call for Mr. Hoover's help and, at the same time, denunciation of him.

**WILSON:** I would like to follow up precisely on that point. It seems to me that either in Mr. Fleming's paper or elsewhere we ought to develop this theme. Mr. Freund very suggestively alluded to it yesterday, when he talked about the liberal dilemma: our desire for government action for certain purposes, on the one hand, and our fear and concern about bureaucracy and proceedings not governed by due process of law, on the other hand. It seems to me this suggests an even larger question. The dilemma is not only for liberals, but for many people. Our government exists to serve many values, including integration. I have a feeling that, in our enthusiasm for how the federal government's powers may be used by vigorous administrators who seek certain objectives, we are overlooking the really profound questions of administrative law, fact determination, the rule of law, due process, and so on. We are talking about the disposition of millions of dollars and the lives of many, many people. We say that integration is so important that we will pull loans or we will stop this or that, but these are not the principles we conventionally apply to the government's activity when it is reaching into other areas of our life. Perhaps in other areas our enthusiasm for the ultimate goal is not as strong. I do not know the solution to this problem. I would simply like to see more attention given to some of the very troublesome questions about administrative proceedings and due process.

My second point is that I have a feeling that a bit more emphasis ought to be given to what can be accomplished in this country with the stroke of the pen, so to speak. I think we can do more than we have. In fact, I am in favor of almost all the measures that have been discussed here. I think I would be in favor of them even if they did not accomplish anything. We should not judge them on utilitarian grounds but, ultimately, on ethical grounds. It is right and just that the taxpayer's money not be used, even symbolically, in any way that would associate it with inequity. Nonetheless, there is a practical question; and I wonder if we can allude to it somehow. What real difference would it make in the housing market if the President's rule, which now covers 20 per cent of the lending activities, were extended to 100 per cent of the lending activities? I do not know that anybody can answer the question, but I have a feeling that we are not really focusing on it. Perhaps, in our enthusiasm for the method, we may lead the unsuspecting reader of this issue of *Dædalus* to believe that we are more sure than we are.

**FLEMING:** First of all, what we can do now is really to implement, to use the tools. They scarcely have been used yet. Title VII is not even in operation yet, and Title VI is really right at its inception. With regard to housing, I did not go into it in my paper because I did not know what subjects would be covered and how they would be covered in other papers. What the broadening of the housing order can do, if vigorously implemented, is to open up the suburbs and the admittedly middle-income and higher-income housing to those Negroes who can afford it and want, or will want over a period of time, to move into those areas. I do not subscribe to the view that what happens to the relatively small percentage of Negroes who may be described as middle-class is unimportant. I think they are the models, the pace-setters. I think that what happens to them is going to condition the attitude toward race. They are the only hope we have of separating the concept of race from the concept of an under class. I think it is terribly important for this relatively small number of Negroes to have open access to the housing which they can afford. Obviously, this will not have much impact on the ghetto dweller.

**WILSON:** How does the housing order give them open access?

**FLEMING:** By covering the whole market, or at least the largest percentage of the market.

**WILSON:** Is the exclusionary principle clearly the financial one? There are many exclusionary weapons, ranging from zoning practices to community pressure to violence. Money is one element. If I had a sense of how important money was in the total housing market for these people, then I think I would have a sense of what the housing order is going to do.

**BERRY:** It seems to me that not all suburban housing is really expensive. When we talk about opening the suburbs for the few upper-middle-class Negroes, we are fooling ourselves. A good part of the housing in suburban developments is very ordinary housing, where ordinary working people live. Industry is going to the suburbs. Right now we are getting the kinds of people whom Mr. Cohen was talking about yesterday—the people in the $35,000 bracket—and the white people bring them cake for coming out there. But there is considerable other housing, and Negroes in cities such as Chicago are paying blood money for rent which is much higher than the price of good suburban property. It is going to be more important than I think you indicated, Mr. Fleming.

**FLEMING:** I did say middle income or better—not just upper income.

**BERRY:** Even some lower-middle-income people can go out and work in plants such as we have building up around O'Hare Airport. Ordinary poor white people are living out there now. Of course, I am not sure that Negroes want to live with them.

It seems to me that whenever we talk about housing, we ought to emphasize the very great responsibility the federal government has in this area. They have this responsibility because they were so guilty of discriminating for so long. They even had restrictive covenants in the old FHA manual. I do not think that they ought to be allowed to forget that. They have a great responsibility to undo all the nastiness they did. Mr. Wilson raised a question about how far the government ought to go in lowering the boom in the application of the sanction. I do not think there is any question about this. It seems to me, Mr. Wilson, that it is perfectly clear that we could say that no part of any tax dollar ought to be used for any discriminatory program or purpose at any time, period. It is just as plain as the nose on my face that the federal government operates with tax money, which is everybody's money and ought to be equally applied. Any government service which is paid for with tax money has this responsibility.

**WILSON:** That was not my question, but I agree with you. I said that justice requires that the federal government take a position quite similar to the one you are pronouncing. The only question is in the practicalities of determining whether discrimination actually occurred and what sanction ought to be applied. I would like to see attention given to the generally troublesome questions of administrative practice and administrative law. I do not think that we have alluded to these questions so far in this conference.

**FOLEY:** I can answer that very simply. There is an administrative proceeding to determine whether, for example, a loan should be called. If a person does not like the results of the administrative proceeding, he has all the judicial and legal recourse which he has in other matters. He can appeal it to the courts. So I do not see how any vigorous, aggressive action of an executive agency would deprive him of his legal rights.

**TOBIN:** I am just not informed about the mechanics of enforcing compliance with the housing order. It seems to me that the possibilities of evading this kind of order are tremendous. In principle, I certainly agree with Mr. Berry. The housing order should be enforced. But how, in fact, can it be done? This relates to Mr. Wilson's question. What are the administrative procedures to insure that the banks, the builders, etc., do not evade the order?

**FLEMING:** The chairman wishes us to address ourselves to that question, so I will take a shot at it. It is a big question, and I do not pretend to have the whole answer. As far as I know, nobody has thought through all the mechanics of enforcement. However, the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing, which is made up of some pretty savvy people, seems to feel that it can be mechanically accomplished. There is no question at all that this will be essentially a complaint-centered program, as our present housing order and Title VII provide for. It simply means that Negroes who feel that they are being discriminated against can file complaints, possibly with the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing. This has been one suggestion. The riding-herd on the complaints will be supervised by the President's Committee, though it will be a responsibility of the regulatory agency. The problem, Mr. Berry, as I see it, is to bridge the gap between the executive department and the regulatory agency, which has the direct relationship with the banks. It seems to me that, while it is complicated, it is feasible. And it is certainly better than not having the federal principle established.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Has there been any significant shift in the borrowing market—from FHA, VA, and so on, to the private sector—for building in the suburbs since the establishment of the order? The prediction at the onset of this order was that building would go down, but in fact it has gone up a little bit.

FLEMING: The FHA Commissioner says that there has not been any significant shift attributable to the executive order. The FHA market is soft; there is not much demand, and it has declined somewhat in the year since the order was issued. But nobody whom I have heard quoted attributes this in any significant degree to the executive order. We cannot really tell, until we get a much more vigorous program. It is not very hard to get an FHA guaranteed loan and go on with business as usual.

PARSONS: I have just a short point, but I think it is a very important one. Since the procedure is a complaint procedure—and it is in many of the state-level cases, too—the civil rights groups can play an extremely important part. A study (which Mr. Pettigrew and Mr. Wilson know about) of the antidiscrimination legislation in Massachusetts showed very conclusively that the increase in effectiveness, over the period since the antidiscrimination law for employment was passed a dozen or more years ago, is overwhelmingly a function of the support of the complainants by the civil rights groups. Isolated individuals do not dare use the procedure.

LERNER: I would like to go back to two, somewhat related, broader issues which were raised. First, I would like to comment on the supposed danger of using rather decisive administrative federal power—on the idea that it might react badly upon worthwhile movements. In the early days of the New Deal, we were deeply troubled by the use of New Deal power in ways which might prove ultimately damaging if used by others in power. I suppose all we can say is that power is always a double-edged sword. We have to grasp it anyway—even though, in some conceivable situations, it might cut against us.

The second issue, raised particularly by Dr. Coles, was the ambivalence of the civil rights people—their hostility toward some of the federal instrumentalities upon which they are trying to exert pressure. We might look at this historically, in terms of some previous movements. For example, all the reformist Marxist movements—but not the all-out Marxist movements—had this problem. The Democratic Socialists, for instance, always had the problem of having to put pressure upon the very political process which they were constantly saying was a decadent thing and would eventually have to disappear. I think that the civil rights people—all of us, both Negro Americans and white Americans—have to face this question and clarify it as the Marxists in the past had to clarify it. Similar ambivalences emerged in the anticolonial movements. In reading several recent volumes of Nehru's papers, it is clear that the people in the Gandhi-Nehru movement were troubled by the fact that they were being asked to get concessions from the very British government which they hated so deeply and which they were trying to overthrow. It would be useful to set the civil rights movement in the framework of past movements, such as the Marxist movements and anticolonial movements, and of revolutionary movements in general. There have been not only problems of libertarianism and egalitarianism in American civilization, but also far-reaching problems in previous movements to which the civil rights movement is somewhat analogous.

**GRAUBARD:** As of now, there is no paper planned in that area.

**FEIN:** I would like to extend Mr. Wilson's point and tie it in with a comment which Mr. Hughes made earlier. Particularly if *Dædalus* has a significant readership in Europe (which I assume it does have), I think that there is a real need for a paper which would be broadly philosophical in terms of federal-state relations, traditional legislative-executive relations, and so on. I take it that the kind of dilemmas which Mr. Wilson poses are much broader than just the question of administrative rule and are related to the dilemma of, for example, supporting the House Un-American Activities Committee in an investigation of the Ku Klux Klan. This kind of issue, cast philosophically in the sorts of traditions that Mr. Hughes was alluding to, strikes me as a very worthwhile topic for a paper.

**GRAUBARD:** As you remember, we agreed that we would insert some oral reports. We do not yet have a paper from Mr. Edwards, so he is going to outline his paper for us now.

**EDWARDS:** I was asked to consider what the future may hold in terms of Negroes becoming perhaps a little more American. That is, given the differences in the structures of Negro and white society, what do I see as forces which carry with them hope for greater similarity, and what in the situation leads to discouragement that there will be a closer resemblance between Negro and white society? Mr. Graubard said, in writing to me, that although the paper might turn out to be a very pessimistic one, I should treat it as faithfully as I saw it.

I would suggest that there are two kinds of forces operating. On the one hand, some of the differences are going to disappear. The question is: How soon can this be accomplished? In terms of our planning here, what would be the strategy to speed up this process? On the other hand, deeply imbedded in the two structures are such great differences that it will be very difficult to change the structures so that they resemble one another in any greater measure in the foreseeable future. There are both forces of optimism and forces of pessimism. Over-all, I am inclined to take an optimistic view.

My first point is that we ought to look at the civil rights movement as part of a general movement—what I call the welfare movement in this country. It has been going on for a long time and has acquired increasing impetus. I think we clearly see this movement as beginning with the New Deal. For example, we had the passage of our first housing legislation in that period. We had Social Security. We had labor reform. Now we have Medicare and the War on Poverty.

I think that civil rights leaders should never take their eyes off of the intersection of the civil rights movement with this more general movement. Civil rights leaders often become so preoccupied with what they can do, in terms of the fruitful use of their time, that they lose this point.

That there has been this revolution in this country—a movement for the upgrading of the general well-being of Americans—is one of the things that leads me to an optimistic stance. This is a hopeful kind of sign for us.

In line with that is the fact that the major actor in this whole process has been the government. We have been talking about the failure of the government to use the full force of its power; but I think that as this movement goes forward, we do have the government playing a most significant role. My judgment is that, given the present leadership, it will become even more important in the future.

I do not think that we could have predicted, even as recently as 1956, many of the things which have come to pass. We were not able to foresee the intervening events. Look at the Kennedy administration, for example. Despite Mr. Kennedy's campaign promise to do away with discrimination in housing with "a stroke of the pen," he was hesitant in terms of playing the political game, as Mr. Fleming pointed out today. Mr. Kennedy promised to send civil rights legislation to Congress, but he held off until Birmingham. Of course, there was a rather swift movement after that.

More significant, I think, is that when the civil rights bill did get to the Congress, it was even improved upon. This meant that much of the force of government—both the executive-order type of force (which Mr. Kennedy was wont to rely upon) and the legislative type of force—was strongly in support of civil rights. And, of course, the courts were there even before the executive and legislative powers came into play. So, in general, if we look at the currents in which the civil rights movement is flowing, we have cause to be optimistic. Certainly it is not easy to turn back.

The third thing I would like to mention is that recently there has been a greater concern, largely because of self-interest, on the part of the white business community. I think we may expect considerable support from that sector of the community—to the end, perhaps, of eliminating some of the differences which we have been observing. With respect to civil rights legislation—on voting and public accommodations, in particular—the business community and, to some extent, the middle class in general in the South are more for compliance with what the government says is right than for maintenance of the established order. This is especially true in those parts of the South where we have had real conflict—in Alabama and in Mississippi. We now have committees which, I think, wield such power that they will be listened to.

I think one of the great differences between, say, South Carolina and Alabama is the fact that South Carolina learned very quickly from the mistakes which Alabama made—in public education, for example. It appeared that the admission of a Negro to Clemson College—about the same time that Governor Wallace was attempting to keep Negroes out of the University of Alabama—was attributable to the political power structure in South Carolina. Actually, the business leaders, who were greatly concerned about improving the general level of that state, had a great deal to do with the thrust which resulted in the admittance of Mr. Gantt to Clemson College without any trouble. This is significant, because we might well have predicted that South Carolina would follow the pattern of Alabama and Mississippi. There were rumbles on the part of the segregationist groups, but they just never materialized. Such, I think, is the power which the business community is exerting. I think they will not only serve their own interests, but their voice and power may be felt in other segments of the community.

I think there is still another hopeful force for producing situations which will help to eliminate some of the major differences. The civil rights movement is attracting an increasingly larger segment of the white community. Perhaps they look at this, as Mr. Moynihan suggested, in terms of liberty rather than equality; but no matter how they look at it, when they give their support, they are offering tremendous promise for eliminating some of the differences. This is particularly true on the part of the present generation of whites—the young people. We should never overlook the participation of the whites in some of the symbolic or ritualistic features of the movement. For example, I do not know what proportion of the 200,000 people who marched on Washington represented the white community, but certainly the whites were there. They have been in Selma. They have been everywhere. In addition to its symbolic meaning, this is also translated into certain power features. Labor gave its support, for example. This is not a pure phenomenon (some people have said that the white liberals have backed up a little bit); but, over-all, into the civil rights movement have come larger numbers of whites, who give their support in funds and in action and who, in many cases, are willing to make some of the sacrifices and to take the extremely dangerous position of participating as the ministers and other people did in Selma, Alabama.

I think that the general tone of my paper will be one of optimism. However, we must accept the fact that this problem is going to be with us for a long time. There will be no early, quick resolution of the problem, although some aspects may yield a little more quickly than others. Establishing equality of opportunity in other areas may be tougher than in the area of public accommodations—the right to sit down at a counter, to ride a bus, and so on. So some aspects of the differences among Negroes and whites will disappear more quickly than others. I recently heard Professor Ginzberg of Columbia University say, in talking to young Negroes who identified with the civil rights movement, that the market place will be much tougher than some of the other areas and that we should really steel ourselves for the struggle ahead. I think he is right.

The differences which we want to resolve—differences in, say, class structure, opportunity, and family structure—have been conditioned in large part by the fact that Negroes and whites have lived separately for so long. Although Negroes have, to some extent, assimilated the American value structure, they do deviate in some important ways. The separation—or isolation—has, of course, led to the breakdown of communication and understanding. One of my old teachers used to say that those who live alike think alike. I suppose that those who live alike also tend to act alike. The ideal way to eliminate the differences, which have come about through isolation, would be to open up the opportunity structure so that Negroes and whites may have more similar distributions of whatever talents they have.

Let me say a word about education, because this touches upon the kinds of difficulties we face. We have some figures from Mr. Hauser and others on what the educational gap is at the present time. For example, in 1960, about 23 per cent of the Negro population, 25 years of age or over, had less than a fifth-grade education; almost one-quarter of the Negro population is functionally illiterate. We could take, as a figure for Negro-white comparison, the median years of education; but I deliberately select the functional illiteracy figure because I think it has a very definite meaning for us. These are the people who have a great deal of trouble in the job market. These are the people who are not prepared for jobs in our society at this time. The white figure is substantially lower than 23 per cent. This is a fundamental difference. What do we do about it? How quickly can this kind of differential be eliminated?

One sociologist has given some attention to the question of how long it would take for this educational difference to be eliminated if Negroes were given the maximum opportunity available. He estimates that if we began now to eliminate the school drop-out differential—if Negroes began to match whites in terms of the rate at which they attended school and stayed in school—educational equality would not be achieved in less than fifty years and, more likely, would take seventy-five years.

I think one of the things to be observed is that there are relationships among the several factors we talked about as features which distinguish the Negro community structure from the white community structure. Therefore, as we work in some of the problem areas, we may get some payoff in other areas as well. For example, if we work with education, we will get a payoff in occupation and income. No matter how we work, however, certain features will defy easy solution and will be minimally affected by solution of other problems. The housing problem, which is, as we have said, a particularly tough one, is a good example. Even if we opened up the market, we would have a considerable amount of segregated housing for a long time to come because of the income structure among Negroes. There is also the fact, which someone mentioned earlier, that many Negroes would want to live in predominantly Negro communities, even if they had other housing available to them. And, of course, there are still other psychological and social factors which would keep Negroes from moving—all the centripetal forces which will continue to operate because of the suspicions and differences which have been generated over the years. The Negro family is concerned, for example, about socialization and free interaction, especially among children; and Negro families are not always confident, when they move individually to a white community, that socialization is available to them.

No one has yet estimated, as far as I know, how long it might take to achieve a congruence of occupational distributions of Negroes and whites. (We cannot always predict occupational demand, but I suppose we can make reasonable guesses about the types of skills which will be in demand.) A great many forces are already operating which will help to eliminate the differences. One such force is the use of government power to insure that jobs are given to Negroes who are qualified for them. If we look at the occupational distribution, we see a heavy concentration of Negroes at the bottom, in the semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. Closing the occupational gap is, to a great extent, dependent upon the opening up of opportunities for Negroes to learn the skills which are in demand. Then we must work to eliminate the discriminations which have operated traditionally. My feeling is that this will not come very soon, but that the extreme differences will gradually disappear.

Let me say a word about family structure. The structures are, indeed, different; but I think the differences are sometimes exaggerated. There is no doubt that the Negro father is absent more often than the white father —not only, may I remind you, because of desertion and divorce, but also because of death. Negro women become widows at much earlier ages, as well as in larger proportions, than white women. Nevertheless, only 21 per cent of all Negro families are headed by women. It is not a universal phenomenon. There are men at home, certainly, in the Negro middle class. We somehow have the idea that if the man has gone, it must be because there was serious lack of preparation for family living. A study by Lewis on child-rearing practices among lower-income families gives us a little clearer perception of what actually happens to the Negro male. From his interviews, Lewis found that a great many Negro males are very concerned about staying with their families. Only after a long period of time do they finally give up; and even after they have left, they really wish that some way could be found for them to go back to their families. I feel that anything which improved the education and the income-maintenance opportunities of Negroes would, in turn, help the family structures and thereby eliminate some of the differences in this area. I think, for example, that the early age at which many Negroes marry is, in part, a cause of the high attrition rates. Many young Negroes may well be resorting to marriage as a way out of the disappointments they experience as they try to attain education, and so on.

May I say, finally, that there is continued resistance to the acceptance of Negroes in a great many areas; but these resistances will gradually lose some of the force they now have. We have talked about the white backlash. We have talked about the concern of many liberal white people about having their children educated in schools with Negroes. I think that, as the government uses its force and as other opportunities arise for Negroes and white to associate, there will develop a structure in which there is more interaction. As Mr. Hauser said yesterday, we have, in effect, transported the Southern plantation to the city. We have a tremendous isolated reserve, which severely limits the opportunities for interaction between Negroes and whites. However, as Negro and white children begin to attend school together and begin to play together, as Negro and white parents become concerned about the same kinds of problems, and as Negroes move into housing communities where whites also live, there will develop the kind of interaction which leads to understanding. All these things will not happen at once; they will happen at different times and in different sectors. But they will happen, and they will help to eliminate some of the differences.

**GRAUBARD:** I think that the two papers which are perhaps closest to yours, Mr. Edwards, are those of Mr. Turner and Mr. Handlin. I would like, therefore, to ask Mr. Turner and then Mr. Handlin to give brief résumés of their points of view. There are, of course, some very significant differences, as well as some similarities, among these three papers.

**TURNER:** Since my co-author, Mr. Whitney Young, happens to direct a national organization, I want to point out that we collaborated on some of the major ideas, but part of the paper represents my personal thinking and, due to his being out of the country, I have not had an opportunity to discuss all of the details with him. Out of sensitivity to the fact that he speaks for a national group, I emphasize that the views herein should not be construed as necessarily representing the views of the National Urban League.

Let me comment on the assumptions which we went on in preparing the paper. First, we assumed that, in talking about what society will look like if and when we have something called full participation of the Negro in it, we would get essentially what has developed around this table and what was put forth quite directly in Mr. Handlin's paper: a range of views. We tried to state the extremes of this range by the use of two concepts: *pluralistic* integration and *individual* integration. Our major point was that we cannot settle the argument about which type of integration is to be preferred. That is, we cannot settle it at this point in history, and we cannot settle it by discussion. Any serious attempt to do so would be dysfunctional to current efforts to move the Negro closer to full participation. It is helpful to look at the two points of view; but, in actuality, the next steps that have to be taken can lead to either end and are equally essential to both ends.

Second, it seems to us that the civil rights effort at this time is essentially attempting to achieve objectives within the over-all values and political and economic structure of the American society. It does not represent an attempt to alter the structure. Third, we assumed that, as in any kind of revolutionary effort, there is always a possibility that people will perceive that they have reached their goal before they have actually done so and that this can become dysfunctional. Fourth, we assumed that the obstacles to achieving full participation are multiple; and, therefore, multiple strategies have to be developed to overcome them. We are not advocating a single strategy in this paper.

Given these assumptions, we try to set forth a few basic ideas. One is that there is need at this time for an interim strategy or interim strategies to equalize the life chance of the Negro. This seemed to us to be a proximate type of goal, on which there is reasonable consensus among civil rights groups and among other people interested in this problem. We suggested two kinds of approaches to this. One approach is that which, in a sense, has as its end the shaping of society so that society becomes more receptive to the inclusion of a Negro on a basis which does not penalize him because of his color. The second approach is to try to help Negroes to cope more responsibly and instrumentally with the system as it happens to be at any given point in time.

We then set forth what seemed to be the basic requisites for launching either of these strategies. They are derived by simply identifying what seems to be, in looking at the inter-group problem, the most overbearing variable: the powerlessness of the Negro, that is, his inability to get other people to behave differently toward him and, in some instances, to get his own group to behave differently for the advancement of group welfare. Therefore, we defined the basic requisite conditions as first of all the development and strengthening of sources of power. Three sources are identified, which seem significant: first, economic sources of power; second, political sources; and third, group solidarity and cohesion sources. (Obviously these overlap, but there are different aspects which require, in my opinion, different operational tactics.) Power in itself is insufficient; there has to be the will to use it. Power is always exerted at a cost, and the real question is whether or not the Negro can use power for group interests as opposed to individual interests and how quickly he can achieve that kind of discipline and control. Furthermore, with power and with the will to use it, there has to be a system which permits the deployment of power where it does the most good at the moment in the most expeditious way. Our concern is that the real issue of assuring continuity and a steady firming-up of the power potential of the Negro community may be imperfectly engaged at the present time. It seemed to us that this is the most essential requisite for sustained progress toward full participation in our society by the Negro.

**HANDLIN:** I attempted in my paper to draw some connection between questions of ultimate strategy and actual tactics. I realize there is a definition of integration which is different from that which I used in the paper. Mr. Hauser, for instance, spoke of integration as the maximization of opportunities for voluntary contact. That, of course, is not the meaning which I attached to the term integration. I have given it a narrower and somewhat different meaning in order to emphasize the character of the strategic goals and the differences of opinion that actually exist, in our discussion and in the United States, about the goals.

In order to show the effects of those strategic differences on tactics, I think it is useful to cite the definition of integration which Mr. Edwards gave. He put it in the form of a question: How can we eliminate the differences among the groups in American society so that they will more nearly resemble each other? In my paper, I tried to show how the necessities of the earlier stages of the conflict, particularly in its Southern context, produced a thrust toward this conception of integration. However, I feel this conception is not particularly relevant to the urban situation, which is now the main setting of Negro life and which will become increasingly the area in which the problem is most prominently located.

I do not agree with Dr. Turner that the question cannot be settled now. I think it is important to clarify these issues, precisely because they do have a direct bearing on tactical problems and on alternatives which are being raised right now. The prime deficiency that I see in the conception of integration as an elimination of differences is that it shows a lack of awareness of the actuality of what has here been referred to as *white society*—as if that were a homogeneous entity with a character which was so explicit and so clearly delineated that it offered a model for Negro society. In my view, white America consists of a congeries of social subsystems. The Negro is misled insofar as he thinks he has a single model against which to pattern his development. In fact, there are clusters of quite different and separate models. Statistically, we constantly use the comparison of white and nonwhite. This is useful, but it is also deceptive. The "white" category only enables us to distinguish color. It is not in itself a useful indicator of the internal composition of the people who are called whites. When it comes to matters, for instance, of life style, income distribution, and patterns of behavior, at the points at which we place more exact forms of definition and description, we continually encounter signs of inner diversity.

I am primarily interested in establishing this because I think that the neglect of it has had an effect on the civil rights leadership, which has often been unable to control the situation or the direction of development precisely because it was unclear about the strategy. The point is also important because it has had an effect upon the development of communal institutions among Negroes. To put that at its simplest: The problem that often seems to have confronted the Negro community, in the half a century or so of its migration to an urban setting, is that of deciding to what extent any kind of autonomous internal action is an acceptance of segregation. My impression is that this fear of acceptance of segregation has inhibited, except in the civil rights movement itself, the development of the kind of solidarity to which Dr. Turner referred—particularly the development of institutional apparatus in which such solidarity is established.

In the paper, I tried briefly to point to the implications of these strategic questions for several of the immediate problems with which we have been concerned. It is significant, for instance, that in politics and in the area of employment Negroes have increasingly operated as groups. I see no reason, of course, that they should not. But I think it would clarify the issues for Negroes themselves and for others if their group action were recognized for what it is. In the area of employment, recognition of the identity of a Negro interest would be extremely helpful in developing the middle-class and professional groups, from which leadership ought to come. That leadership could be more effectively exercised if its identity with a group were firm.

To some extent, I am not as worried as Mr. Moynihan is about the problems and implications of equality. It is curious that no one in this two-day meeting has mentioned the biggest weapon we have for coping with that: the fact that the pie is getting bigger. The gross national product has grown and is capable of growing still bigger, so there will be more to divide. This may take a good deal of the edge off the necessities of dealing with that problem.

I believe that confusion about strategy has been most disruptive in the fields of education and housing. I can pose the issue most clearly in the form which I used in my paper: Is the primary objective more houses and better schools or racially balanced residences and schools? I am in favor of open occupancy and open enrollment. Anything that can be done to further those ends is desirable and, indeed, will have a useful function in permitting full utilization of the educational and housing resources of the community. However, to make racial balance an end in itself, either in education or in housing, is in effect disruptive. The real problems are the improvement of the quality of the housing and of the education available to the Negro—whether it is racially balanced or not. And to the extent that emphasis on this alternative objective divides the effort and confuses the issue, I think it is an unfortunate emphasis. That it has divided the effort and has confused the issue can be seen in the experience of a number of cities over the past five years.

The point that perhaps deserves the most attention is the connection I attempt to draw between the problems of family life to which we referred yesterday—and which I think we all feel are important—and the character of the community, in this case, the Negro community. I think that these disorders in family life are the products of tensions which arise from rural-urban migration. I think that they are characteristic of other similar migrations. They are, of course, particularly extreme in the case of Negroes, but I think what has been more seriously lacking among Negroes is the pattern of autonomous institutions from *within* the group that can help to counter the effects of the disorders in family life with which we are concerned. As it is, the broken Negro family in need of help can turn only to the government—usually only to white people. This is a situation which is different from that of groups which have a variety of internal resources for supporting the solidarity and the discipline of the family. The difference, of course, is a product of history and of the character of the the migration; but I think it is also a product of the slowness of the Negroes involved in this migration to accept the consequences of their identity as a group and to take up the tasks of community organization. That slowness is clearly related to the confusion about objectives—to the fear that any separate institution or any separate quality is a means of preserving segregation.

**BREEDEN:** The Negro community is not as lacking in internal structure—buffer structures, I suppose one might call them—as Mr. Handlin seems to be suggesting.

**REDDING:** I would like to say a couple of things. First of all, I spoke to Mr. Edwards about the possibility of discussing the active resistance—the people who do it from their guts. Having heard Mr. Handlin, I wonder whether we shouldn't, indeed, get some of these arguments against equality, liberty, balance. I think that Mr. Handlin's paper emphasizes, at least for me, the necessity for someone to find out what the white man's image of the Negro is and why people are constantly saying, "What does the Negro want?" It seems to me to indicate a distortion that needs to be brought into focus.

**PETTIGREW:** I do not entirely agree with Mr. Handlin, but I think it is useful to distinguish between *better* schools and housing and *racially balanced* schools and housing, as Professor Handlin has done for us. (This relates to the disagreement we had yesterday about whether we could do things solely for the Negro.) I think the analogy with other groups causes us to make some unfounded statements about the Negro. Certainly, the lack of quality and the separation have been inseparably intertwined throughout Negro American history. They argue for balanced schools and balanced housing, because that is the only way that they have ever been able to achieve quality housing and schools. This has not been the case with many other groups. But again, it is the misleading analogy with other groups that would cause you to make this distinction and feel that it was a real one for strategy as applied to Negroes.

**MAYER:** I would like to address myself to the problem of the issue of *Dædalus* itself, because some of us feel there is a paper missing. We may have come to a curious paradox. First, we have heard a general statement—implicit although not analyzed—that there is no specific cultural tradition among Negroes in our country; but then that color as such is not by any means the only thing that distinguishes Negroes from the whites—in fact, that the Negro minority is somehow more different from the main stream of America than any other minority has been.

Listening to Professor Handlin, I almost feel that if the Negro minority does not have the culture or the social structure to buttress that last view, it is high time they got one by creating a well-structured and well-educated Liberia within the United States which could then be integrated with the country as a whole. It is possible that what we need is a paper on "What is a Negro?" Is it defined purely on a modified Nuremberg law basis? That is, is a Negro anybody who had a grandfather or a great-grandfather who was a Negro? Or do we have other definitions? Obviously, if the color of the skin is the only basis for social difference, and if we want to eliminate this, then we are in favor of general randomization. If, on the other hand, there are cultural traditions which Negroes want to preserve, then they may elect to stay grouped within their subcommunity.

**GRAUBARD:** I want Mr. Handlin to have a chance to respond to a few of these comments.

**HANDLIN:** First, I did not mean to imply that I would create a segregated school in order to improve its quality. However, look at the experience of a place like Washington, D.C., where 85 per cent of the children are Negro. Most Washington schools are, by virtue of that fact, as racially imbalanced as schools get. Nevertheless, Washington has quality schools—attended primarily by Negroes. I do not think that there is anything in the mere fact of a school's having a preponderantly Negro population that prevents it from improving its quality. So it seems to me that an over-all demand for racial balance, as an end in itself, is not productive and sometimes is even self-defeating.

On Canon Breeden's point, I think probably I exaggerated for the purposes of argument and failed to take full account of the extent to which buffer structures do exist in the Negro community. But I think it is also important to consider the limited area in which they operate. Furthermore, they may not have a genuine function. It has been argued, for instance, that there ought not to be a Negro press or that there ought not to be Negro churches.

**WOODWARD:** I think that Mr. Handlin has done us a service in pointing up this issue and even in exaggerating the implications of integration. I do think that the concept of integration has distinct implications for some elements of the civil rights movement. I think they come at the costs that he names, and I think they are terrible costs—surrendered identity—which can only be satisfied really by an eradication of the past. (I would like very much to draw Mr. Ellison into this discussion, because I think he has views that are very relevant to it.) I do not think we can really endorse that conception of integration, but neither can we endorse desegregation as a satisfactory American objective—let alone Negro objective—in this movement. I think to do so is to accept this equalization of the Negro minority with previous minorities which have been included in American society. I do not accept the picture that Mr. Handlin arrives at of the Negro in the Northern community before World War I. I think that that American society *was* a racist society, a white-supremacy society—North as well as South, though in different degrees—and that the Negro has always faced a very different kind of handicap and will continue to for a long time. Simple desegregation will not achieve the ends and the goals that we should envisage.

**FICHTER:** There is a fact emerging from our National Opinion Research Center (NORC) study of Negro colleges which certainly supports this notion. The Negro-college presidents are saying that they simply cannot wait for white students to come to their schools. The major problem is to improve these schools as going institutions at the present time. So many classrooms and college campuses are needed. We can talk all we want about integration and desegregation, but the major problem facing them is to improve the quality of the Negro colleges that now exist.

**COHEN:** I wonder if we can focus on our agreements and disagreements. I am not sure. First of all, I hope that Mr. Handlin will not use the word *integration* in the sense that he has used it, because this, I think, involves us in semantic confusion. I think we all agree that we want an open society, where Negroes can live where they wish, go to school where they wish, and identify with a group if they wish to or not identify with a group if they do not wish to. I think there is no disagreement about this. But it seems to me that we have some disagreement as to whether group identity should remain and whether it is desirable. It also seems to me that we are arguing whether we want, in the case of the Negro, cultural pluralism or the melting pot. We were asked if we wanted a well-structured and well-educated Liberia. In fact, we have a number of such enclaves in the United States. I would say, for example, that in some respects we have a well-structured, well-educated Israel in the United States. And I am shocked that there is any implication that no one would want a Negro community, as such, to continue and to be identified as a Negro community and to make its contribution to the United States as a

Negro community—which does not at all deny the right of an individual to move as he wishes in an open society.

With regard to racial balance, I think that to indicate that there is nothing wrong with segregation that quality would not cure is to ignore the history and the humiliation of the Negro. I grant that, in terms of education, rarely does desegregation by itself do anything for the child. But what desegregation does for the dignity of the Negro is crucial. There are a number of segregated Jewish schools around the country. I see nothing wrong with them with regard to quality. I do, however, see something wrong with them with regard to the possibility of contact with others. I think this is another factor in favor of racial balance.

**BERRY:** I do not know whether Mr. Handlin is arguing for segregation, apologizing for segregation, or recommending it. I think the paper says categorically that the goal of the civil rights movement is racial balance. I do not know where this goal comes from or who enunciated it other than Mr. Handlin; and I am a little distressed that some of the people around the table assume that to be the actual goal. In my association with the civil rights leadership, I have not known anyone to suggest that racial balance was the goal. I think what we are much more likely to be in agreement upon is the definition of integration which Mr. Turner gave us: equal access to the privileges and the responsibilities of American society. *Racial balance* is a term that has been used by those who wish to take a look at the extreme demands of a few very extreme people; and in no sense has it become an agreed upon thing. I hope that this paper will be the most rigorously amended of any that I have looked at.

**HANDLIN:** I think I should respond to a few of these questions and suggestions, and I would like to do so now. I agree with Mr. Woodward about the inadequacies of *desegregation*. I did not mean to imply by that term a purely negative attitude on the part of government or other agencies. Perhaps it would be better if I appropriated the term *integration* in Mr. Hauser's sense and used some other word for the other meaning of integration. I do not agree with Mr. Cohen that the issue is whether the Negro should retain a separate community. Individual Negroes have to decide whether they wish to preserve this identity. I do not see that anyone else is in a position to tell them what they should do. What I pointed out in my paper is that the Negro *is* separate. He does have an identity which is a product of his history. But the kind of community and the kind of organization that exist among Negroes are incomplete and fail to extend into a variety of areas, partly as a result of strategy and partly as a result of historical development. Again referring to Mr. Cohen's comment I agree that contacts are desirable. They are desirable on both sides. Society ought to maximize the opportunities for voluntary contacts. But I would emphasize the voluntariness of these contacts. There are contacts which are not desirable or useful, because they lead to conflict, they exacerbate, and they exaggerate differences. Under those circumstances, to say contact as such is useful is, I think, beside the point.

With reference to Mr. Berry's point, I do not remember saying that racial balance is the goal. I do think, for example, that in the development of the discussions over school questions in New York City, what started as the demand of one sector became—because of internal pressures and because of the whole strategy and the way it unfolded—*the demand* of the civil rights movement in New York. The statement to which you refer, Mr. Berry, is: "No spokesman has fully articulated the implications of this point of view, but the thrust of integration, in the sense that I define it, is toward an organization of society in which every sector is radically balanced." I think that the comments we have heard about the congruence of distributions illustrate that thrust. This is quite different from saying that the civil rights movement has adopted racial balance as its goal.

**ELLISON:** One thing that is not quite clear to me is the implication that Negroes have come together and decided that we want to lose our identity as quickly as possible. Where does that idea come from? I have encountered it in a number of places recently. One place (which almost frightened the pants off me) was in *Commentary,* where Mr. Nathan Glazer makes this assumption and follows it up with the rather frightening picture that all other immigrant and minority groups and some cultural groups in this country have somehow worked out an accommodation which respects the group identities of other peoples, but that Negroes are running wild, that we recognize no limit, and that we would like a total homogenization of the society. It is easy enough to see why Mr. Glazer would get off on that, because (as one of our participants also made very clear) he feels that Negroes have no culture.

I am not being defensive about this; I am trying to get at the logic of the assertion. If one assumes that a group, which has existed within this complicated society as long as ours, has failed to develop cultural patterns, views, structures, or whatever other sociological terms one may want to use, then it is quite logical to assume that they would want to get rid of that inhuman condition as quickly as possible. But I, as a novelist looking at Negro life in terms of its ceremonies, its rituals, and its rather complicated assertions and denials of identity, feel that there are many, many things we would fight to preserve.

There is something else which could be thought about along this line. There are great areas of this society which are available to Negroes who have a little consciousness. The contacts which exist are not limited to the roles which they might have. The human consciousness is there. Contacts are being made. Judgments are being rendered. Choices are being made. I know that in the life styles of any number of groups in the nation, there are many things which Negroes would certainly reject, not because they hold them in contempt, but because they do not satisfy our way of doing things and our feeling about things. Sociologists often assert that there is a Negro thing—a timbre of a voice, a style, a rhythm—in all of its positive and negative implications, the expression of a certain kind of American uniqueness. (I am not talking about Negritude. The Negro sociologists fall biggest for that.) If there is this uniqueness, why on earth would it not in some way be precious to the people who maintain it?

I would like to suggest what the fighting is about. For one thing, the oversimplified and very often unfortunate slogans which are advanced in the civil rights movement act as slogans always do. Why do we demand that terrible, encyclopedic nuances be found in the slogans of the civil rights movement? No slogans have ever had that kind of complexity. They would not be slogans if they did. The other thing is that part of the struggle (which I have known now for some fifteen years) has always been not to get away from the Negro community, but to have the right to discover what one wanted on the outside and what one could conveniently get rid of on the inside. That seems to me very American. I think it is one of the assumptions which is implicit in a pluralistic society, and I see no particular reason for people to be upset by the possibility that we are actually going to achieve it.

**TURNER:** I would first like to address my remarks to Mr. Handlin's paper and then to make a couple of other observations. It does seem to me that Mr. Handlin's paper has been useful in focusing our attention on this issue. I agree, however, that in view of his remarks here this afternoon, it would be unfortunate to use some of the terms which he selected. It would appear from current usage that the term integration is not synonymous with the term racial balance. Also it may be helpful to us if you would define your meaning of the term desegregation.

It seems to me that there are a couple of other confusions which run through the paper and which you may wish to clarify. For one thing, racial balance, as it is commonly used, is a tactic—not a strategy, and, as has been pointed out, not a goal. There are differences in tactics and strategies and goals. It is possible, as has also been pointed out, that a particular tactic, such as racial balance, may be quite appropriate at a given point in time. The problem, for example, of how to get improved education in a particular school may hinge upon having integrated schools at that particular moment. In some other community, this may not be true. So if you are going to use this as an illustration, it seems to me that you also have to give the other kind of example to fully explicate your argument.

It also seems to me, not by your remarks, but by what you have written, that you undervalue the idea of equality. In part what Mr. Berry has been saying throughout these two days is that equality of opportunity is, in fact, a mate—part of a dual goal that the Negro is concerned with. He is not just concerned with improving his condition; he is concerned with equal access to opportunity. These are related but different kinds of ideas.

Maybe we need to have a paper on Negro culture. I do not understand what *our* way is of doing things. I can understand *your* way. I know *my* way. But I really do not know what *our* way means. It seems to me, however, that Mr. Handlin's picture of the white majority as being segmented, differentiated, and multidimensioned is true and that, furthermore, this picture is equally true of the Negro community. It also seems to me that if one loses identity as a Negro, he does not necessarily become nothing at all in terms of identity. There are other choices with which he may chose to identify. This is at least a possibility.

I do think that if we are going to propose a concept of pluralistic integration, we have to ask in all seriousness what conditions are required to make this work. I would suggest that it is difficult to maintain pluralistic integration except on a defense basis, unless the members of a cultural group have the capacity of losing that identity when they choose to move out into the larger society. I cite the experience in Nazi Germany as evidence of that.

**MOYNIHAN:** I think that if we confront this problem, we may do the most important thing to be done by this issue of *Dædalus*. A great many of the white people in this world have quite a different vision of what Negro demands, intentions, wishes, or probabilities are, as Dr. Redding has said. Furthermore, most of the whites do not have a very clear idea of what their own experience has been. I think that Mr. Handlin described that experience rather well.

A year and a half ago—Mr. Ellison mentioned it, and I will, too—Nathan Glazer and I published our book, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, in which we described this phenomenon in New York. We had one chance for a good review. Murray Kempton, a dear friend, was going to review the book in the *Herald Tribune*. And lo and behold, he froze at the typewriter, and four days and several bottles of whiskey later, he explained that there was not going to be a review. He said, "What am I going to say about a book that goes on for 300 pages complaining that Negroes are not Jews?"

I think they are not. But I do think that the gentlemen of color in this room should remember that the experience of a great many of us in our life has not been so very different in some respects from yours. There have been differences, but the differences have been part of a spectrum.

I grew up in Manhattan. Almost the first thing I learned was that we Irish were a put-upon, discriminated-against people. The second thing I learned was that the most awful thing that could happen to one of us was to go to school with people who were not of our own kind. I went to a segregated school system as a matter of desperate importance to us. Not to do so was to lose something of profound value.

This experience, although it is not very clear in the minds of many whites in the North, is nonetheless understood instinctively, at least well enough to lead us to the question Dr. Redding has come back to so many times: What is the nature of the Negroes' demand, and is it not, in fact, a traditional demand? I think that sometimes the slogans make it appear untraditional. I do not know whether it should or should not be traditional, but I think that it is.

**FREUND:** I noticed that at one point in his paper, Mr. Handlin seemed to join the issue of job preference with integrated schooling and integrated housing as expressions of integration in his definition. At another point, it seemed to me that he spoke of job preferences as a legitimate way of simply maximizing opportunities. I think there is some ambivalence in how he classified that—a small point, but perhaps indicative of a larger one, namely that there may be more agreement on program than on ideology and that similar programmatic actions may be motivated by different ideologies.

## SESSION V

**GRAUBARD:** As you can imagine, the task of preparing the papers for publication is going to be a Herculean one. I will surely need your cooperation in many respects. Nothing would please me more than to have your personal accounts of the topics which you feel are missing. As I indicated in our first session, one of our hopes is that articles on those topics may be commissioned.

I know that there are several people who did not have a chance to speak this morning. I would like to start with Mr. Parsons, and then I will ask Mr. Hughes to speak.

**PARSONS:** I found the last phase of this morning's discussion particularly interesting. It seemed to me to point up much more sharply some of the things that were emerging yesterday about the background of Negro history in this country, the current nature of the Negro community, the immediate processes of transition which it has been very much in the middle of, and the possible direction of the future. I was very impressed by Mr. Ellison's point that there is a clearly distinctive Negro culture. This seems to me to be one aspect that is very much in need of attention. We need to have a clearer description of what Negro culture has been and is.

Despite all the complicated crosscurrents of the discussion initiated by Mr. Handlin, we seem to have reached a consensus that, within the framework of free access to opportunity, it is very unlikely and probably undesirable that a Negro solidarity should evaporate as an immediate function of the success of the movement. The unlikelihood seems to me to be very much reinforced by the fact that the movement itself creates solidarity. I think this is even true across the racial line, because the participation of whites, as has been emphasized at a number of points, itself reinforces the identification. There is a Negro cause, with which it is important to identify oneself and which one should help as much as one can.

I would like simply to suggest that, for several reasons the historical position of the Negro group in this society gives them a very special mission (I think that word is not too strong) as the symbolic carrier, more than any other group, of the value of equality. Despite the many, many difficulties, some of which we have been surveying, the mission has, it seems to me, good prospects of very substantial success. Insofar as the mission is internally successful, it will be established as a collective entity which has made a contribution of the first order to what I think (as I tried to say in my paper) is one of the crucial problems of American society. The problem is not a Negro problem, but a general problem: the sense of what the necessary and appropriate meaning of equality is in this society. I think that this is altogether adequate ground on which to establish a highly valued collective identity, in which others may participate, but which is especially the Negro identity.

Furthermore, it seems to me that it has a very important implication in the world at large. Only the paper by Mr. Emerson and Mr. Kilson has had much to say about the relation of the racial situation in this country to that of the world at large. For understandable reasons, this conference could not concern itself in any detail with this relation; but I think we are all aware that this is a very central reference point for the whole problem. My own feeling is (as another *Dædalus* enterprise is considering) that this is a very major issue in the world at large. Colonialism has been identified with white supremacy, perhaps not universally in the worst Southern segregationist sense, but certainly in the sense of the "white man's burden" and other well-known clichés. There is an inherent link between the position and the success of the Negro movement in American society and the position of the United States in the world.

For specifically racial reasons, the immediate reference is Africa. Africa is a symbol in many ways for the colored peoples, including our neighbors in Latin America. The Indian of Peru, for example, is not a white man by Spanish definitions. The mestizo is not quite a mulatto, but not altogether different from a mulatto in the Latin American world. The Asian world is something yet again. So I want to suggest that a collective Negro identity, which has achieved its basic goals internally or which is well on the way to achieving them, may be a terribly important link of American society to the rest of the world. This reinforces the notion that color-blindness—and, therefore, the disappearance of Negro identity—would not be a desirable thing. What would be desirable is development, along the line Mr. Cohen suggested, of groups within American society which have more and more got away from the invidious hierarchy of top dog, underdog, and discrimination to be a pluralistic variety within a society which has a certain underlying and fundamental egalitarianism. This ties in, of course, with the Moynihan-Glazer picture of New York.

**HUGHES:** I think it would be a pity if we were to put forward old race doctrines, but I do not think it would be bad to state what is known about race and about the nature of what is called the Negro race in this country. Although I do not think that any geneticist would claim to know exactly what the so-called American Negro gene pool is, I have heard it estimated at 25 per cent Anglo-Saxon. (I just this morning invented a word for American Negroes: NASP's.)

What I really want to say is related to both Mr. Handlin's and Mr. Parsons' arguments. It is about the structure of our society. Religious sects have settled all over this country—the Mennonites in Pennsylvania, for example—and they have survived. Why? It is not that all of the individuals stay with the group. A lot of the groups have very high birth rates, yet they remain about the same size. The nucleus remains. This is true of the Jewish community, which we have talked about. Not by a long shot are all the Jews born in this country, or people with Jewish parents, part of that society. And I estimate that there are probably more people of French Canadian descent in the United States than there are in the French Canadian world.

I think we have to see the American social structure as having lots of nuclei. We have, for example, an Irish nucleus; but a friend of mine, who is a rector of a church in Evanston, made Episcopalians out of forty Irishmen one year. (Religiously, they were downwardly mobile, but they thought that socially they were upwardly mobile.) I think we ought to look at American society in these terms. We have many nuclei, but we also have a lot of people who do not really belong to any such nucleus. When I was a youngster in southern Ohio, if a Methodist, an Episcopalian, or a Presbyterian married a Lutheran, it was a mixed marriage. It would not be now, but it was then. I think we can imagine circumstances in which there could be what we now call interracial groups, that is, groups which would not be like the old interracial groups which had to shunt themselves off in a corner. We should watch for the possibility of new nuclei which are made up of people who do not want to fit into any of the others. Then if Negroes want to be Negroes, they can be; if they do not want to be, they do not have to be. Of course, Negroes probably will want to continue being Negroes, because social nuclei die hard. The only social nucleus that had died, as far as I know, is that of the Huguenots. I think we will have social nuclei of one kind or another for a long time to come. I think they are in the character of American society. And we should remember the possibility of creating new ones. I think, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Rossi was referring to a new social nucleus when he talked about the increasing interracial marriages around academic communities.

I do not think that anybody ought to tell anybody else whether or not he ought to create one of these social nuclei. I think it is his own business. However, I think we ought to be aware of the possibility that, in the fantastic sorting which has been the genius of our society, we might someday get some nuclei in which race did not count. That does not mean there would not be others in which race did count.

**GRAUBARD:** I would be pleased if that figured into your paper, Mr. Hughes.

**HUGHES:** That is the kind of fantastic thing—not based on any facts—that my paper is meant to be. I think, too, that we ought to look at the world scene, as Mr. Parsons just suggested. I do not think that we can escape the fact that, whatever we may think in this country, outside of the United States border, the impression (certainly in Canada) is that we are ready to send the Marines anywhere if the population is not completely white. We may not think so, but this is the image. This is the standard joke in England and Canada—and a bitter one. They are joking in Canada about how many Communists we have to find there before we send Marines to Canada, and the punch line is, "Oh no, our Communists are all white." If we are going to write about the problem of race in this country, we should consider the world view of the problem.

**LERNER:** Apropos of Mr. Moynihan's amusing story about Murray Kempton, I really do not think we want the Negroes to be like the Jews. What some of us may be driving at is that, in the American experience, the Jews managed to do two things: one, to retain a subcultural identity and, two, to achieve an impressive measure of access to life chances in the larger culture. This is also true of several of the other cultural minorities. The problem is to what extent these twin objectives can be maximized in the case of the Negro Americans. To the extent that the Jews have achieved them, these objectives have not been achieved easily. They have been achieved with tears and grief. Unfortunately, a fair number of inner ghettos have been constructed. We have had to go through that.

The Jews are now deeply concerned about the extent to which their identity as a subculture may be in the process of being undercut. There is among them considerable anxiety about the possible or even probable obliteration of their identity in the calculable future. So I think we had better get rid of any notion that the Jews have a totally satisfactory solution of the problem.

Finally, what counts in having this subcultural identity is not so much the sense of warmth among ourselves (which has been, nonetheless, worthwhile) as the feeling that we have left some impact on the larger culture. I am suggesting, of course, that, for the Negro American, subcultural identity is important in developing a creativeness which in turn, leaves an impact on the larger culture. However, subcultural identity, in and of itself, is not so very important.

**HUGHES:** We must remember our history. Jewish culture existed. The American Negro just did not exist.

**LERNER:** Mr. Ellison does not agree with that.

**HUGHES:** Negro Americans are an American creation. They might want to be different, but that certainly is not the same thing as maintaining a 2,000-year-old culture.

**PARSONS:** Who says it is the *same* thing? It may, however, be an important thing and not a nonexistent. A culture does not have to be 2,000 years old.

**HUGHES:** My guess is that there *will* be an identifiable Negro nucleus in this country for a long time, but I hate to have anybody read a sermon on whether or not they *ought* to have one. I think it is their business. They ought to have the chance to choose whether to have it or not.

**ELLISON:** From reading American literature and from studying American culture, I feel that subcultures are basically American, regardless of where they come from, whether they are Jewish or Negro, whether they are urban or rural. Once we recognize that, we can get into the area of making distinctions. One concept that I wish we would get rid of is the concept of a main stream of American culture—which is an exact mirroring of segregation and second-class citizenship. I do not think that America works that way at all. I would remind us that before there was a United States, a nation, or a form of a state, there were Negroes in the colonies. The interaction among the diversified cultural groups helped to shape whatever it is we are who call ourselves Americans. This, I think, is a very important distinction to make.

I may have been only a busboy in a club in Oklahoma City, but I knew much more about some of the things that occurred there than some of the *nouveau riche* oilmen who were members of the club. When I worked for Jewish businessmen in Oklahoma City, I learned certain things, not because I embraced the religion and not because of my blood components, but because I was in cultural contact with a group of people

3

who were very expressive. This is America, as far as I know. I know no way of defining this reality out of existence.

Once we recognize this, where do we go from there? I find that if I am going to write something, I can very often tell where it comes from, in terms of both the traditions of the particular literary form and the traditions of the people around me. Someone should pay some attention to how the folk stories which are told about Negroes in one meeting might be told about Jews in another. There is a basic unity of the experience, despite all the other stuff. The whole problem about whether there is a Negro culture might be cleared up if we said that there were many idioms of American culture, including, certainly, a Negro idiom of American culture in the South. We can trace it in many, many ways. We can trace it in terms of speech idioms, in terms of manners, in terms of dress, in terms of cuisine, and so on. But it is American, and it has existed a long time. It has refinements and crudities. It has all the aspects of a cultural reality.

**GRAUBARD:** I would like to ask Mr. Fischer to make a few comments on his paper.

**FISCHER:** I suspect the one point on which all of us here would agree is that virtually everything we have talked about in these two days has its educational aspect in terms of implications for educational institutions and educational processes. Many of the things we have talked about rest wholly for their accomplishment on educational efforts. I am going to discuss in my paper (unless you talk me out of it) the three types of tasks which I think the schools need to work on and are working on now to a considerable degree. I will then go on to suggest some of the implications that flow out of these various categories of necessary work.

At what might be called the lowest level, it seems to me that the schools—I am speaking here primarily of the public elementary and secondary schools, although there are obvious extensions of these ideas into higher education—must undertake to assure instruction in desegregated, nondiscriminatory situations which will be equal in quality, in amount, and in accessibility to the instruction which is available to whites. There will, of course, be certain local and regional differences, as we have these differences in all aspects of American education; but certainly we cannot tolerate, in any sense, inequality of the opportunities which are available to Negroes and those which are available to any other group in our society.

A second task is to provide the distinctive (or call them, if you will, compensatory) types of education or training which are required to enable Negroes who are handicapped socially, culturally, historically (if you want to put it that way), or in any other way to attain the status from which they may participate and compete more effectively in the total American society.

The third general task is to provide opportunities for as many white and Negro students as possible to participate in racially integrated educational situations, under conditions that will be favorable to the development of productive and satisfying relationships. I think that last modification is critically important, and I shall say more about it later, if we want to go into it.

Another point that I think we need to recognize is that there are differences in the difficulty of achieving the conditions for performing these three tasks. In one sense, the easiest will be the establishment of desegregated, nondiscriminatory opportunities. It may be argued that all we need to accomplish this task is more manpower, more facilities, more money, and, in some situations, the necessary legal support and protection.

The difficulty of providing special or compensatory educational opportunities has not yet been fully realized, I am afraid. Here we must develop, first of all, better understanding of the reasons that Negro Americans are educationally handicapped and the reasons that they are socially handicapped. We need to understand the underlying difficulties, so that appropriate educational responses may be provided. Lacking understanding of the causes, we lack even more notably any basis for providing the kinds of educational responses which have to be developed. At the least, we must expect to develop new teaching procedures, new instructional materials, and a number of new institutional arrangements in order to carry out the kinds of things that have to be done. Most particularly, we need to improve what we are doing in teacher education. We cannot hope to have the programs we need without teachers who are much more understanding and much more competent than the great majority of the teachers who are now working in the schools.

If we are to have genuinely effective integration of our educational institutions, we must face the most serious difficulties. The obstacles to be overcome are psychological, cultural, sociological, pedagogical, administrative, and political. I think that the difficulty of achieving integrated schools is now much less a matter of law than it is a matter of professional judgment and policy. We certainly have not yet put behind us all of the legal difficulties; there are still court decisions to be obtained. But, by and large, as we move from the relatively simple *de jure* situations into the *de facto* situations—the *de facto* ones which have no element of *de jure* weakness in them—we get into the area of professional judgment as to what constitutes good or better education or, if you will, equal educational opportunity. We run into a whole range of possibilities for the exercise of discretion in establishment of public policy.

Some of the possibilities which are available to us are already becoming visible in the beginnings that are now underway. We can see what is happening in preschool programs. Although a great deal more must happen than has yet occurred, we have seen at least the leading edge of some fairly promising compensatory programs. New teaching materials are also beginning to appear. Although much more slowly and in much less creative forms than we need, at least the beginnings have shown themselves. Some schools and school districts are approaching, gingerly, some of the problems of reorganization which must be tackled, but a great deal more must be done and on a much more fundamental scale than we have yet thought about. Some school districts are actually talking about educational parks which will bring into a large-scale, common school the children of a whole community or a large part of the community. These are all indications of the kind of future that I think we can envision.

I think it is necessary to mention the hazards of school-district reorganization as these reorganizations begin to occur. I have been saying that I am confident that we shall see movement in two directions. One direction involves decentralization of schools. But there must also be a reorganization in the other direction to bring together school districts which are too small to provide adequate educational opportunities for their children. As these administrative redesign exercises are carried through, we must be very careful that we not set up hermetically sealed, self-contained subdistricts which will make it impossible to move children from one to another. If in New York City, for example, Harlem became a unit within the total city structure, so that youngsters living on the fringes of the Harlem community could not move into better integrated schools, I would count the decentralization process a loss, rather than a gain. One must be careful in setting up organizational patterns not to confuse efficiency of organization with the containment of student populations in some districts.

Quite aside from these things that I have been talking about, it seems to me that we must anticipate some very large-scale innovations. I am convinced that we are on the verge of some fundamental reforms in the control of public education in this country. I think the excessive localism of school control has seen its highest point and will now have to begin to be tempered by a much greater awareness of larger-scale concerns. Mr. Conant gets at this in his latest book, in which he argues for much stronger state departments of education, which would be ready to exercise some of the authority which ought to accompany the assertion of state sovereignty in education in this country. One aspect of this will be, I think, the merger of some overly small districts. But another part of it, I am convinced, will have to be the design of control arrangements which will make it possible for school systems to gain some degree of protection from sudden swings of public pressure and public concern. This is not to say that the schools should be freed of the need to respond to public pressures. There are people who are now saying that the superintendency of American schools is becoming a totally untenable position and is a job that only a fool would get into. To some degree they are right, because the system itself needs considerable alteration. I keep hoping that one of these days we will find a way to govern our schools which would be analogous to the governance of the better public universities, where there is a kind of responsiveness to the public will, but sufficient protection to avoid the necessity for the institution to respond continually to changes in the position of the wind vane. Schools cannot be as flexible or as adaptable as they should be in the present period, unless they have the stability which provides the basis for reasonable and sensible flexibility.

I mentioned the need for state authority to be asserted with somewhat more strength. There must also be a good deal more competence in state departments of education than we have been accustomed to in this country. There are a few good state departments, but it would not take the fingers of two hands to count virtually all of them.

At the same time that we have to assert the leadership of states in education, we shall also need to be recognizing the national dimension in public education in the very way in which we in this country have been loath to recognize it. This brings us to the question of what might happen if we had a Department of Education, with a Secretary in the Cabinet. I personally think that this is very likely to happen. There is reason to think that this will not happen in this session of the Congress, but that it might well happen in the next session. If so, Americans are going to have to reassess the traditional idea that there should be no connection between politics, in the ordinary sense, and the control of education. I think one cannot imagine any President having in his Cabinet a Secretary of Education whom the President viewed as an apolitical animal. Today education is very important in the total life of the country. We can no longer hope to have educational affairs divorced from the political affairs of the country in the way in which we have heretofore told ourselves they should be. Exactly what this will mean in the activities of the schools and higher educational institutions of the country, I do not yet foresee with any great clarity; but I am sure we are going to have to view this differently from the way we have before. This may very well strengthen the argument for building in new institutional safeguards and a new operating stability.

There will also be, I am convinced, the need for undertaking large-scale experimentation at the local level—developing schools for example, which will be able to meet the task of universal public education in a typical urban setting and which, at the same time, will be able to offer educational programs so good that the most discerning parents will want them for their own children. We do not yet have many, if any, schools in our large cities which can do a job of that breadth. I keep hoping that we will find the ways to set up such schools. I think the possibilities are now available under the new elementary and secondary act. It would, I think, be wholly feasible to set up in any large city an elementary school or a secondary school which would be under the joint control of a university and a group of citizens outside the public school system itself. Such a school might be managed so as to undertake the problem of educating the whole broad spectrum of the children of the community and so as to offer, at the same time, programs of sufficiently high quality to appeal to parents who want only the best kind of education for their children. Until we can find a way to set up a common school of that sort, the issue of the future of public education in this country will remain in doubt.

We shall have to find ways, of course, to deal with the special problems of the poverty-stricken areas, both in large cities and in rural areas. It may be that we shall need to do a good deal more than we have heretofore done to make it possible, on a financial basis, for individual students to continue their education. We have not really come to grips with that problem, although we are beginning to approach it in tentative ways.

Basic to everything else I have talked about, of course, is improvement of the education of teachers and administrators—not only those who will be entering the schools in the future, but most particularly those who are in the schools now. To hope to reform any institution by dealing only with the young newcomers who enter means a delay of a generation in achieving anything like the degree of change that is required. We must undertake immediately—the time is already too late—very aggressive programs to deal with the people who are now in charge of the schools of the country. The problems that we have seen—we were talking about them yesterday and this morning—in Chicago and in New York indicate something of the weaknesses in the preparation of the leaders of the schools, particularly the school administrators, over the past generation. Most of the people who are now in charge of American public schools are woefully unprepared to deal with the currents of change. We have people who are reasonably good technicians and reasonably good managers, but they are by no means as well equipped as they should be to understand the forces which they can use or which they must oppose in the various communities.

This gives you a general notion of the way in which my thinking has been running. The essence of it is that the schools have to be made *inclusive,* they have to be made *relevant,* and they have to be made *effective.* Moving from those three words to the details which must be dealt with will be quite a job, but I am convinced that we have to try.

**BERRY:** I am immensely impressed with that presentation. I certainly agree that we need in our public schools an approach as massive as the Manhattan Project and as flamboyant as the Marshall Plan. But I wonder if you are going to say anything about the upgrading of textbooks and other teaching tools. Textbooks have been notoriously bad in failing to teach about American democracy in terms of race relations. Most of the people who teach kids now do not have the tools, and they learned out of the same bad books. They do not know anything either and have to have some help. I also wonder if you are going to touch upon integrating the teaching staffs in major cities—which is something we can do without getting involved with the sacrosanct "neighborhood" concept. And I wonder if you are going to comment on fair-employment practices within the school system, which has been about as discriminatory as any other kind of employer that I know of.

**FISCHER:** There are several aspects to this. One is the question of how teachers are qualified in the first place. The examinations which have been used, particularly in the larger cities, to establish eligibility lists for teachers have been objective but, in many cases, almost wholly irrelevant. As I said once, if you want objectivity, just weigh and measure people. This will give you quite objective bases on which to deal with them. Of course, their height and their weight have nothing at all to do with their teaching ability, but if it is objectivity you want, use that. Then use something else to get at their teaching competence.

The area of textbooks and other teaching materials is also enormously important today. I could argue that perhaps the greater importance, if there is to be a comparison made, is the development of materials for white children rather than for Negro children. Usually the argument is that we need better materials for the Negro children in order to give them self-respect. Of course, we need them. But we also need materials for the white children, who have been very badly misinformed about the whole business of racial groups.

**BERRY:** That was really my concern. I did not want to have a special edition for the colored schools. We are going to get rid of the colored schools sometime, so we had better get a textbook which we can use for everybody.

**FISCHER:** Another point is that the textbooks, which are terribly inappropriate for big-city slum children who happen to be Negro, are almost equally inappropriate for big-city slum children who happen to be white. The books are just as unrealistic in, say, their illustrations for the slum white kids as they are for the slum Negro kids.

**BERRY:** Will you recommend the demise of Dick and Jane, please?

**FISCHER:** I was delighted to see, in our Teachers College bookstore window not many weeks ago, a display that was headed "Reading without Dick and Jane."

**COHEN:** I wonder, Dr. Fischer, if you are going to deal with this in general terms or if you are going to be specific. I believe that our problems in education are greater than they ever have been, because, for the first time, we recognize their dimensions. It seems that this generation is being presented the bill for past sins of our society. I wonder if you are going to indicate, in some detail, the extent of the bill which has to be paid. There have been many expositions on the need for education to overcome the problems of those who are disadvantaged and those who have been humiliated by the customs of our society. Are you going to discuss this in some detail? Are you going to spell out the needs in teacher education and the many actions which have to be taken in order to achieve this massive change you talk about?

**FISCHER:** I would hope to give enough illustrations to develop some air of reality about the whole business. I would not expect to be able to come up with a comprehensive survey of everything that is needed in all fifty states; but I think it is possible to cite such illustrations as the difference, in many school districts, between the provision for the education of physically normal children and the provision for the education of physically handicapped children. We have been offering compensatory education to children with various kinds of handicapping conditions for a long time. We have not given much recognition to social handicap or economic handicap, but we have done a good deal with deficient hearing ability, mental retardation, and so on. We have established the principle of differential expenditure for children with different kinds of educational needs. It is a firmly fixed part of the American school system. I see no reason that we should not extend this principle to children who have handicaps of a kind which we have not heretofore recognized.

**COHEN:** I just wanted to indicate briefly that I hope you will go into as much detail as possible. It would be a further contribution if you could give some idea of what this is going to cost. We already have a differential in New York City. In Chicago, the differential is the other way around—those who most need it, get it least. But in New York City we at least have the intention, and we are doing something. I hope this will be included in your paper.

**BREEDEN:** It seems to me that the point that Mr. Fischer brought up toward the end—the need for providing universal public schools with quality education—sets the context for the initial questions about the particular needs of Negro Americans. I think it has not really been acknowledged that American schools are not universal. There is a myth that the American public school *is* universal.

With regard to Mr. Fischer's point about professional judgment, I would argue that professional judgment was a general factor in all areas of education and that in this difficult area of school integration, it is simply more frequently exposed. It is operative in other areas. For instance, when we talk about changing textbooks, we begin to expose a whole complex of judgments, decisions, political concerns, and so on.

**EDWARDS:** I wonder, Dr. Fischer, if you will discuss the civil rights movement as it has brought the educational problems to our attention. While we know that the transfer into our cities of large hordes of low-income people has put certain pressure upon the schools, if we look at the indicators—level of achievement, and so on—the school systems might be rated somewhat higher than in other years. However, since the school-desegregation decision, education has become a specific symbol, Negroes and others see it as a way up and out, as the avenue for mobility. So the civil rights movement has really played a part in this. I agree with a great many of the things you said, Dr. Fischer, but I should like to have them linked to the general civil rights movement. I wonder, also, if you intend to discuss the strategy which the civil rights movement has employed. I think that this might indicate in some way the kind of strategy we need in order to accomplish some of the things you feel should be done.

**FISCHER:** I do not know yet how that will be worked in. There is so much to be said on the subject of education, and there will be so little space in which to say it.

**GRAUBARD:** We will give you as much space as you want.

**GEERTZ:** I think there is another aspect that needs to be changed. It seems to me that the communities which support the schools need much more reliable information about what goes on inside the schools. We hear all kinds of myths about what is going on. I have two children, five and three years old; and I cannot figure out whether the schools in our community are any good. I do not quite know how to go about it. Yet it seems to me that there must be some objective information on how good the education is in various schools. There must be some way of making reliable, valid estimations. I wonder what may be done about this. I think the white fears of what is going on in integrated schools and, to some extent, the Negro notions of what is going on are often exaggerated. We need a yardstick. When we talk about universities, we have some idea about them.

**FISCHER:** I sometimes wonder whether we know any more about universities than we do about lower schools.

**GEERTZ:** Maybe not.

**FISCHER:** The fact of the matter is that there is relatively little connection between the reputation an educational institution enjoys and what that institution actually has done. I have often said that until we can find a way to determine how much change and what kind of change a particular school makes in a child from the time it begins to work with him until it turns him over to somebody else, we will not know the difference between a good school and a bad one. Ordinarily, if one goes into a community and asks where the best school is, he will almost automatically be given the name of the school in the part of town which has the highest real-estate value, the best educated parents, the homes with the greatest number of books, and so on. Most schools today get good reputations either because they are very careful about whom they admit or because they are just plain lucky about the place in which they happen to have been built. There is very little correlation between the reputation a school enjoys and what the teachers of that school actually do. I keep asking my colleagues to come up with an educational equivalent of the economists' notion of value added by manufacturing. I keep hoping we will get something of that sort some day, but we are still not close to it.

**MAYER:** First, I would like to make a very brief point with regard to what Mr. Geertz just said. I have been looking at a book on criticisms of American public schools throughout history. The thesis was that criticism has been going on all along and that it tends to reflect the attitudes of people toward changes in society rather than any knowledge of the schools at a given time.

I also want to respond to a point which Mr. Edwards made about the role of the civil rights movement in focusing attention on the schools. I can give an example of a similar point, based on my own experience. We have been conducting a survey of the nutritional status of fourth-grade and fifth-grade children in Roxbury, which is an essentially Negro area in Boston. We have been impressed to find that by and large the children in Roxbury with the worst nutritional status are the white children. It looks as though, in terms of health and nutritional status, the part of the Roxbury community which is white is more depressed on the average than the part which is Negro. But apparently nobody bothered about these white children until there was enough pressure built up in terms of problems of Negroes, so that we, among other people, went to look into it. I think very much the same thing is happening in education.

**COHEN:** I think a dreadful thing is happening in some of our major cities—I shall talk specifically about New York—with regard to the myths that are perpetrated about the public schools. Perhaps some of you read Martin Mayer's article in the *New York Times* a week or so ago. Mr. Mayer is rather sharp and, I think, given to rather abrupt judgment at times; but he did make one statement which I believe is true. He said that he has found magnificent things going on in every school that he has visited. This has also been my experience in New York. I think that the civil rights movement itself has been responsible—I can understand why—for creating a false impression of the schools. This, in turn, has resulted in flight of white people.

I visited one school which is at least 40 per cent Negro and Puerto Rican. It is one of the better elementary schools I have seen—and I lived in the suburbs for many years. How do you know that a school is good? Visit classrooms. Some teachers will even be delighted for you to teach a class on a subject in which you may be expert. You will see, if you sit in classes, that some of the teachers are really magnificent. I visited another school which is 70 per cent Negro and Puerto Rican, and I think most children are getting a wonderful education. I am appalled by the mythology which drives white people and middle-class Negroes out of the public schools. When one lives in Manhattan, middle- and upper-middle-class people are appalled that one even considers sending one's children to public schools. I think this is something we have to attack.

**GEERTZ:** My point was not really about my own kids. I was wondering whether an information program would eliminate some of this mythology. In the area in which I live, it is also very strong; and I think, as you do, that most of it is nonsense. Whatever the source of it may be—the civil rights movement or local whites—it seems to me that an information program would be a very important element in any real revision of the system.

**COHEN:** I did not mean that the civil rights movement was basically responsible for this.

**WILSON:** I would like to develop Mr. Geertz's question in a somewhat different direction. I, too, have a five-year-old boy, and I do not know whether the school I am sending him to is any good. I do not think that I could persuade the school to let me teach a course on politics. That is what they want to keep out of the schools. I would like Dr. Fischer to consider stating very explicitly what he believes we now know about the quality of education in different kinds of schools. Whether to divide the schools on racial lines or on some other basis, I leave to his judgment. And if he means what he says—if, as President of Teachers College, he really does not know how to measure what is going on in the schools—I hope he will say that, because I think this issue has to be faced squarely.

What is it we are trying to accomplish in the schools? I am a little bit troubled, because, as I listen to his prescriptions for what the school of the future ought to look like, I find much to be sympathetic with, but I also find some hard choices. He mentioned that he is in favor of decentralization, but against localism; that he wants both equal treatment and compensatory treatment; that he wants innovation, but not sudden change; that he wants responsiveness to the needs of the community, but greater immunity from political pressure. I say this not in criticism, because all human values are somehow in conflict. A conflict between liberty and order is, in fact, one of the questions we have been concerned with throughout this conference. We find incompatible values everywhere. But in picking our way through them—in trying to find the balance point—we must consider what we know and what we can learn. I think if this were stated rather boldly for the edification of those readers who assume they know what is going on in the schools, we might be able to put these choices in a perspective which I did not think they had when I first heard the presentation.

**BERRY:** It seems to me that there are some ways of finding out how well the schools are doing, if schools do not hide the information. Every time schools hide information, they are immediately suspect, even if they are doing something good. Probably most of them that hide information have something to hide, as in Chicago. No wonder you could not find out anything in Chicago; Benjamin Willis would not let anything out except some distorted gobbledygook.

There are kids graduating from certified high schools, and when these kids try to get into college, they have to take remedial reading. In Chicago, we had some kids who had been on the honor roll and a couple who were valedictorians of their classes in Jim Crow schools, and they were found to be reading at the seventh-grade level when they went to junior college. We have a variety of ways of finding out things in Chicago. For instance, we are always trying to get Negroes jobs. We send the kids, who are high-school graduates—they have to have high-school diplomas even to sweep floors now—to the friendly employers, who want to hire them, and a great many of them cannot pass the tests that have sixth-grade arithmetic in them. We are not doing a good job.

I would say that there is another measurement which probably is the most important of all: What kind of society do the graduates of our schools produce? How come we got into all this mess we are in right now if our schools in the American community have been doing anything like the job they should do? I think Mr. Cohen is wrong in saying that schools in New York are excellent.

**COHEN:** I did not say that.

**BERRY:** Since I do not work in New York, most of the information that I get on the New York schools comes from publications of the New York Board of Education. Now, the New York Board of Education admits that they have some pretty tough problems, and never have I heard a board of education say that the problems were worse than they were. I do not think that there should be an implication that the civil rights movement has given a distorted opinion about the public schools and is therefore responsible for the flight of the bumblebees, or the WASP's. Bad public schools in the Chicago area have become bigger blockbusters than the real-estate speculators. I know many hundreds of white people in Chicago who have fled bad schools but wish that they could have good integrated schools. I do not think that the civil rights movement is in any way responsible for this flight, Mr. Cohen.

**COHEN:** Mr. Berry, you encourage me, by that kind of statement, to send my children to private schools. I do not think you have given us an objective account of the Chicago schools. You cannot tell me that everything that is happening in the Chicago schools is bad any more than I can tell you that everything that is happening in the New York schools is good. But there are, beyond question, a lot of wonderful things happening. There must be, by the very nature of things.

**GRAUBARD:** I do not want to cut this conversation off, except that I would like Mr. Foley to say a few words about the argument he is going to present in his paper. We can come back to this discussion afterward.

**FOLEY:** I was asked to write about the Negro in business and the forces impeding his integration into commerce and industry. Very little has been written about this subject. Very little is known about it. Probably it has its importance not in the number of Negro businessmen—because there are not many—but in terms of the American culture which has placed so much importance on businessmen or on business values. Rather than looking at the Negro white-collar worker or at the Negro in big business, I decided to take a look at the Negro entrepreneur. Because I have had some experience in the city of Philadelphia, I decided to pay particular attention to what is going on in that city.

There are myths carried by Negro businessmen and by Negroes in general. The first one has to do with the lack of credit; the second one, with the Jewish merchant; and the third one, with the state of poverty of the Negro community. We investigated these in terms of the Negro entrepreneur in Philadelphia.

In terms of financing, it is true that the Negro businessman has a tough time getting credit, but he does not have any more trouble getting credit than any other very small businessman. The Drexel Institute made an actual count of every Negro businessman in Philadelphia. (For those of you who are interested in the field of statistics: in 1960, the Census Bureau counted only about 1,600 self-employed Negro merchants in that city. There actually are about 4,200 Negro businessmen in Philadelphia.) There are no millionaires, but there are about 10 who may have a net worth of approximately $100,000—which, in business circles, does not make them outstandingly successful, but does make them comfortable and secure. Nevertheless 10 out of 4,200 obviously is not very many. Thus, when we talk about the Negro business community, we are talking about the familiar pattern of retail trades and services—very small businessmen, who in this country just cannot get credit. Sixty per cent of *all* the small businessmen of this type in Philadelphia just do not have any banking relationships.

Banks have branches in the Negro areas of Philadelphia, and they do make loans to Negroes. They make two types of loans: consumer loans and mortgage finance loans. They make them every day and have been for years. But they do not make business loans to Negroes for the same reason that they do not make them to the same type of white businessmen anywhere else in the city of Philadelphia: business loans are very risky loans. For instance, since World War II, one branch has been making, on the average, fifty consumer loans a month to Negroes; but in its history it has made only two loans to Negro businessmen. I think it is very important to overcome the myth. It is true that Negro businessmen lack credit, but it is not because of a special prejudice peculiar to financial institutions. The banks are in the Negro area to make loans and, therefore, to make money. Very small businessmen—Negro or white—cannot get loans simply because of the risks to the banks.

With regard to the Jewish merchant, there seems to be a feeling among a lot of Negroes, particularly middle- and upper-class and educated Negroes, that the Jewish merchant is an unfair competitor. (There seems to be an even stronger feeling that there is a kind of nepotism taking place, that is, that he has inherited his business, that he will not sell to the Negro, that there is no way a Negro can break in.) We took a consumer survey on five different items. We asked eighty-four Negro housewives, in a very small, two- or three-block area in Philadelphia, where they bought these items. Seventy-five Negro housewives shopped exclusively at white grocery stores, and nine shopped exclusively at Negro grocery stores. This was also the case with drug stores. With cosmetics, there was a slight majority for white stores. With dry cleaning, there was a slight majority for Negro stores. With gasoline, there was a considerable majority for white stations.

We asked the women why they shopped in the white store or in the Negro store. The white store was always "lower priced." The Negro store was invariably "more convenient." When we compared the prices of nineteen various grocery items in white and Negro stores in that area, we found that the median prices of most of these articles were actually the same. There were four or five items which were higher priced in white stores, and three or four which were higher priced in Negro stores. This is something I am going to have to look into further. (I plan to compare many more items in many more stores and to do so (a) in terms of the quality of the merchandise, (b) in terms of not only the best Negro stores, but the second-rate and third-rate Negro stores, and (c) in terms of not only the white stores in the Negro area, but the white stores downtown and in the suburbs.) But we have found so far that the median prices in white stores are slightly higher than in Negro stores—contrary to the overwhelming impressions of the Negro housewives in the area. The Jewish merchant is not, in my judgment, an unfair competitor.

With regard to the poverty of the Negro community, we found that, although it is undoubtedly a poor area, there are many white merchants there who are making a very handsome profit.

It seemed that lack of financing, competition from Jewish merchants, and poverty were really not the reasons that there were not more Negro businessmen or that Negro businessmen were not more successful. I decided, therefore, to take a look at the history of Negro business in Philadelphia. It occurred to me that perhaps there was simply a short tradition. However, I found that there was a long tradition of Negro business in Philadelphia—as far as I know, longer than in any other city in the country. We traced Negro business back to 1789. By 1820, there were quite a few Negro businessmen in a small population of Negroes in that city. There were several who were very wealthy and very prominent in the community. Then the European immigration started in the 1820's, and the first riot between immigrants and Negroes occurred in 1829. This rioting occurred every other year or so until the Civil War. (I think most people have forgotten about these riots that occurred in the City of Brotherly Love.) In 1836, Negroes were deprived of the right to vote in Philadelphia. This apparently had its effect, because the number of Negro businesses decreased from 344 in 1838 to 111 in 1849.

One thing to remember is that Negroes in Philadelphia did not live in a ghetto until about the 1890's. They served the general populace; they competed with white merchants. There were good, solid Negro businessmen, including a handful of very successful businessmen, before the Civil War. After the war, the migration northward gradually began; but there were still only 419 Negro businessmen in Philadelphia by 1896. About this time—right around the turn of the century—two things happened. First, there was the great migration; the Southern Negroes came North. The Negroes tended to live in small pockets, and as the migration increased, these pockets grew larger and larger, and a separate retail and service trades' economy gradually developed. Second, the white reaction in the North really set in about that time, and Negroes could no longer use public or commercial accommodations. By 1915, there was really a Negro ghetto. Given the ghetto market, the number of Negro businesses increased to about 1,200. Bear in mind that in 1838 there were 344 and in 1896 there were still only 419. In a matter of less than twenty years, there was a tremendous increase in Negro businesses because the ghetto had become large enough to support a separate economy and because Negroes were denied the privileges of both public accommodations and commercial places in downtown Philadelphia. There was a small rise in the number of Negro businesses during World War I and in the 1920's, a sudden fall, continuing during the Depression (which came first and lasted longest for Negro businesses), another small rise during World War II, and a steady but not significant rise since World War II.

Why is it that only 10 of the 4,200 Negro businessmen in Philadelphia are significantly successful? We cannot say that the Negro is inherently not capable. When he started on an even keel with the white merchant in the nineteenth century, he was in every business that the white merchant was in, and he was very successful. Furthermore, I am convinced from our agency's experience with a very liberal financing program that the Negro is, indeed, capable. My agency had previously made seven loans in ten years to Negro merchants in Philadelphia. We decided to experiment with a very liberal program and to break away from conventional lending standards, and last year we made ninety-eight loans to Negro businessmen. Only four are delinquent, and none has defaulted. This convinces me that there is a real potential in the type of management training and the type of liberal financing we provided. (This is now part of Title IV of the Poverty Act, by the way.)

I do not really know why the Negro businessmen are not successful. I think the lack of success probably relates to what Mr. Turner and several others have talked about: the feeling of powerlessness. An entrepreneur has to have several qualities: thrift, self-confidence, hope, riskiness. Many Negro businessmen seem to feel: "What's the use?" They never really stick with a problem long enough. I think it is the apathy and the tendency to give up so fast—characteristics of all of the social complexes within the Negro community—which probably have had an effect on the Negro as an entrepreneur.

**PETTIGREW:** I found Mr. Foley's paper very interesting, particularly so because there has been so very little current information on this subject. I would like to add a sort of cultural explanation, which does not, I think, conflict with anything Mr. Foley said.

The Negro is primarily Southern. Two-thirds of the Negroes who are living in the North and West today were born and raised in the South, where the tradition of entrepreneurship has not been highly developed. Many things which are seen as strangely Negro in the North or in the West—everything from speech to food—are in fact quite Southern, although there is a somewhat distinctive Negro Southern style. The lack of entrepreneurship comes, I think, from the Southern background. The Puerto Rican, for example, comes from a very different kind of culture, and he is hardly settled in a new block of East Harlem when he starts opening up shops at the bottom of every tenement house.

**FOLEY:** Yes, but all immigrant groups have had problems getting credit, getting started, getting locations; yet somehow there were always considerable numbers who broke through and became outstanding businessmen.

**HANDLIN:** It is true that some broke through—but different percentages in different groups. The amount of entrepreneurship was not the same, say, among the Irish as among the Armenians.

**EDWARDS:** If we look into fields of business other than small business, we will see, I think, the promise of tremendous changes.

**BERRY:** Mr. Foley, are you going to discuss in your paper: one, the very recent breakthroughs of Negroes into management-training programs in the larger businesses and, two, any understanding you may have of why Negroes have been kept out of business schools in this nation?

**FOLEY:** I was not going to go into that, Mr. Berry. I would say, in terms of devising a strategy, that Title IV of the Poverty Act may be helpful. In our agency, we are creating small-business development centers, which bring together very successful businessmen in the community to provide management-training courses for Negroes. Then we provide liberal financing. After the person gets the management training and the financing, we provide a counselor to stick with him through the first three or four months. I think that, in terms of advice and strategy, this social interaction may be helpful. Furthermore, I think we can stimulate some success symbols and perhaps a sense of achievement earlier than any of the other poverty programs.

**PARSONS:** Is there a special tendency among Negroes to go into service businesses?

**FOLEY:** Twenty-four per cent of all the Negro businesses in Philadelphia are beauty-culture shops. Eleven per cent are barber shops, and another eleven per cent are luncheonettes.

**PARSONS:** Barbering exclusively for Negroes? I was thinking that the Jewish tendency is to specialize in merchandising and finance. The Irish tendency is to specialize in contracting—taking advantage of high-ups in city government (not necessarily corrupted). Since the Negro has acquired a special position in certain service functions, I was wondering whether there was a tendency to specialize in catering and other things of that sort.

**FOLEY:** The Philadelphia caterer is a legendary figure, you know. There were, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, about eight or ten caterers in any one year who were self-sufficient. But there are only two good catering firms in Philadelphia now.

I ought to say that it is very obvious that in ten years there will probably be fewer Negro businesses than there are today. Hopefully, with our programs, we will make the existing businesses better, more competitive businesses.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Did you count the illegal businesses?

**FOLEY:** It is kind of hard to count the illegal ones.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** Do you lend money to them?

**FOLEY:** I am afraid we probably do. We compared prices on thirteen or fourteen standard dry-cleaning items, and the Negro stores had much lower prices than the white stores. Yet the Negro housewife says she shops in Negro stores not because of the lower prices but because of the greater convenience. She says she shops in white stores because of lower prices—but, in fact, the prices are not lower. I happen to know, from confidential sources, that the dry-cleaning shops are standard numbers-game centers.

**GRAUBARD:** I would like now to ask Father Fichter to make a brief comment on his paper.

**FICHTER:** Do you mind if I take a few minutes to report the findings of a study on Negro students and the civil rights movement? In our NORC study of Negro college students, we have found that the civil rights movement is much more active in the South on the Negro private college campus than on the Negro public college campus. We have found that the students who do not participate are likely to be older, married, female, not so smart, and rather pessimistic. They get less awards and honors. They are more likely to be in natural sciences or in business study, while the leaders in the movement are more likely to be in the humanities or in the social sciences. It is interesting that three out of ten Negro college students said that they are taking no part in the civil rights movement and that they are indifferent to whether or not their schools have more whites. About two out of ten Negro students call themselves leaders or active participants in the movement.

To get very briefly to my paper on religion and race, I think there are concepts here which are related to other concepts which we have discussed, such as the higher-law principle. We often hear that we ought to improve our race relations in order to lessen the dissensions in the local community, the economic costs, or the bad image of the American society. If we can speak about *pure motives*, I suppose we ought to speak about the ethical aspect from the point of view of the organized churches. Better human relations between the races are right and just and decent and proper and good. Ideally, these ought to be the reasons for better race relations in this society.

When we look at organized religion—the churches and the synagogues—we find some rather interesting structural differences with respect to types of human relations. There are, in organized religion, analogies to the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft idea, the difference between a craft union and an industrial union, and so on. In my paper, I discussed two rather simple questions: (1) the extent to which organized religion and the churchmen are interested in *outside integration*, that is, integration in the society outside of the religious body itself, and (2) the extent to which they are interested in and active in *inside integration*. We find that in outside integration, where the personal contact is the least and where the moral consensus is the clearest, the church leaders seem to be very active, very vocal, and perhaps very successful. The real problem is the lack of practice within the church congregation of what is often preached there. We find this across the board, in all types of churches and denominations. However, there is a significant difference between the informal, friendly, fellowship type of congregation which one finds as a kind of ideal among Protestant denominations and the formal, objective-worship, large-scale, secondary type of associational organization which is found in the Catholic Church. We Catholics talk about loving each other as members of a Christian community; but it seems that as long as a parishioner goes to Mass he doesn't feel that he has to pay attention to the other worshippers around him. As a man of God I hate to say this, but as a sociologist I see that this lack of personal fraternal concern makes it easier to integrate a Catholic congregation. For example, a Catholic parish church in New Orleans should find it easier to desegregate than a Methodist, Presbyterian, or Baptist church, where members are expected to have close personal relations. As a matter of fact, these Protestant congregations are not integrating successfully, whereas Catholic Negroes and whites do go to Mass together there. Catholic Negroes and whites in New Orleans are under the same bishop, they belong to the same diocese, they can attend services at any church they want to, even though they continue to have separate territorial parishes. Essentially, of course, I am looking at this problem sociologically rather than theologically.

**COHEN:** May I ask a question? Did you not consider the influence of the religious institutions on the attitudes of white people? There are some data available, although perhaps they are not adequate.

**FICHTER:** Do you mean their influence on their own membership or on white people in general?

**COHEN:** Both.

**FICHTER:** If we look at the general influence of the religious bodies in the United States, we find, I think, that the moral impact has been tremendous, because it has reinforced the democratic notion that integration is something that ought to be achieved. We find a sort of handclasp between the political and the theological or the ethical. I think that the statements of bishops, of church councils, of Jewish organizations, of Martin Luther King, and so on have been influential in a reinforcing kind of way.

**COLES:** I want to add, without disagreeing with you, that even the integration of a Catholic Church can become complicated in parishes where the Church must contend with people like Leander Perez.

**FICHTER:** Yes. That is a good example, because here we have an excommunicated Catholic, who is the dictator of the county. Perez has so much power that the several Negro families who sent their children to the parochial school had their water, gas, and electricity turned off. They lost their jobs. Then a fire bomb was thrown on the roof of the school. The priest wanted to get a building permit to repair the roof; but Leander Perez can say who gets a permit and who does not get a permit, so the priest could not get a permit to repair the roof. He called in workers from New Orleans to repair the roof anyway; and then he could not open the school because he made the repair without a permit. This is the extent to which the political power there can interfere with a religious group struggling to implement its principles of racial integration.

**PETTIGREW:** There are interesting data of Ringer's on what white Southerners—Protestant white, Catholic white, and Jewish white—thought other white Southerners' attitudes were toward desegregation. There was general opinion that the Catholics were the most liberal. In fact, they were not. They were not very different from the Protestants. The most liberal whites in the South (as we would guess on regular sociological grounds) were the Jews. But the Jews themselves thought the Catholics were the most liberal. Catholics themselves, even though they personally were not very liberal, thought that other Catholics were. This is an interesting example of pluralistic ignorance. I think it is caused partly by the visibility—not just to Catholics, but to many others—of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. I think that structural changes are often not reflected in attitudes for quite a while.

Six years ago, I said in a book that I did not expect much from the Church. In fact, I gave up studying it because it did not seem to me to be a very serious factor in the revolution. In point of fact, I think I overgeneralized; if I had it to do over again, I would not be quite so across-the-board negative. I think that in general the Church has failed, but it has failed less than I thought it would. It seems to me that it was not just chance that the Reverend James Reeb, for example, had no parish. There are priests with parishes and ministers with congregations who participate in protest marches, but the overwhelming percentage are in one way or another marginal. They are not in the central structure of the Church. They do not have parishes, particularly big downtown parishes. They tend to be freer agents. I thought that the most interesting and significant thing of the Selma participation of the Roman Catholic Church was that bishops and cardinals began coming and began getting involved—directly intervening, despite the old tradition that one does not go into another man's diocese. (This was not particularly true of the Protestant churches, although one Episcopal bishop showed up.) I think it may be the beginning of something. Would you agree, Father Fichter?

**FICHTER:** I do not think you are using the right words. Actually, the more *local* a clergyman is, the less likely he is to be involved. You used the word *central.* The people who are in the central diocesan organization are participating. You will find men from the chancery office. You will find monsignors, and priests who are on college and university faculties. It is true, we do not have local parishes to take care of, but I don't think we can be called marginal. We are indeed freer to act, as you said. We do not have to face the local congregation which may be opposed to change in the racial pattern.

**PETTIGREW:** I did not mean geographically; I meant structurally.

**UNIDENTIFIED:** But the people who are going are the powers from the chancery, Mr. Pettigrew.

**PETTIGREW:** Yes, but that is a recent shift. That, I think, is what made the religious participation in the march from Selma to Montgomery particularly significant.

**FICHTER:** I think that there is a danger of underestimating the influence of the Negro clergymen. I think we all did, until Liston Pope started looking at the history of the Negro clergy. When we look at the leadership that came out of the Negro Church—long before 1954—we find that there was not simply conformity to the white customs. I think this began to be clear when we saw the bombing and burning of Negro churches. The white Southern segregationist no longer viewed the Negro Church as a desirable institution for keeping peace and order among Negro people. I think this point should be stressed, because we have tended all along to underrate the Negro clergy.

**PARSONS:** To the outsider, it was very striking that in the Selma episode there was public and conspicuous Catholic clerical participation, including not merely secular clergy, but regular clergy and nuns. I wonder if this was connected with some specific turn within the Church. Or was it just the point at which something, which had been going on informally, became overt?

**FICHTER:** I went down there with two priests, several other clergymen and some university professors from Chicago. One of the questions which the others asked us Catholic priests was, "Did you clear this with the chancery?" We did not, as a matter of fact, think about seeking permission from the chancery. It was just the kind of thing we felt a citizen should respond to. I think that there was a spontaneous acceptance of Martin Luther King's invitation, which was phoned all over the country on the Monday after that bloody Sunday evening. People simply decided that they were going, and it worked out all right, and *then* came the approval by the bishops. At least, that is my interpretation.

**PARSONS:** Did the nuns go on their own?

**FICHTER:** No, Cardinal Ritter got hold of a plane from some industrialist in St. Louis, and he sent them down. So the first sisters who went had clearance right from the top. I am not sure about the ones who went after that.

**HUGHES:** You spoke of the formality and secondary nature of the Mass. Max Weber said long ago that the American Protestant congregation was the prototype of the voluntary association. There are, of course, many voluntary associations which are attached to the American Catholic parish. Negro and white Catholics worship together, but are they also moving toward engaging in the same *voluntary* parochial associations? Are you going to say anything about this in your paper?

**FICHTER:** I recognize that the great obstacle to integration in the Catholic Church in the South is the separate parish. If the separate Negro parish were eliminated, everything else would have to go—the mothers' club, the youth organization, the choir, the athletic teams. These are groups made up of voluntary members within the parish, but they don't have much chance to form and join such integrated groups if the parishes themselves remain formally segregated. I do mention this in the paper as a change that ought to be made promptly.

**FEIN:** When we start looking at the people who participate in civil rights in terms of their position or the discipline that they are studying, we should remember that there was a previous selection process. Indeed, it may well be that people in certain positions are in those positions *because* they are the very kinds of people who would be attracted to both things. It is probably not that humanities makes one active in civil rights, but that if one is the kind of person who is interested in humanities, he would also be interested in civil rights. I do not know if this is true in the Protestant or Catholic religious community; but I think that, in the Jewish religious community, representation from central organizations in Selma was a function not only of the freedom of central organizations but of the fact that many persons committed to such values as civil rights tend to leave local congregations and to go to work for central organizations.

**ELLISON:** Getting back to the role of the Negro church, I wonder if it is worth saying that these churches, during the periods when there was not a lot of overt agitation, seemed to have a function not only of preserving hope, but of maintaining a certain kind of discipline on the basis of that hope. I think this is very important. Another thing which might be meaningful is that, in this particular period, some of the most alert Negro intellectuals—people who have some conception of what is going on in the total culture—happen to be Negro theologians.

**FICHTER:** There is a point that should be noted. In the South, the Negro clergymen who wanted to survive had to find a way of living with the white people in the community. But there was a time, in the 1930's and early 1940's, when Negro ministers became labor leaders.

**ELLISON:** They became Communists, too. It went right down the line. Very often the Negro leaders of the NAACP and the Urban League have been ministers. And much of the agitation within the Negro community has been seated within the Negro church.

**FLEMING:** I wanted to go back for a minute to the white clergy. I think that the mobile moral leadership which has developed lately has deflected attention from the continuing problem of the role of the local clergy in community change. Mr. Pettigrew's exacting standards are not being met and never have been met. I think it is worth noting that it is usually the business leaders in the South who make the decision that some social change is going to take place. They then look to the local religious leadership for moral validation of this step. It is certainly not an exciting kind of leadership, but it is interesting to watch the way in which it works. First, of course, there has to be some pragmatic, self-interest reason for changes. Then the laying on of hands, so to speak, by the religious leadership becomes an almost indispensible requirement. That still goes on, and I think it has been overlooked because of some of the more dramatic Selma-type developments.

**TURNER:** I agree that the role and the contribution of the theological side of the Negro church have been very important. However, I suspect that equally important is a simple sociological function. The Negro church, as an autonomous organization, under the least amount of surveillance by the majority group, was the one place where leadership could develop.

**COLES:** I have a brief comment which is relevant to this discussion. When the Negro migrant workers, whom I have seen in Belle Glade, Florida, get ready to go North in May, the lay ministers are always divided up as carefully as is the transportation. This is done so that on the road and up North no one will be without the exhilarating and, I think, consolidating and controlling services, which are sometimes held for hours at a time.

**GRAUBARD:** I would like now to turn to Mr. Kilson's paper.

**KILSON:** Rupert Emerson and I wrote this paper together. I laid out the main lines of attack in terms of Mr. Graubard's suggestions for points of reference, but Mr. Emerson and I are not altogether happy with the paper. Part of the problem is that it is hard to delineate effectively and meaningfully the ways in which the postwar international world has affected the whole problem of American race relations—changes in governmental institutions resulting from changes in the status and the position of the United States on the international scene.

We begin with the proposition that the rise of self-assertion in both Asia and Africa has been the major force in bringing about a new perception of what the role of the government should be in trying to effect new patterns in American race relations. We considered, on another level, the question of how African self-assertion in particular has affected the Negro American's identity and self-awareness—how the Negro has gained a certain inspiration from the fact that the African situation is now, after several hundred years, emerging from the position of dependency upon the white Western world. I am not sure that one can determine precisely how African self-assertion has affected the Negro protest movement, but we suggest that in some way the average Negro has gained a new lease on life.

**GRAUBARD:** Mr. Ellison, would you tell us just a little about what you are hoping to do?

**ELLISON:** I must confess that I am utterly intimidated by trying to project what is to come. Nonetheless, I shall try to work from the basis of what I think I know about how Negroes actually function in this society. Of course, we function in many, many different ways, but I would like to reexamine our relationship to the total culture. I would like to examine some of the assumptions which we bring to this intricate relationship. I would also like to point out that each minority group, including Negroes, tries to impose its sense of the total experience upon everyone else. This is nothing to be frightened of. It is something which can be very, very creative for all of us. I think Mr. Lerner was saying pretty much the same thing when he described the Jewish experience.

I think that we all owe something to the total experience. I think that each of us has no special grasp upon reality, but that each of us lives a special part of it. It is owed to the rest. We all must learn from it. We all must be able to partake of it if we would. One of the great things about this country—one of the things which, I think, is a working assumption, although we deny it—is that any American can become, at least in a symbolic way, a member of any other group. This is how we actually work. I learned to walk in a certain way because I admired Milton Lewinson, who ran a clothing store in Oklahoma City. It was not just that I liked his walk. I liked his principles. He happened to be a Jew. But I know that that much of Milton Lewinson is Ralph Ellison. I know other people from whom I have taken certain attitudes of thought, interest in certain foods, certain literature, certain myths, and so on.

I think that this is the kind of society toward which we are working, a society in which there will be no stigma attached to taking advantage of this experience, no fear that to do so is to lose status. The feeling that I have about my own group is that it represents certain human values which are unique not in a Negritude sort of way, but in an American way.

Because the group has survived, because it has maintained its sense of itself through all these years, it can be of benefit to the total society, the total culture.

**PARSONS:** Do you apply that general doctrine even across the sex line?

**ELLISON:** Yes.

**HUGHES:** You are not saying, then, that one cannot understand a group unless he is a member of it.

**ELLISON:** I do not say that at all. I think that it is like the old argument about whether a white man can play jazz. If he has a talent and has respect enough for the complexity of the music and the culture and is willing to discipline himself to it, of course, he can. Any American can learn what is going on in the rest of the culture. I think that there are certain things which are accrued over so many years and which are so subtle that no outsider can take them on. But if there is anything viable about expression and cultural or artistic form, then it is available to all the people who will pay their dues.

One of the problems with Negroes—one of my own problems—is that, for all I know about this society, so much of it is not immediately available to me. I am not asking for integration; I am talking about something else. It is that there are certain patterns—certain ways of doing things—which Negroes who wait on tables or who work as domestics in the South will know even today. But it is not so easy to know these things here and now. These things should be known not simply on the domestic level, but in terms of business. I know, for instance, Percy James, who ran a cola bottling works in Oklahoma City, years and years ago when I was a boy. For certain definite reasons, he could not expand his business. I do not know whether prejudice was the basic reason, but part of it was sheer lack of financing ability—knowing how to capitalize, knowing how to join with a bigger group without being sucked in. There are many parts of this complex American society which Negroes have been kept away from. Even most of our novelists do not give enough of a report of how life is actually lived in the country for a Negro to pick up a novel and get some clues. The constrictions and the exclusiveness very often have gotten into our perception of social complexity. I hope that this conference is a beginning step in breaking down this kind of thing.

**TURNER:** I know that we are not giving you enough time in which to present your main thesis, Mr. Ellison, but I am really not sure what your central theme is. It seems to me that there is enough ambiguity in what you are saying for it to be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, you seemed to be talking about a socialization process which ought to be going on. On the other hand, you seemed to be saying that an individual depends upon some sort of subculture. I do not think you can be saying both of these things, and I think you really ought to be saying one of them.

**ELLISON:** I defend the subculture, because I have to work out of it, because it is precious to me, because I believe it is a vital contributing part of the total culture. I do not think I want to deny that. If I did, then I would have to throw away my typewriter and become a sociologist. I also believe that the subculture and the larger culture are interrelated. I wish that we would dispense with this idea that we are begging to get *in* somewhere. The main stream is in oneself. The main stream of American literature is in me, even though I am a Negro, because I possess more of Mark Twain than many white writers do.

**GRAUBARD:** I asked both Mr. Ellison and Mr. Hughes to describe a society in which reconciliation—integration, if you will—had taken place. It was obvious that Mr. Ellison and Mr. Hughes would approach this problem from very different professional and intellectual points of view. I wanted them to reflect on what the nature of such a society would be. If they wanted to talk about the kinds of family structures which would exist or the values which would exist, that was fine. I think that, in some sense, there are two nations which coexist in our society. I wanted Mr. Hughes and Mr. Ellison to talk about a time in the future when these two nations would no longer exist, when there would really be a single nation. I gave them great freedom to treat this in any way that they wanted to. The reason I chose Mr. Hughes was that this topic was very close to a suggestion which he had made at our original planning committee meeting. (And, as you know, nothing happens to any man who does not sometimes volunteer an idea.) I chose Mr. Ellison for reasons which I am sure are obvious to all of us who have long admired his work. I wanted him to describe, in the most imaginative way, what this kind of society might be.

**HUGHES:** I have been teaching at Brandeis University for four years. The school says it is nondenominational, but we all know that the spirit and impulse are very, very Jewish. I had never before lived in an environment like that. I was brought up in a very different way. We saved money to get an education, but we were afraid to have money and also afraid we would lose it, so we did not play games with it. Since being in this very Jewish environment, I have discovered that there is a whole culture in which money is something with which one plays exciting games. But, while I think that it is wonderful and exciting, I will never learn to play that game. I think that in a way this is what Mr. Ellison was talking about. There are many facets and nuances in culture, and many of us share one or another subculture. We can understand integration, and we can all contribute to it. It is not just a question of preserving everybody's folklore. It is something much more than that.

**LERNER:** One does discover that money can be an exciting game among Jews—and I am a Jew. But the fact that I had to make this discovery at some point shows, I think, the diversity *inside* of the Jewish groups and inside of Brandeis. I suppose I have been more influenced in my own development by the nonpecuniary values—by other games which are more exciting to me.

I want to say that, unlike Mr. Turner, I am not distressed by the ambiguity of what Mr. Ellison has said. I value it. There are in the American civilization pattern some things which involve ambiguities—some things in which the ambiguity value is a high value. I think I discovered this when I was trying to determine—very imperfectly—the total civilization pattern in America. Life does not come in clear-cut alternatives and choices, and we cannot impose compulsive alternatives and choices upon it.

I want to ask Mr. Ellison a question which has to do with the African movements. In your picture of American Negro life as you have been working in it and living in it, Mr. Ellison, to what extent have these identity revolutions in Africa had an impact not just on the civil rights movement, but on the sense of selfhood of the Negro American?

ELLISON: Let me put it this way. Africa has always figured somewhere in the American Negro's sense of himself—certainly since I have been in the world. The Garvey movement reached Oklahoma, and few people sold their farms and went off. (One newsdealer in Harlem never tired of telling me that but for that Marcus Garvey, he would have inherited a farm rich with oil wells.) For the most part, however, the Garvey movement was laughed at. I think the same thing is happening now. The assertion that the emerging nations of Africa have given all the stimulus to American Negroes seems very questionable when we examine how Negroes are actually operating, what their values are, what the techniques of protest are, and so on. When I see pictures of the march in Selma, I remember photographs which appeared in a crisis around 1919, when Negroes marched up Fifth Avenue carrying signs: "Am I not a man and a brother?" And when I think of that, I think back to abolitionist times. I think that what is going on now is coming out of an American Negro tradition and an accumulated discipline which go back many, many years.

Despite the Black Muslims, the stimulus is not to get away and not to find or to construct an African life style, but to become more a part of the American society. The problem for all of us—and I guess this is why I am not communicating with Mr. Turner—is that Negroes have a style of life which we have not been able to separate from segregation. But within the group, we act out, we make certain assertions, we have certain choices, and we have various social structurings which determine to a great extent how we act and what we desire. This is what we live. When we try to articulate it, when we try to define it, all we have is sociology. And the sociology is loaded. The concepts which are brought to bear are usually based on those of white, middle-class, Protestant values and life style. I know this has been said before, but I am saying it as one who looks at life through the disciplines of fiction and through the disciplines of the humanities as they come to focus in great literature.

What is going to happen now, I suspect, is that, as the society becomes more open, Negroes are going to become very arrogant. They are going to say, "This is all right, but it is not good enough." A friend, who is a critic of jazz, said recently, "No one ever thinks of the possibility that Duke Ellington might well have been a first-rate classical composer, but that he was looking for something better." This is a shocking thing from one point of view, but not from another. For example, if I went back into the church, I would go back into a shouting Negro church. I am a fairly sophisticated man, but I think that more would be communicated to me through that form of communion than through some other.

**KILSON:** I think what I laid out in this paper on the African and American Negro is basically not very different from what Mr. Ellison has said. Mr. Emerson argued that I should try to indicate more specifically just how the postwar African self-assertion has worked its way into very concrete modes of the postwar Negro American social and political behavior. I just do not think it is possible. There are Negro Americans who do think that there has been a more direct, more complete, and more specific connection with the African reality; and they have gone to Africa to find out the why and the wherefore of it all. Those whom I have encountered—and I have encountered many Negro Americans of my postwar generation out in Africa—found very little. They found, by and large, a great deal of confusion which, indeed, can only be cleared up by coming back to what is really their culture, to what is really the situation and setting which has shaped them for whatever they may be.

**BERRY:** I have a couple of comments to make on the civil rights movement and efforts at reconciliation. I said yesterday—and still think today—that what we are trying to do is to make it all right to be nonwhite in the United States. From my experience in studying race relations in the United States, it seems to me that most Negroes do not want to stop being Negroes, but would like very much to get rid of the *encumbrance* of being a Negro in the United States. There has been a lot of weight put on this paint job we carry.

It also seems to me that in these efforts toward reconciliation, we are trying to alter a culture. And cultures, barring revolutions, alter slowly. In this country, we do not try to overthrow the old model; we tinker with it and try to make it better. We are tinkering with the old model now and trying to see if we cannot come up with a better model. It seems to me that in this new America, we will see more integration. We will see more participation in more areas on the part of Negroes. At the same time, we will have a lingering of segregation—of the Negro enclave. These things will go on simultaneously. What we will come out with in the end, I do not think anybody knows at this point. We do not have that good a crystal ball. As Negroes get more money and get better jobs, they will become more attractive people, because one way to become attractive in our society is to have some money that other people like to get from you. Ugly people can get very pretty according to American standards.

I have one last little point, something which has lingered with me for a good many years. When I was on the West Coast, I did a little survey on stereotyped notions about Negroes. There are a great many of them. Most of them are bad, but a few of them are affirmative. We tried them out on 145 Negro college graduates in the little town of Portland. We listed the stereotypes and asked these people if each was true or false. We found that the Negroes whom we had engaged in this little study overwhelmingly rejected every one of the bad stereotypes and accepted every one of the positive ones.

**PETTIGREW:** I want to mention briefly some data which I published last year in my book on the Negro American. They might be of some help to you, Mr. Kilson, because they are related to one aspect of the influence of Africa. Controlling for education, in a random sample of adults in Roxbury, we found that skin color was the best single predictor of information about Africa, positive attitudes about Africa, and the feeling that new and emerging independent countries in Africa would be of aid to the Negro Americans' struggle for rights in the United States. The darker the respondent, the more he knew about Africa and the more convinced he was that the new countries in Africa were going to be of importance to Negro America; and that was in spite of the fact that, with education again controlled for, the darker respondents tended to have less other information. Because the darker respondents were more often Southern, more often had had poorer education, etc., they were less informed about other things; but they actually knew who Nkrumah was, who Haile Selassie was, etc., at a significance level above lighter respondents. That Africa is much more important to darker Negro Americans strikes me as consistent with the psychological interpretation of the meaning of Africa, in terms of identification.

**KILSON:** It also seems consistent with what we know about the kinds of groups who tend to be attracted to the Black Nationalist definition of the resolution of the Negro problem. The most active adherents and supporters of the Garvey movement were, I think, from among lower-class Negroes, who were also invariably the darker Negroes.

**ELLISON:** Mr. Pettigrew, is there any possibility that, in answering your questions about Africa, people were put on the defensive? That is, everybody seems to feel that he has to have a "homeland." In this country, no one is free not to have a homeland. Over and over again, this idea gets into the literature. One has to have some place to feel proud of. Well, I am proud of Abbeville, South Carolina, and Oklahoma City. That is enough for me.

**KILSON:** I am not sure that is enough for many people.

**ELLISON:** In my experience, by raising the possibility of Africa as a "homeland," we give Africa an importance on the symbolic level that it does not have in the actual thinking of people. Does that make any sense?

**HUGHES:** I think it makes a great deal of sense.

**MOYNIHAN:** Remember, Mr. Ellison, that an enormous number of Sicilians became Italians in America.

**HUGHES:** When, at the age of twenty I went to Chicago and worked in a steel mill, I had to be from somewhere. I thought I was from Ohio; but since I was not from any of the places which they named, they said I must be from England. There is a great emphasis in this country on having a homeland. I had no sense of any except Ohio.

**PETTIGREW:** The Southern identity has been so strongly identified as white that if we say "a Southerner," people assume that we mean a white Southerner. I think that the term *Southerner* is only now beginning to get a little more meaning. I have suggested to Negro college students in the South the idea that they be called Southerners. It is, of course, an old white liberal trick, and they do not particularly care for the term. Nor would white segregationists like the term to apply to Negroes.

**ELLISON:** I used to pull the trick myself and talk about "us Southerners." Interestingly enough, I happened to call an elderly cousin of my father, and I asked him about my grandfather's home, a little farm in Abbeville, South Carolina. His first statement was, "That is a historical piece of property." I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "It is right close to Secessionist Avenue. It all started right around there. Your grandfather owned historical property." The ambivalence was very much there.

We make so many assumptions. We assume that Negroes are not going to love the South. I suppose it is hard to contemplate an elasticity which allows us to survive these total efforts at brutalization during various periods and still to affirm the seasons, the landscape, the birds, and so on. This is the human reaction. I do not believe that we begin to understand Negroes or white Southerners until we take this into consideration. Love of the South is glamorized by the white Southerner; but the suggestion that a Negro may love the South is usually denied as an utterly outrageous idea.

**GRAUBARD:** Gentlemen, I want to say again how very grateful I am to all of you. I urge you, if you have any further suggestions, to send them along to me. If there is anything which you feel is conspicuously absent, I shall do my best to do something about it for the *Dædalus* issue and, more importantly, for the book. My thanks to all of you and, of course, our enormous gratitude to the Carnegie Corporation for supporting us in this venture.